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AFIT/GIR/ENV/10-J01 
Abstract 
Military organizations have embedded information technology (IT) into their core 
mission processes as a means to increase operational efficiency, improve decision-
making quality, and shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle.  This IT-to-mission dependence 
can place the organizational mission at risk when an information incident (e.g., the loss or 
manipulation of a critical information resource) occurs.  Non-military organizations 
typically address this type of IT risk through an introspective, enterprise-wide focused 
risk management program that continuously identifies, prioritizes, and documents risks so 
an economical set of control measures (e.g., people, processes, technology) can be 
selected to mitigate the risks to an acceptable level.  The explicit valuation of information 
resources in terms of their ability to support the organizational mission objectives 
provides transparency and enables the creation of a continuity of operations plan and an 
incident recovery plan.  While this type of planning has proven successful in static 
environments, military missions often involve dynamically changing, time-sensitive, 
complex, coordinated operations involving multiple organizational entities.  As a 
consequence, risk mitigation efforts tend to be localized to each organizational entity 
making the enterprise-wide risk management approach to mission assurance infeasible. 
This thesis investigates the concept of mission assurance and presents a content 
analysis of existing continuity of operations elements within military and non-military 
guidance to assess the current policy landscape to highlight best practices and identify 
policy gaps in an effort to further enhance mission assurance by improving the timeliness 
and relevance of notification following an information incident.  
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MISSION ASSURANCE:  A REVIEW OF CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS 
GUIDANCE FOR APPLICATION TO CYBER INCIDENT MISSION IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (CIMIA) 
 
I.   Introduction 
“When the well's dry, we know the worth of water.” 
- Benjamin Franklin 
 
Background 
Information has become the critical asset in the operation and management of 
virtually all modern organizations (Abrams, Jajodia, & Podell, 1995; Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000; Denning, 1999; Department of the Air Force, 2006a; National Institute of 
Standards and Technology [NIST], 2008c; Pipkin, 2000).  Organizations continue to 
embed information technology (IT) into their core mission processes as a means to 
increase their operational efficiency, exploit automation, reduce response times, improve 
decision quality, minimize costs, and/or maximize investments (Alberts, 2002; Alberts, 
Garstka, & Stein, 1999; Department of Defense [DoD], 2009b; Rubin, 2010).  This is 
especially true in military environments where information is constantly being collected, 
processed, analyzed, distributed, and aggregated to support situational awareness, 
operations planning, intelligence, and command decision making (DoD, 2006b).  
However, the increasing dependence upon information and IT to produce value within 
the organization has resulted in an environment where an information incident (e.g., the 
loss or degradation of the confidentiality, availability, integrity, non-repudiation, and/or 
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authenticity of an information resource or information flow) can result in significant 
mission degradation or failure (Anderson, Choobineh, & Grimaila, 2005; Fortson & 
Grimaila, 2007; GAO, 1996; Grimaila & Fortson, 2007; Jajodia, Ammann & McCollum, 
1999; Ware, 1970).  When this incident occurs, the decision makers within organizations 
whose mission is critically dependent upon the affected information must be notified in a 
timely manner so they may take appropriate contingency actions. 
Organizations typically employ an enterprise-wide focused risk management 
program that identifies and prioritizes risks so a set of control measures (e.g., people, 
processes, technology) can be selected to mitigate the risks to an acceptable level given a 
limited budget (COBIT, 2007; COSO, 2004; I2SF, 2005; (ISC)2, 2009; ISSA, 2005; 
NIST, 2002; OCTAVE, 2004; Petrocelli, 2005).  Risk management has proven successful 
in static environments, when all stakeholders participate, and all resources critical to the 
success of the operations can be enumerated.  However, military missions often involve 
dynamically changing, distributed, time-sensitive, complex, cooperative, and coordinated 
operations involving multiple organizational units within a military service (e.g., fighter 
squadrons, aerial refueling squadrons, special operations units), between various service 
elements (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines), between various national agencies, and 
across multiple allied coalition partners (Alberts & Hayes, 2006).  Because each 
organization participating in the mission is resourced and managed as a separate entity, a 
centralized enterprise-wide risk management approach is largely infeasible.  Since the 
accuracy, conciseness, and timeliness of the information used in decision-making 
processes dramatically impacts the quality of command decisions, and hence the 
operational mission outcome, the recognition, quantification, and documentation of 
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critical information dependencies is essential for the organization to gain a true 
appreciation of its operational risk (DoD, 2010; Grimaila, Fortson, & Sutton, 2009; 
Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], 2010).  By explicitly documenting information 
dependencies and formalizing the linkage between mission operations and the underlying 
dependent information resources, mission commanders and their staff can maintain 
awareness of their critical information resources during mission operations and 
ultimately, improve situational awareness.  When an information incident occurs, the 
incident notification can recall and display context-dependent information collected when 
documenting the linkage between information dependencies and mission operations, to 
include potential contingency measures.  
 
Problem Statement 
Non-military organizations that conduct risk management are better prepared to 
deal with, and recover from, the impacts to their mission objectives resulting from 
information incidents.  For example, after the September 11, 2001, attack on the World 
Trade Center, the financial firms of Lehman Brothers and Cantor Fitzgerld were able to 
quickly resume operations because they had established backup data facilities as an 
element of their business continuity contingency plans (Moss & Townsend, 2004).  The 
complexity and distributed workflow process of organizations makes the adoption of risk 
management and assessment extremely challenging (Alberts & Dorofee, 2005).  The 
nature of this new organizational environment extends to the dynamic and decentralized 
nature of military operations and has prevented the direct adoption of a standardized, 
centralized risk management process.   
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This thesis seeks to improve mission assurance by developing a clear 
understanding of the concept of mission and mission assurance and by conducting a 
content analysis of existing continuity of operations components within military and non-
military guidance, advance one aspect of mission assurance:  improving the timeliness 
and relevance of notification following a cyber incident. 
 
Research Questions 
This research strives to answer the following research questions in order to 
advance mission assurance through improving the timeliness and relevance of cyber 
incident notifications: 
RQ1.  What is mission? 
RQ2.  What is mission assurance? 
RQ3.  What are risk management and risk assessment, and how are they used to 
support mission assurance? 
RQ4.  How are risk management and risk assessment conducted in military and 
non-military environments? 
RQ5.  What elements of continuity of operations are required to enable mission 
assurance? 
RQ6.  How are mission impacts represented through risk management and risk 
assessment to facilitate continuity of operations planning? 
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Research Scope 
Prior research and the perspective of this follow-on research are from the context 
of military operations, although non-governmental guidance is also examined to extend 
any applicable findings and best practices to military operations.  This research continues 
within the Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) stream of research 
(Table 1).   
Table 1.  Summary of CIMIA-Related AFIT Thesis Research 
Research Author 
Mission Impact/Visualization 
Enabling Network Centric Warfare Through Operational Impact Analysis Automation 
 Mission impact analysis of link state availability 
Stanley, 
2005 
Graph Theoretical Analysis of Network Centric Operations Using Multi-Layer Models 
 Proposed to extend Network Centric Operation (NCO) Common Framework  
 NCO model for holistic view of mission dependencies between entities 
Wong-
Jiru, 
2006 
A Model for Performing Mission Impact Analysis of Network Outages 
 Proposed model of network outages  
 Modeled Air Tasking Order process at Combined Air And Space Operations Center 
with the goal to prove mission database feasibility, tied to mission essential task lists 
Shaw, 
2007 
Mission Impact Analysis Visualization for Enhanced Situational Awareness 
 Examined creation of mission impact analysis visualization to enhance situational 
awareness; allow decision makers to understand the scope of mission impact when 
network outages occur 
Carroll, 
2008 
Developing Network Situational Awareness through Visualizations of Fused Intrusion 
Detection System Alerts 
 Examined theory, application, and results of using visualizations of fused alert data to 
develop network situational awareness 
Avitia, 
2008 
Damage Assessment 
A Study to Determine Damage Assessment Methods or Models on Air Force Networks 
 Highlighted lack of standardized network damage assessments 
Thiem, 
2005 
Towards the Development of a Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Methodology 
 Proposed operations-focused defensive cyber damage assessment and mission impact 
methodology 
Fortson, 
2007 
System Design 
A System Architecture for Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) 
 Proposed a system architecture for Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment 
Sorrels, 
2008 
Integration of Cyber Situational Awareness Into System Design and Development 
 Recommended improvements to acquisition policy and guidance, advocating cyber 
issues be an integral part of early system design and development 
Chase, 
2009 
Information Asset Valuation 
An Analysis of Information Asset Valuation  Qualification Methodology for Application 
with CIMIA 
 Proposed an information asset valuation schema 
Hellesen, 
2008 
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The purpose of CIMIA research is to develop a structured process to provide 
decision makers with timely notification and relevant estimation of mission impact, from 
the time an information incident is declared, until the incident is fully resolved, so 
decision makers can take appropriate contingency measures (Grimaila et al., 2009).   
Specifically, this research attempts to assist in assuring missions and the 
continuity of operations by investigating current government and non-government 
mission assurance, continuity planning, risk management, and incident management 
policies and analyzing the guidance for application towards improving the timely and 
relevant notification of decision makers following an information incident. 
 
Research Significance 
In 1996, eight national critical infrastructures were specified in Presidential 
Executive Order 13010 as being so vital that their “incapacity or destruction would have 
a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States” (p. 1).  
One of the centers of gravity included was the continuity of government.  The threats to 
the critical infrastructures were classified into two categories:  physical and cyber threats 
(Executive Order No. 13010, 1996).   
Cyber threats continue to escalate and cyberspace has grown to be a contested 
domain (Baker, Waterman, & Ivanov, 2009).  Simultaneously, the mission dependency 
on cyber assets continue to rise (Lyle, 2009; Millette, 2010).  Coupling the expanding 
threats and cyber dependencies increases the potential for cyber-related risks to 
potentially disrupt operations.  The recently declassified 2010 Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) identifies cybersecurity as one of the most serious 
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economic and national security challenges the United States faces, and that the nation is 
inadequately prepared to deal with these challenges (CNCI, 2010).  The acknowledged 
importance of mission to cyberspace dependency is further identified in the United States 
Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace.  One of the objectives stated in the blueprint is “to 
ensure mission success by maximizing cyber continuity, availability, and resilience” (Air 
Force Space Command, 2009, p. 11). This speaks to the seriousness and noted contested 
nature of cyberspace.  However, initiatives such as improved cyberspace situational 
awareness, security, and information assurance efforts across the cyber infrastructure may 
elevate resiliency and improve operational capabilities.   
To ensure Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) availability, the DoD uses the 
DCI Program (DCIP), a risk management program (DoD, 2008).  It is DoD policy to 
conduct assessments of the threats and hazards, vulnerability, and risk to DoD-owned 
DCI and the inter- and intra-dependencies needed to accomplish required DoD missions, 
with the support of the appropriate DoD Components and Defense Infrastructure Sector 
Lead Agents.  These activities are the major elements of the DCIP and the actions should 
support incident management.  Also, the DCIP must coequally complement other DoD 
programs, functions, and activities contributing to mission assurance through risk 
management (DoD, 2010).   
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report further recognized risk 
management as central to effective decision-making and is vital to mission success, 
although it can be challenging to accomplish.  The QDR noted the need for non-
quantitative methods (informed judgments, expert opinions, scenarios) to improve the 
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military complexity associated with the identification, categorization, and aggregation of 
operational risk (QDR, 2010).  
Recognizing the increasingly contested nature of cyberspace, the need to enhance 
awareness of cyber dependencies, and the need for non-quantitative risk assessment 
measures, the research presented in this thesis seeks to enhance mission assurance by 
surveying mission assurance, continuity planning, risk management, and incident 
management policies and guidance, and analyzing the results for application towards 
improving the timely and relevant notification of decision makers following an 
information incident. 
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis includes five chapters and supporting information found in the 
appendices.  This chapter provided an introduction, an overview to the research 
questions, and the motivation to complete the research.  Chapter 2 provides a more 
detailed review of the existing literature and reviews the concepts and definitions of 
mission, mission assurance, risk management, risk assessment, continuity of operations 
planning, and contingency planning in order to provide the background necessary to 
identify key terms and concepts used in the content analysis.  Chapter 3 discusses the 
content analysis research methodology and explains how this research was designed.  
Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the results of the content analysis.  Chapter 5 includes 
further discussion and recommendations, along with research limitations and future 
research ideas.  Readers can find additional supporting information for this research in 
the back of this report under the appendices, bibliography, and researcher’s vita.  
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II.  Literature Review 
“Don't be afraid to see what you see.”  
                                                             - President Ronald Reagan 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, a literature review is presented containing topics relevant to this 
research effort.  Specifically, this chapter discusses aspects of mission, mission 
assurance, risk management, risk assessment, continuity of operations, and contingency 
planning that are relevant to address the stated research problems. 
 
Mission 
Military missions often involve dynamically changing, time-sensitive, 
coordinated operations involving multiple organizations.  As such, missions are often 
complex.  This complexity seems to extend to the definition of mission as the term is not 
necessarily well defined across the defense community (Donley, 1995).  The term 
“mission” is frequently written in publications; but, mission is rarely defined within the 
same publications.  For example, this is evidenced in the publication that prescribes and 
describes Air Force Mission Directives (AFMD), Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-101, 
Format and Content of Mission Directives, 2003.  AFMDs provide guidance about an 
organization's mission and describes what an organization does (Department of the Air 
Force, 2003).  However, mission is not defined within the instruction itself.  The assumed 
meaning of mission and the complexity of missions causes confusion about the term 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2005).  
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Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 2001, defined mission as: 
1.  The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to 
be taken and the reason therefore.  
2.  In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a 
duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.  
3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular 
task.  (p. 349) 
 
 Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley analyzed the use of 
the term mission in Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff reports, JP 1-02, and Title 10 of the 
United States Code and defined missions similar to JP 1-02; however, Donley further 
stated a mission is “considered generally as integrating many activities around a common 
theme or purpose” (1995, p. 87).  This integration of activities, and usually the 
combination of organizational entities performing the activities, leads to the complex 
nature of missions.  Nonetheless, the accepted definitions of mission appear to be tasked 
focused.  As specified in Title 10, Chapter 2, of the United States Code, the Secretary of 
the DoD must include a description of the major military missions to Congress each year. 
Additionally, it is important to differentiate mission from roles (broad, enduring 
purposes) and functions (powers, duties, and responsibilities) (Donley, 1995).  DoD 
Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 
Components, 2002, prescribes three functions of the DoD.   
 In the keystone publication for joint operation planning doctrine, missions are 
linked to tasks through objectives and effects.  Three types of tasks are defined:  
specified, implied, and essential.  A specified task is specifically assigned by higher 
headquarters.  An implied task is not directed by higher headquarters; however, an 
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implied task is derived during mission analysis as a task that must performed to 
accomplish a specified task or the mission.  An essential task is either a specified or 
implied task that must be performed to accomplish the mission (DoD, 2006c).  The 
relationship between missions, operations (military action), and tasks are shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1.  Relationship of Missions, Operations, and Tasks (DoD, 2002c, p. A-8) 
 To communicate mission requirements, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) 
serves as a common language and reference system to communicate a joint mission 
essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission essential task list (AMETL).  JMETLs are 
developed to identify the required capabilities for mission success (DoD, 2002c).  To 
further identify Air Force unique tasks, the Air Force Universal Task List (AFUTL) 
incorporates Air Force-specific tasks and extends the UJTL to show hierarchy.  There is 
an effort underway to further extend the METL construct and create Air Force core unit 
METLs.  The core unit METLs would describe the essential tasks in a unit’s mission, 
would include mission essential tasks from either the UJTL or the AFUTL, and must 
include specific conditions, measures, and criteria.  In effect, this expanded METLs 
hierarchy would provide the basis for linking capabilities to tasks (AF/A3O, 2008).     
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Mission Assurance 
With a common understanding of mission, and the posited linkage to tasks, what 
does it mean to assure a mission?  DoD Directive 3020.40, DoD Policy and 
Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 2010, defines mission assurance as: 
A process to ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed in 
accordance with the intended purpose or plan.  It is a summation of the 
activities and measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all 
supporting infrastructures are available to the Department of Defense to 
carry out the National Military Strategy. It links numerous risk 
management program activities and security-related functions, such as 
force protection; antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection; IA; 
continuity of operations; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
high explosive defense; readiness; and installation preparedness to create 
the synergy required for the Department of Defense to mobilize, deploy, 
support, and sustain military operations throughout the continuum of 
operations. (2010, p. 19) 
 
In this definition, risk management activities are essential to the ability to provide 
mission assurance through the continuity of operations.  Also, although supporting 
infrastructures are not defined, the association of both physical and cyber infrastructures 
essential to planning and executing military operations is contained within the definition 
of the Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (Department of the Air Force, 2005a).   
 In a recent draft of cyberspace operations doctrine, a distinct cyberspace mission 
assurance definition was proposed.  Mission assurance (cyberspace) is defined in the 
draft doctrine document as the “measures required to accomplish essential objectives of 
missions in a contested environment. Mission assurance entails prioritizing mission 
essential functions, mapping mission dependence on cyberspace, identifying 
vulnerabilities, and mitigating risk of known vulnerabilities” (Department of the Air 
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Force, 2010, p. 56).  The proposed definition highlights the need for connecting mission 
dependencies to cyberspace, an identification step needed for risk assessment that is not 
explicitly defined in general risk management frameworks.  
 To ensure assigned tasks or duties can be performed as intended to assure the 
mission, as mission assurance strategy must be employed.  Through a risk management 
program, operational risks may be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level.  
However, given the DoD hosts 7 million computers and more than 15,000 area networks, 
and the DoD networks are probed thousands of times per day with an ever increasing 
frequency and sophistication (Daniel, 2010), it is likely impossible to reduce all cyber-
related risks to zero or an acceptable level (Department of the Air Force, 2005a; NIST, 
2009).  Rosenzweig (2009) noted even when it is feasible to eliminate risk it may be 
impractical because the risks are systemic and resistant to traditional cost‐benefit 
analysis. Furthermore, “in a world where the identity of the threat cannot be determined 
with confidence, mitigation of that threat is problematic” (Rosenzweig, 2009, p. 2).   
Acknowledging these challenges, as well as the difficulty of conducting risk 
management across an enterprise as large and complex as the DoD, a strategy and 
processes must employed to resolve risks as they happen.  Resolving problems as they 
occur (Figure 2) is a central focus area for CIMIA, specifically the timely and relevant 
notification on cyber incidents. 
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Figure 2.  Mission Assurance Strategy (Adapted from Alberts & Dorofee, 2005, p. 14) 
 
Mission Assurance:  Existing Situational Awareness Tools and Techniques 
To help communicate and mitigate problems as they are identified during 
operations, efforts are reviewed to improve mission assurance by enhancing situational 
awareness of mission critical resources.  The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) funded research in the area of mission assurance and survivability and 
their efforts yielded several significant publications related to these objectives (Bickford, 
Kreitz, van Renesse, & Constable, 2001; D’Amico & Salas, 2003; Goldman, 
Heimerdinger, Harp, Geib, Thomas, & Carter, 2001; Melliar-Smith, Moser, Kalogeraki, 
& Narasimhan, 2000; Moore, Kewley, Parks, & Tinnel, 2001; Tinnel, Saydjari, & 
Haines, 2003).  The research focused on defending mission-critical information systems 
from coordinated attacks through the development of novel sensors, improved methods 
for alert correlation and reduction, visual attack correlation, and mission impact 
assessment and response (Tinnel et al., 2003).  The mission impact assessment research 
attempted to formalize the core problem of recognizing critical resource dependencies for 
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the purposes of assurning the mission.  Some of the more salient publications are 
reviewed and a brief commentary on the tool’s strengths and weaknesses is provided. 
 
Secure Scope 
D’Amico and Salas (2003) prototyped several mission impact visual displays and 
incorporated the most promising ones into a visualization software architecture called 
Secure Scope that can be deployed in an operational setting.  The mission impact 
visualization system was designed to act as a front end to a relational database populated 
with the resources and tasks required to complete a mission.  The tool provided a quick 
means to visualize impacted resources with a linkage to the tasks affected by an incident.  
The tool visually represents "bottom-up" mission impact analyses showing the mission 
effect of a specific breach on a specific asset, as well as "top down" analyses showing 
cyber assets that must be secured for the achievement of certain mission-critical tasks. 
 
Master Caution Panel (MCP) 
The MCP system was developed to provide an improved situational awareness of 
the potential impacts on the mission operations of an Air Operations Center (AOC) as a 
function of system and network availability (Jos & Culbertson, 2006).  The MCP requires 
the AOC mission is first decomposed into its’ subordinate mission tasks and the systems 
and network components that can impact these tasks are explicitly identified.  A database 
is populated with this information and an explicit representation of the relationship 
between the networking infrastructure components and the operational tasks.  The 
operational tasks are annotated with their percieved criticality and contingency plans are 
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also entered into the system to provide advice to users when a loss of availability of 
network resource occurs.  The database, combined with a network status monitor, 
provides the ability to present enhanced situational awareness to users within the AOC.  
The MCP provided great value to the operational community because it enabled the 
monitoring of mission critical tasks as a function of the status of the availability of the 
underlying systems and networks on which it depended.  In 2004, the MCP was 
incorporated as a third party enhancement to the Theater Battle Management Core 
System baseline.  However, implementing MCP still required custom programming and 
worked only on traditional IP networks.  The tool also requires manual decomposition of 
the mission tasks and manual identification of the underlying dependent systems and 
networks.  Finally, MCP focuses only on resources within the AOC and requires a 
centralized representation of all of the organizations functions within a single server.   
 
Command and Control Resource Management System (C2RMS) 
Following the success of MCP, it was clear that a next generation of situational 
awareness systems needed to be developed to overcome some of the barriers identified in 
deployment of the MCP.  Specifically, C2RMS extended the MCP by providing more 
flexible and extendable monitoring capabilities, expanding to next generation protocols 
such as those found in airborne networks, and providing a Monitor Development Kit 
(MDK) which greatly simplified deployment and customization of instances of C2RMS.  
This enabled virtually anyone to instrument their organization with the monitiors 
necessary to collect status from local and remote network resources and to create tailored 
displays which fuse information from multiple resources.  Jos and Cubertson (2006) 
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provided an example which demonstrates the value to commanders when fusing 
information from multiple sources, including environmental information such as current 
weather, in a centralized situational view which portrayed the readiness and capability of 
the aircraft fleet.  While the mission tasks and underlying resources still had to be 
manually identified, the burden of creating monitoring agents and user interface 
capabilities were greatly reduced by the development of the MDK.  Further, multiple 
instances of C2RMS could be created and communication capabilities were provided to 
allow communication between these instances to improve situational awareness. 
 
Mission Service Automation Architecture (MSAA) 
Stanley, Mills, Raines, and Baldwin (2005) introduced the MSAA.  The 
architecture correlates information flows to operational capabilities providing the ability 
to prioritize network traffic.  MSAA incorporates the concept of IT service codes as 
defined in the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) as a means to align 
IT services with customer mission requirements.  The MSAA requires a configuration 
management database and collection of independent software agents to provide an 
understanding of the purpose of information flows.  Data tagging is used to provide the 
needed visibility by inserting IT service management codes into the headers of network 
packets.  When an operational unit requires network services, the network operations 
personnel are tasked with assigning a unique service code to the requirement and 
populating the configuration management database with a listing of all of the resources 
needed to fullfill the requirements and the operational mission processes or capabilities 
supported.  In aggregate, this information can be viewed as a Service Level Agreement 
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(SLA) between the operational organization and the network personnel.  A key benefit of 
the MSAA is that it allows network operations personnel to quickly identify the impact 
resulting from network traffic that is delayed or degraded following an network outage.  
While MSAA has not been operationalized yet, it is clear tagging information flows with 
service codes would enable network personnel to quickly identify the organizations that 
are impacted when a network outage occurs and provdes the ability to easily visualize the 
importance of bulk network traffic.  However, MSAA places a burden on network 
operations personnel to identify the operational mission processes supported in the SLA, 
requires manual identfiication of the underlying dependent systems and networks, 
requires a centralized representation of all of the organizations functions within a single 
server, and is susceptable to adversaries gaining an understanding the criticiality of 
network flows over time because it encodes service codes into the network traffic. 
 
Camus: Automatically Mapping Cyber Assets to Missions and Users 
 Most recently, Goodall, D’Amico, and Kopylec (2009) provides further, potential 
advancement to cyber situational management thorough a proposed method for 
automated mapping of Cyber Assets to Missions and Users (Camus).  The researchers 
developed methods for aggregating data from multiple, common network feeds, coupled 
with an ontology-based system to populate a model.  This method allows the system to 
map cyber assets to the users who rely on the assets, to the mission the assets support, 
and to the services they provide.  Additionally, the Campus approach may assist in 
collecting and automating information assets, going beyond just cyber hardware 
monitoring. 
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Risk Management  
Before discussing risk management and risk assessment, a clear understanding of 
the term risk is required.  Risk is defined in JP 1-02 as the “probability and severity of 
loss linked to hazards” (DoD, 2001, p. 470).  By international standards, risk is 
parsimoniously defined as an “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2009b, p. 1).  In 
the 2010 QDR, four risk categories are established and have been used since 2001:  
operational risk (ability to execute strategy); force management risk (ability to recruit, 
retain, train, educate, and equip the force); institutional risk (capacity of management and 
business practices); and future challenges risk (capacity to execute future missions).   
A general expression of risk is a function of probability, severity, and exposure, 
and may be written as:  risk = ƒ(P, S, E) (Department of the Air Force, 2000b).  However, 
for information security risks, probability is a more complex and imprecise variable than 
is normally found in other risk management domains.  Because risk factors are constantly 
changing, probability is highly subjective in the absence of objective data (OCTAVE, 
2004).  A subjective view of probability can refine the understanding of threat by 
focusing on information about motives, means, opportunities, historical data, and any 
unusual conditions of risk (i.e., non-quantitative assessments) to bear on risk management 
decisions, in support of the 2010 QDR to find qualitative means to improve the military 
complexity associated with the identification, categorization, and aggregation of risk. 
Managing risk includes the process of coordinated activities (identifying, 
assessing) to direct and control risks (DoD, 2001; ISO, 2009b).  DoD extends the 
definition and stated the process should incorporate a cost/mission benefit assessment 
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(DoD, 2001).  Risk management therefore provides a documented, structured, and 
transparent process to identify and mitigate risks (Gerber & von Solms, 2005).    
Since all activities involve risk and organizations manage risk to some degree, 
ISO 31000, Risk management — Principles and guidelines, 2009, established 11 
principles to be satisfied to make risk management effective; the principles are: 
Risk management… 
 creates and protects value 
 is an integral part of all organizational processes 
 is part of decision making 
 explicitly addresses uncertainty 
 is systematic, structured and timely 
 is based on the best available information 
 is tailored 
 takes human and cultural factors into account 
 is transparent and inclusive 
 is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change 
 facilitates continual improvement of the organization. (pp. 7-8) 
 
These principles support an overall risk management framework.  The purpose of a 
framework is to integrate the process for managing risk into the organization's overall 
governance, strategy and planning, management, reporting processes, policies, values, 
and culture (ISO, 2009a).  A risk management process then operates within the construct 
of the risk management framework.  In ISO 31000 (2009), the fundamental elements of 
the risk management process are stated as:  communication and consultation; establishing 
the context (determination of risk assessment objectives and risk criteria); risk assessment 
(comprising of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation); risk treatment; and 
monitoring and review. 
In the context of infrastructure risk, the Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) 
Program supports a risk management process that seeks to ensure DCI availability.  DCI 
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availability focuses on defense critical assets.   The DCI Program risk management 
process is comprised of a risk assessment component that identifies critical assets and 
infrastructure interdependencies supporting DoD missions.  To complete the risk 
assessment, applicable follow-on threat and vulnerability assessments are conducted on 
the applicable critical assets.  When properly executed, the implemented risk assessment 
procedures of critical assets enable informed risk management decisions, leading to an 
appropriate risk response.  The risk response component ensures limited resources are 
optimally allocated toward those assets deemed important to overall mission success. 
These activities comprise the major elements of DCIP risk management (DoD, 2008). 
Specific to information systems, the DoD Information Assurance Certification 
and Accreditation Process is the DoD process to ensure risk management is applied to 
information systems (DoD, 2007).  However, NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk 
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, recognized “the principal goal 
of the risk management process should be to protect the organization and its ability to 
perform their mission, not just its IT assets” (NIST, 2002).   
Additionally, the Air Force’s effort to institutionalize risk management is through 
the concept of Operational Risk Management (ORM).  ORM is a six-step process of 
identifying hazards, assessing risk, analyzing risk control options and measures, making 
control decisions, implementing risk controls, and supervising/reviewing the activity 
(Department of the Air Force, 2000a).  ORM information and training may be located on 
the Risk Management Information System web site 
(https://rmis.kirtland.af.mil/default.asp) hosted by the Air Force Safety Center, Kirtland 
Air Force Base.  The site also includes the Total Risk Assessment and Control System, a 
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tool designed to help users apply ORM to assess and control risks affecting missions, 
operations, systems, and decisions (Air Force Safety Center, 2005).   
 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is generically the process of identifying, characterizing, and 
understanding risk.  The roots of modern risk assessment can be traced to the nuclear 
power industry, where risk assessment methodologies were developed to analyze the 
operations of the new nuclear power facilities. These methodologies centered on 
fault/event trees used to capture all possible plant failure modes and display them visually 
(Soo Hoo, 2000).   
The DoD defines risk assessment simply as the identification and assessment of 
hazards, the first two steps of the DoD risk management process (DoD, 2001).  Similarly, 
the international standards community defines risk assessment as the process of risk 
identification (finding, recognizing, and describing risk), risk analysis (comprehending 
nature of risk and to determining level of risk), and risk evaluation (analyzing result of 
risk analysis with risk criteria (ISO, 2009b). 
A general international standard on the selection and application of techniques for 
risk assessments was published in support of ISO 31000 (risk management). The 
standard, IEC/ISO 31010, is general in nature and, as such, provided guidance applicable 
to many types of industries and systems.  Of particular interest in this standard is the 
information provided on 31 tools and techniques used for risk assessment.  The standard 
provided the following detailed information for each of the risk assessment techniques 
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featured:  overview, use, inputs, process, outputs, strengths, and limitations (IEC/ISO, 
2009). 
In respect to system security management, two ISO documents are noteworthy. 
ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology — Security techniques — Information security 
management systems — Requirements, 2005, identified the requirements for an 
Information Security Management System (ISMS).  The ISMS is based on an operational 
risk approach, to establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain, and improve 
information security.  ISO/IEC 27002, Information technology — Security techniques — 
Code of practice for information security management, 2005, specified control objectives 
(what is to be achieved) and controls (applied to the control objective) intended to be 
implemented to meet the requirements identified by a risk assessment.  
In concert with vulnerability and threat information, security categories are also 
used in assessing the risk to an organization (NIST, 2004b).  Security categories have 
been established for information and information systems in FIPS Publication 199, 
Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, 
2004.  The three security categories are:  confidentiality (preventing unauthorized 
disclosure of information), integrity (preventing unauthorized modification or destruction 
of information), and availability (preventing disruption of access to or use of 
information).  Non-repudiation and authenticity are included as elements of integrity 
(NIST, 2004b).  Furthermore, NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide 
for Information Technology Systems, 2002, described the impacts of the loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability.  For example, the loss of confidentiality could 
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result in the “loss of public confidence, embarrassment, or legal action against the 
organization” (NIST, 2002, p. 22). 
In addition to the categories of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, Parker 
(2007) posited an additional category described as “Other harmful actions” (p. 5).  
Included in this category are actions such as:  failure to support security, annoy, and 
waste time or effort (Parker, 2007).   
 
Continuity of Operations 
At least since the Cold War era, government organizations have had a 
requirement to continuously conduct their operations, regardless of any disruptions the 
organizations may face.  However, recent events such as the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 against the United States and the cyber attacks against Estonia have 
reemphasized the need to ensure continuity of operations after a disaster or extended 
disruption.  All organizations should be prepared to respond to a wide range of potential 
emergencies.   
At the national level, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20, National 
Continuity Policy, 2007, established a comprehensive national policy on the continuity of 
Federal Government structures and operations.  In the directive, the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) was designated as the 
National Continuity Coordinator.  It is the policy of the United States to maintain a 
comprehensive and effective continuity capability, consisting of Continuity of Operations 
and Continuity of Government programs (Homeland Security, 2008).   
Within the DoD, continuity of operations (COOP) is defined as: 
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The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, 
or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying 
out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of 
the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed 
by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the 
commander. (DoD, 2001, p. 118) 
 
DoD documents also described continuity of government (COG) similarly, with 
the emphasis on the capability to continue minimum essential responsibilities (DoD, 
2009a).  The DoD mandated the following COOP guidance (DoD, 2009a): 
 Components ensure continuation of current approved DoD and DoD 
Component mission essential functions under all circumstances across the 
spectrum of threats 
 Continuity requirements shall be incorporated into the daily and routine 
operations of all DoD Components 
 DoD continuity planning and programming must: 
- Be based on the assumption no warning of attack or event will be received 
- Ensure the performance of MEFs during any emergency for a period of up 
to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed 
- Be based on risk-management assessments to ensure that appropriate 
operational readiness decisions consider the probability of an attack or 
incident and its consequences 
- Emphasize the permanent and routine geographic distribution of leadership, 
staff, and infrastructure  
- Maximize the use of technological solutions to provide information to 
leaders and other users, facilitate decision making, maintain situational 
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awareness, and issue orders and direction.  Technology, information systems 
and networks must be interoperable, robust, reliable, and resilient 
- Integrate critical infrastructure protection, information assurance, operations 
security, and defense crisis management requirements, as appropriate 
Cerullo and Cerullo (2004) recommended the business continuity planning 
process should address three objectives:  identifying major risks, developing a plan to 
mitigate or reduce the impact of the risks, and testing the plan for effectiveness.  In 
comparison, Air Force guidance mandated the following minimal continuity of 
operations program elements: 
 Program guidance 
 Planning and procedures, to include essential functions, delegation of 
authority, orders of succession, alternate operating facilities, interoperable 
communications, vital records and databases, and human capital 
 Test, training and exercises to assess and validate plans, policies, procedures 
 Designation of an organization as the office of primary responsibility and 
appoint a continuity planning officer (Department of the Air Force, 2005a) 
The key elements necessary to maintain continuity and enhance decision-making 
are command and control, through the organization of appropriate personnel, 
communication and computers, and information. (Department of the Air Force, 2005a) 
 
Contingency Planning 
At the strategic level, contingency planning is used to develop operations plans 
for a broad range of contingencies.  The planning is based on requirements in the 
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Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).  The CPG fulfills the statutory requirement of 
the Secretary of Defense to publish policy annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff for contingency planning. The CPG focuses the guidance given in the National 
Security Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance (DoD, 2001).  A contingency is 
defined as “a situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, 
terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US 
interests” (DoD, 2001, p. 117).   
At the operational and strategic levels, contingency planning appears to be used 
interchangeably with continuity planning, or minimally, contingency planning is devised 
for a specific situation when things could go wrong and is included as an element of 
continuity planning.   
 For example, in a DoD Inspector General (IG) Report on Contingency Planning 
for DoD Mission-Critical Information Systems, the report stated: 
The Federal Information Security Management Act requires that Federal 
agency information security programs provide, among other things, 
plans and procedures for the continuity of operations for agency 
information systems to continue operations during a disruptive or 
catastrophic event. This is called contingency planning.  (DoD Inspector 
General, 2008, p. 5) 
 
 Furthermore, as it is relevant to the research topic, the results of the report speak 
to the lack of systems preparedness the DoD may face in the event of any system 
disruptions.  Using the DoD Information Technology Portfolio Repository (DITPR) as 
the primary information source, the DoD IG reported that of 436 mission-critical 
information systems requiring information assurance certification and accreditation: 
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 264 systems (61 percent) lacked a contingency plan or their owners could not 
provide evidence of a plan 
 358 systems (82 percent) had contingency plans that had not been tested or for 
which their owners could not provide evidence of testing 
 410 systems (94 percent) had incorrect testing information reported in DITPR 
 37 systems (8 percent) had incorrect contingency plan information in DITPR 
As a result, DoD mission-critical systems may not be able to sustain warfighter 
operations during a disruptive or catastrophic event.  Furthermore, the reported stated the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief 
Information Officer did not implement management controls by establishing a 
comprehensive and overarching contingency planning policy (DoD Inspector General, 
2008).   Although the results of this audit cannot be extrapolated to other categories of 
systems, the results may provide an indication of the level of preparedness to continue or 
restore mission-critical systems in the event of a disruption.   
 
Relevant Research Categories and Topics  
Furthermore, as part of the literature review, key topics and subtopics were 
captured, and subsequently iteratively refined, for use in investigating continuity of 
operations related concepts in selected guidance documents (Appendix A).  The topics 
were grouped into four overall categories.  The subtopics were included to further clarify 
the topics; however, the list of subtopics was not meant to be all inclusive.  
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III. Research Methodology 
“No-one is so brave that he is not disturbed by something unexpected.” 
      - Julius Caesar 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology employed to review United States 
Government and non-United States government guidance to discover existing risk 
management frameworks and identify common elements needed for continuity of 
operations planning.  The chapter describes the design of the research study, details the 
research approach, discusses the content analysis methodology, explains the process for 
data collection and analysis, and lastly, discusses the limitations of the study. 
 
Methodology and Research Strategy 
Qualitative research is an “umbrella term” covering many different research 
strategies (Roberts, 2004, p.11).  As such, determining the best research strategy to 
employ can be challenging; however, for this research a pure naturalistic-qualitative 
strategy was used from Patton’s 2002 “Integrated Model of Measurement, Design, and 
Analysis” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  This strategy began with a naturalistic inquiry, 
in this case, “What written guidance is available identifying how to plan for and assure 
mission continuity after an incident?”  A content analysis was then performed to 
investigate the inquiry. 
Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words 
or concepts within texts, or sets of texts.  Content analysis further provides a systematic 
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and replicable technique for condensing the text into content categories (Berelson, 1952; 
Krippendorff, 2004).  This type of analysis is used by the researcher to quantify and 
analyze the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make 
inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer, the audience, the culture, and 
time frame in that they were written.  To conduct a content analysis on any such text, the 
text is coded, or broken down, into manageable categories on a variety of levels—word, 
word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme—and then examined using one of content 
analysis' basic methods:  conceptual analysis or relational analysis (CSU, 2010).   
Conceptual analysis establishes the existence and frequency of concepts, most 
often represented by words of phrases, in a text.  In contrast, relational analysis goes one 
step further by examining the relationships among concepts in a text.  Either of these 
analysis approaches can be applied to examine any piece of writing or occurrence of 
recorded communication and is used in marketing and media studies, to literature and 
rhetoric, ethnography and cultural studies, gender and age issues, sociology and political 
science, psychology and cognitive science, and many other fields of inquiry.   In this 
study, a conceptual content analysis will primarily be used to “identify the intentions, 
focus or communication trends of an individual, group or institution” (Berelson, 1952). 
The use of conceptual analysis requires the researcher first clearly develop their 
research questions and to select the documents to be analyzed.  Next, the researcher must 
selectively reduce the texts to a set of categories consisting of a word, set of words or 
phrases.  This enables the researcher to code specific words or patterns that are indicative 
of the research question.  Once chosen, the texts must be coded into content categories.  
The process of coding is basically one of selective reduction (CSU, 2010). 
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Methodology Approach 
Based on the selected conceptual content analysis methodology, an approach for 
the review of the United States government and non-United States government guidance 
needed to be designed.    
 
United States Government Publications 
There are thousands of DoD and Air Force policies.  As of 26 March 2010, there 
were 1,352 DoD issuances, consisting of DoD Directives, Instructions, Publications, 
Directive-Type Memorandums, and Administrative Instructions listed on the DoD 
issuances web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/).  The issuances were categorized 
into eight major subject groups.  As of 24 March 2010, there were 1,827 Air Force 
departmental publications categorized into 38 different publication series.  The Air Force 
documents included in the publication series were Air Force departmental documents, 
such as Air Force Policy Directives (AFPD), Instructions (AFI), Manuals (AFMAN), and 
Pamphlets (AFPAM) hosted on the Air Force e-Publishing web site (http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/), the principal web source for accessing, viewing, and downloading 
electronic products.   
To first narrow the body of information for the content analysis, the DoD issuance 
and Air Force departmental publication series were reviewed to determine what series of 
publications would be examined.  To determine the DoD issuance series to investigate, 
the DoD Issuance Numbering System schema was reviewed.  Based on the DoD major 
 
 
 
32 
 
subject groups and subgroups numbering system for issuances (DoD, n.d.), two major 
subject groups were selected for investigation.  The two subject groups were: 
 Plans and Operations, Research and Development, Intelligence, and Computer 
Language (Series 3000 issuances) 
 Information Management/Information Technology (Series 8000 issuances) 
Within these two DoD major subject groups, four subgroups were selected for review; 
they were: 
 Crisis Management and Emergency Preparedness (Series 3020 issuances) 
 Mission and Functional Processes (Series 8200-8299 issuances) 
 Vulnerability Management (Series 8531 issuances) 
 Critical Infrastructure Protection (Series 8590 issuances) 
To determine what series of Air Force publications to initially review, the publication 
series descriptions in AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 2006, were 
reviewed.  Six Air Force publication series were selected for review (Appendix B).   
Next, within each of series selected, each DoD issuance and departmental Air 
Force publication was briefly assessed to determine if the publication would be included 
in the content analysis sample.  Specifically, the title and opening paragraph (purpose 
statement) of each publication was reviewed to decide if the publication addressed any of 
the research topics identified in Appendix A.   
An a priori approach to coding was taken; as such, the topic categories were 
established prior to the analysis.  As previously discussed, the list of topics and subtopics 
was constructed based on the key terms identified during periphery research and the 
literature review conducted in Chapter 2.  Additionally, the topics were agreed upon 
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between the researcher and a PhD professor closely familiar with the area of research, as 
well as reviewed by a handful of other professors and graduate students investigating 
other elements of this stream of research.  Subtopics were added to further clarify the 
topics, and the subtopics were not meant to be all inclusive. 
Each publication title and opening paragraph was subjectively reviewed for the 
following concepts and key words:  mission, assurance, assessment, planning, continuity, 
crisis, emergency, disruption, disaster, impact, incident, threat, scenario, organizational 
resilience, infrastructure protection, vulnerability, and risk.  Also, six document key-word 
searches were conducted during this cursory review; the key words were:  continuity, 
incident, mission assurance, planning, recovery, and risk.  The key terms were selected 
from the topics in Appendix A, and were the most relevant to the concepts being research 
in this content analysis.   
Throughout these steps, the overall naturalistic inquiry statement (What written 
guidance is available identifying how to plan for and assure mission continuity after an 
incident?) remained in focus. 
In addition to reviewing DoD and Air Force guidance, documents developed by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) were selected for content 
analysis.  NIST, a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce, 
has statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347 (E-Government Act of 2002),  and is responsible 
for developing standards and guidelines for providing adequate information security for 
all agency operations and assets (NIST, 2004a). 
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NIST Special Publications in the 800 series were reviewed and publication 
selections were conducted using the same phased review approach detailed for DoD and 
Air Force publications.   The Special Publication 800 series reports on NIST Information 
Technology Library’s (ITL) research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in computer 
security, and ITL’s collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic 
organizations (NIST, 2010b).   
 
Non-United States Government Publications 
 To complement and compare against the United States government publications, 
publications from four non-United States government bodies of knowledge were 
investigated for inclusion in the content analysis sample.  First, international standards 
were considered.  Since the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the 
world's largest developer and publisher of international standards (ISO, 2010), ISO 
publications were consider in the sample population.  Specifically, publications from the 
ISO/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) family of standards (Series 27000) were reviewed for inclusion.  Through 
the use of the ISMS standards, organizations can develop and implement a framework for 
managing security of their information assets and prepare for an independent assessment 
of their ISMS applied to the protection of information (ISO/IEC, 2009).   
Second, IT Governance Institute’s (ITGI) Control Objectives for Information and 
related Technology (COBIT®) document was selected for inclusion.  ITGI was selected 
because of their recognized effort to assist enterprise leaders in their responsibility to 
ensure IT is aligned with the business and delivers value, its performance is measured, its 
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resources properly allocated, and its risks mitigated.  ITGI exists to be the leading 
reference on IT governance for the global business community (ITGI, 2010). 
Third, IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) documents were considered for the content 
analysis.  Developed in the late 1980’s, the ITIL codifies industry best practices for the 
support and delivery of IT services and has become the world-wide de-facto standard in 
Service Management (Office of Government Commerce, 2000).  The Air Force 
understands the Air Force-Global Information Grid requires an organized management 
methodology and recognizes ITIL as an IT management standard across both industry 
worldwide and DoD (Department of the Air Force, 2006c).   
Lastly, the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVESM) criteria document was selected to be included as a publication sample.  
The OCTAVE work is conducted by Carnegie Mellon University and is sponsored by the 
DoD.  OCTAVE enables organizations to understand and address their information 
security risks, and it is a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven, and self-directed 
evaluation approach (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens, & Wooky, 
2003). 
 
Instrumentation and Data Collection 
After transitory reviews of the publications were completed using a naturalistic 
inquiry methodology and the sample documents were collected, the next step was to code 
the documents and collect qualitative data (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).  A Likert-like 
scale was developed to subjectively code the degree of concept coverage of each topic in 
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a publication.  The sample policies were assessed and coded for each of the 14 topics 
(Appendix B) using the content analysis coding scheme shown in Figure 3. 
 
Coding Scheme 
1 = No discussion of topic 
2 = Concept identified by name; but, not defined 
3 = Concept introduced by name; but, limited discussion (e.g., 1 of 3 noted:  defined, examples, or strategies) 
4 = Concept introduced by name with moderate coverage of topic (e.g., 2 of 3 noted:  defined, examples, or strategies) 
5 = Concept introduced by name with full coverage of topic (e.g., 3 of 3 noted:  defined, examples, or strategies) 
 
Figure 3.  Content Analysis Coding Scheme 
 
Multiple Coders 
 A content analysis method is a systematic process.  Inferences from the analysis 
must be objective and the inferences by one researcher should be analogous to the 
inferences on another researcher with access to the same data.  To make valid inferences, 
“it is important that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being 
consistent:  Different people should code the same text in the same way” (Weber, 1990, 
p. 12).  
 One way to calculate reliability is to measure the percentage of agreement among 
coders (Stemler, 2001).   However, this method does not take into account the fact that 
raters are expected to agree with each other a certain percentage of time simply by chance 
(Cohen, 1960).  To account for chance, an inter-rater reliability analysis using the Cohen 
kappa coefficient statistical measure was also performed to determine consistency among 
 
 
 
37 
 
raters.  A kappa value of 0 implies no agreement, other than by chance.  Conversely, a 
value of 1 corresponds to a perfect agreement between the two raters (Vanbelle & Albert, 
2008).  Krippendorff (2004) recommends a kappa agreement level of at least .70.  Some 
scholars use a measure of .80 or greater (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).   
An on-line statistical computation tool developed by Dr. Lowry (2010), Vassar 
College, was used to calculate the kappa statistics.  The weighted kappa was used 
because the coding data are ordinal (Lowry, 2010; Vanbelle & Albert, 2008) and the 
weighted kappa allows for “close” coding ratings not to simply be calculated as “misses” 
(TexaSoft, 2008).  Table 2 shows the imputed relative distances between the ordinal 
categories used for the kappa statistics calculations. 
Table 2.  Kappa Weighting:  Imputed Relative Distances 
Successive Ordinal Categories   1~2   2~3   3~4   4~5  
Imputed Relative Distances  1 1 1 1 
 
   For this content analysis, one researcher analyzed 100 percent of the sample 
publications and another researcher analyzed 50 percent of the publications.  After 
scoring a few test publications together, the researchers worked independently on coding 
the sample publications.  The publications examined by the second researcher were 
randomly chosen by selecting every other publication on the coding matrix.  Also, while 
the second researcher was familiar with the overall CIMIA research project, the 
researcher was not unduly familiar with the topics investigated during the content 
analysis.   
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
“In the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.” 
- Albert Einstein  
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the research conducted.  The 
publications selected for analysis are identified and the inter-rater reliability statistics are 
described.  The data are analyzed with the intent of answering the research questions and 
are organized around the 14 topics analyzed during the content review.  The findings 
include both qualitative and quantitative descriptions.  
 
Publications Selected 
Using the methodology detailed in Chapter 3, of 1,352 DoD issuances, 6 DoD 
issuances were selected for content analysis.  Of the 1,827 Air Force departmental 
publications, 6 publication series were selected, 97 publications of interested were noted, 
and 36 publications were selected for content analysis (Table 3). 
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Table 3.  Air Force Publications Reviewed 
Air Force Pubs Series Number 
and Series Title 
Number of 
Pubs in 
Series 
Pubs 
Reviewed 
Pubs of 
Interest 
Pubs 
Coded 
10 - Operations 148 148 51 21 
31 - Security 54 54 6 1 
32 - Civil Engineering 110 110 7 3 
33 - Communications and 
Information 75 75 13 6 
90 - Special Management 31 31 12 4 
91 - Safety 68 68 8 1 
Total 486 486 97 36 
 
Air Force publications of interest were publications that did not met the 
naturalistic inquiry of this research and were not coded; however, the publications did 
have some relevance to the stream of research.  As such, the researcher noted the 
publications and captured key text extracts from the publications.  Text extracts were also 
collected for the Air Force publications selected for the content analysis sample.  
Appendices C through H provide the title, date, and text extracts for the publications of 
interest, as well as the publications selected for coding.  As shown on the tables in the 
appendices, the publications chosen for the content analysis are highlighted to distinguish 
them from the publications of interest.   
To complete the list of United States government publications included in the 
sample, nine NIST Special Publications in the 800 series (information technology 
security publications) were chosen for the content analysis.   
Furthermore, nine publications from four non-United States government entities 
were selected for coding.  As a result of the overall publications review, a total 61 
documents were selected for content analysis. 
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Coding Results and Inter-rater Reliability 
 The coding results from the primary researcher are shown at Appendices I and J.  
The coding results of both researchers were analyzed and two measures of reliability 
were calculated:  percentage of agreement among coders and Cohen’s kappa.  Two 
measures were calculated due to the strengths and weakness of each measure.   
First, the percentages of agreement were computed and the statistics are shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4.  Percentage of Agreement Between Coders 
Topic 
Percent 
Agreement 
Number of 
Agreements 
Number of 
Disagreements 
Number of 
Disagreements 
Greater Than 
One Value 
Mission Assurance 80.0% 24 6 0 
Mission 
Assessment 86.7% 26 4 1 
Mission to IT 
Dependencies 60.0% 18 12 2 
Continuity Plan 43.3% 13 17 5 
Preparedness 30.0% 9 21 1 
Recovery 53.3% 16 14 1 
Lessons Learned 63.3% 19 11 2 
Scenario-Based 
Planning 66.7% 20 10 0 
Organizational 
Resilience 66.7% 20 10 1 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection 70.0% 21 9 2 
Risk Management 66.7% 20 10 1 
Risk Assessment 50.0% 15 15 2 
Incident Response 73.3% 22 8 0 
Incident 
Notification 63.3% 19 11 1 
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  Although the percentage of agreement for the topics varied from 30 to 86.7, the 
number of disagreements greater than one value on the coding scale was small.  Of the 
840 coding decisions made by the two coders, only 19 decisions (2.3 percent) were a 
result of disagreements greater than one value.  For example, if one researcher coded a 
topic a “2” (concept identified) and the other researcher coded the same topic a “4” 
(concept moderately covered), the result would be a value difference of 2.  Since the 
publications were coded on an ordinal scale (that is, a topic was coded from a minimum 
of not being discussed to a maximum of being fully discussed), these results suggest the 
researchers similarly coded the documents. 
Next, the inter-rater reliability for the researchers for each of the 14 topics was 
calculated using Cohen’s kappa.  The resulting kappa statistics and confidence intervals 
are show in Table 5.   
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Table 5.  Kappa Statistic Results for Two Coders 
Topic 
Kappa with Linear Weighting   
Observed 
Kappa 
Standard 
Error 
.95 Confidence 
Interval Kappa 
Interpretation 
(Landis & 
Koch, 1977) 
Lower 
Limit 
Upper 
Limit 
Mission 
Assurance 0.5161 0.1509 0.2203 0.8119 Moderate 
Mission 
Assessment 0.1964 0.2146 0.0000 0.6171 Slight 
Mission to IT 
Dependencies 0.1463 0.0857 0.0000 0.3142 Slight 
Continuity Plan 0.4241 0.1217 0.1856 0.6626 Moderate 
Preparedness 0.4221 0.0815 0.2624 0.5818 Moderate 
Recovery 0.6318 0.0803 0.4744 0.7892 Substantial 
Lessons Learned 0.5752 0.1066 0.3663 0.7841 Moderate 
Scenario-Based 
Planning 0.6795 0.0827 0.5174 0.8416 Substantial 
Organizational 
Resilience 0.4444 0.1350 0.1798 0.7090 Moderate 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection 0.6577 0.0823 0.4964 0.8190 Substantial 
Risk Management 0.7334 0.0738 0.5887 0.8781 Substantial 
Risk Assessment 0.5438 0.1007 0.3464 0.7412 Moderate 
Incident Response 0.7624 0.0793 0.6070 0.9178 Substantial 
Incident 
Notification 0.5476 0.1214 0.3097 0.7855 Moderate 
 
The observed kappa statistics ranged from 0.1463 to 0.7624.  While unsupported 
empirically, the kappa interpretations are based on the suggested benchmarks identified 
by Landis and Koch (1977).  The levels Landis and Koch proposed for interpreting kappa 
are listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  Kappa Statistic Agreement Levels  
(Landis & Koch, 1977, p.165) 
Kappa Statistic Strength of Agreement 
<0.00 Poor 
0.00- 0.20 Slight 
0.21- 0.40 Fair 
0.41- 0.60 Moderate 
0.61- 0.80 Substantial 
0.81- 1.00 Almost Perfect 
 
 All of the topics were coded with a kappa agreement level of either moderate or 
substantial, except for two topics.  Mission assessment and mission to IT dependencies 
had a “slight” level of agreement.  Although the kappa statistics were low for these two 
topics, the data suggest one reason may be the high level of agreement within just a few 
coding categories.  For example, when the researchers coded the mission assessment 
topic, 25 samples (50 coding decisions) out of 30 samples fell within one coding 
category.  This was the most samples coded in a single category of any topic.  For the 
mission to IT dependencies topic, 26 samples were clustered within two coding 
categories.  Strijbos, Martens, Prins and Jochems (2006) highlighted the concern of 
underestimating kappa agreement for a category that is commonly used, specifically as 
the number of categories available is increased. 
 Given the percentages of coding agreement, the ordinal nature of the coding scale, 
the subjectivity of the coding effort, the high percentage of exact and close proximity 
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coding, the observed moderate to substantial kappa statistics, and most importantly, the 
intended use of the data, the data suggest the coding results are sufficiently reliable for 
this research effort. 
 
Publication Authors  
 Of the 61 documents selected for analysis, the civil engineering community was 
the most prolific authors of government documents.  The ISO authored the most non-
government documents analyzed.  Table 7 lists all of the organizations who published 
documents reviewed during the content analysis.   
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Table 7.  Organizations Who Authored Publications Included in Content Analysis 
Functional Community/Organization No. of Pubs 
HQ USAF:  Civil Engineering (A7C) 13 
National Institute of Standards and Technology; US Department of 
Commerce (NIST) 
9 
HQ USAF:  Operations, Plans and Requirements (A3/5) 7 
SECAF:  Information Dominance and Chief Information Officer (A6) 6 
International Org for Standardization/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC) 
6 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) 4 
HQ USAF:  Security Forces (A7S) 3 
HQ USAF:  Safety (SE) 3 
IT Infrastructure Library - UK Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 2 
HQ USAF:  Plans and Requirements (A5) 1 
HQ USAF:  Analysis, Assessments and Lessons (A9) 1 
Asst Secretary of Defense - Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) 
1 
Asst Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 
(ASD(NII)) / DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
1 
Carnegie Mellon University  (CMU) 1 
HQ USAF:  Inspector General (IG) 1 
IT Governance Institute (ITGI)  1 
HQ USAF:  Surgeon General (SG) 1 
 
Ranking of Topics 
 Based on the summation of the raw coding scores for each topic reviewed, the 
topics were ranked from the topics most discussed to the topics least discussed.  For 
example, preparedness was found to be discussed the most within the government 
publications and as such, was ranked 1.  Table 8 shows the rankings of all 14 topics with 
the results computed within each publication category (government or non-government).   
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Table 8.  Topic Rankings (Most to Least Discussed) 
US Governmental Publications 
  
Non-US Governmental Publications 
 Topic Ranking  Topic Ranking 
Preparedness 1 Risk Assessment 1 
Recovery 2 Preparedness 2 
Risk Assessment 3 Risk Management 3 
Risk Management 4 Continuity Plan 4 
Lessons Learned 5 Incident Notification 5 
Continuity Plan 6 Recovery 6 
Incident Response 7 Lessons Learned 7 
Scenario-Based Planning 8 Incident Response 8 
Incident Notification 9 Scenario-Based Planning 9 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 10 Mission to IT Dependencies 10 
Mission Assurance 11 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 11 
Mission to IT Dependencies 12 Mission Assurance 12 
Organizational Resilience 13 Mission Assessment 13 
Mission Assessment 14 Organizational Resilience 14 
 
Comparing the two rankings, topics typically ranked relatively close (plus or 
minus one ranking position) between the two publication categories (Table 9).  The two 
exceptions were recovery and incident notification.  Recovery ranked second in the 
government publications and sixth in topic coverage within the non-government 
publications. The inverse was true for incident notification.  Incident notification ranked 
fifth in the non-government publications and ninth within the government publications. 
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Table 9.  Topic Ranking Differences:  Government vs. Non-Government Publications 
Topic Ranking Difference 
Preparedness 1 
Risk Management 1 
Incident Response 1 
Scenario-Based Planning 1 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 1 
Mission Assurance 1 
Organizational Resilience 1 
Mission Assessment 1 
Risk Assessment 2 
Lessons Learned 2 
Continuity Plan 2 
Mission to IT Dependencies 2 
Recovery 4 
Incident Notification 4 
 
 
Top Reviewed Publications 
 Using the content analysis coding scale, each publication could receive a 
minimum score of 14 (lowest code of 1 multiplied by 14 topics) and a maximum score of 
70 (highest code of 5 multiplied by 14 topics).  Based on the summation of the raw 
coding scores for each publication reviewed, the top five publications with the greatest 
degree of topic coverage are listed in Table 10.  No single publication fully covered each 
topic and received the maximum score of 70.  COBIT v4.1 provided the most coverage of 
the 61 publications reviewed and, minimally, identified each of the concepts investigated.   
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Table 10.  Ranking of Top Five Publications 
Publication Raw Score Ranking 
ITGI Control Objectives for Information and 
related Technology (COBIT) v4.1, 2007 48 1 
NIST Special Publication 800-34, Revision 1, 
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal 
Information Systems (Draft) , 2009 43 2 
ITIL Service Delivery v2, 2001 39 3 
AFMAN 10-2504, Air Force Incident 
Management Guidance for Major Accidents and 
Natural Disasters, 2009 39 4 
NIST Special Publication 800-61, Revision 1, 
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, 2008 38 5 
 
 
Results and Analysis of Topics 
Mission Assurance 
 In a majority of the documents, mission assurance was not discussed and as such 
the topic was ranked in the lower tier for both government and non-government 
publications.  However, mission assurance was defined in two publications. Both 
documents defined mission assurance as ensuring organizations can perform assigned 
tasks or duties in accordance with the intended purpose or plan (Department of the Air 
Force, 2006b; DoD, 2010).  DoD’s framework for mission assurance includes a range of 
programs, e.g. risk management and security-related functions, with the intention of 
securing war fighting capabilities even when under attack or after disruption.  These 
efforts include force protection measures, preparedness, continuity of operations plans, 
emergency management, consequence management, continuity of government, and 
critical defense infrastructure protection (Department of the Air Force, 2006b).  
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 In light of these activities, successful missions do not just happen; they are 
indicators of how well a system is functioning. The contributors to successful missions 
are man, media, machine, and management.  Mission then is the desired outcome, and the 
results of the interactions of the man, media, machine, and management (Department of 
the Air Force, 2000b).  
 Mission assurance was also discussed in the narrower context of information 
assurance and DoD information systems.  DoD policies, implemented through AFI 33-
200, Information Assurance (IA) Management, 2008, require DoD information systems to 
be assigned a mission assurance category (MAC) (DoD, 2002b,  2003).  The categories 
are primarily used to determine the requirements for availability and integrity.  Although 
the MAC’s are directly associated with the importance of the information the systems 
contain relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives, the three-tier category 
classification system is system-centric. 
 Additionally, the IT Governance Institute advocates for the need for management 
to establish control objectives to reasonably assurance business (mission) objectives are 
achieved (COBIT v4.1, 2007).  COBIT v4.1 defines control objectives for 34 processes 
(210 components); but, they are IT specific.  However, the guidance does give a 
substantial framework for managing IT to assist with managing one element required in 
an overall effort to achieve mission assurance.   
 DoD Instruction 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) 
Management, 2008, also mentioned the concept of mission success and mandated a 
mission focus statement be produced specifying defense critical infrastructure 
performance standards and conditions necessary for mission success.  However, the 
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instruction does not specify examples or how to determine the necessary standards and 
conditions.   
Although details beyond an overall framework and overarching concepts on how 
to assure the mission were not discovered, understanding the concept of mission 
assurance does appear to be important to the Air Force.  One of the Counter-Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (C-CBRN) Education, Training, and Exercise 
(ETE) competencies is to “understand mission assurance/continuation planning 
considerations and relationship to command, control, communications, computers and 
intelligence on Air Force installations” (Department of the Air Force, 2008d).  C-CBRN 
ETE competencies are knowledge, skills, and abilities to be educated, trained, and 
exercised by the Air Force to realize its desired C-CBRN operational capabilities.  These 
Air Force competency requirements are met collectively through various education and 
training program, including formal education and technical training; MAJCOM-level, 
base-level, other Service and other federal agency education and training; and appropriate 
civilian academic institutions.  The competencies apply to all Air Force personnel, 
regardless of rank or Air Force specialty code (Department of the Air Force, 2008d).   
 
Mission Assessment 
 Mission Assessment ranked as one of the least discussed topics in the sample.  No 
formal definition of mission assessment, or the concept in general, was uncovered.  
However, there is a general sense of mission assessment or evaluation within the 
Inspector General (IG) system, considering IG teams focus on inspecting and grading 
mission performance.   
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Whether conducting an operational readiness inspection or compliance inspection, 
the IG assesses readiness, key processes, procedures, or requirements, based on by-law 
requirements, executive orders, and/or instructions.  Among other items, but specific to 
this research, inspected units may be evaluated on whether the unit has a continuity of 
operations and if unit personnel know what actions to take during potential incidents.  
Unit’s may also be assessed on their ability to conduct the full range of contingency 
operations while simultaneously responding to or recovering from incidents, such as 
natural disasters, attacks, etc. (Department of the Air Force, 2009c).  The IG does provide 
a mission assessment snapshot in time; however, the IG process does not provide a 
standardized system of assessment or evaluation of the day-to-day missions conducted 
across the Air Force each day.   
 ITGI, in COBIT v4.1 (2007), noted the importance of measurable metrics to 
support business objectives.  The measures are required for an organization to be graded 
a 4 (0 – 5 point scale) on their IT Processes, Organization, and Relationships Maturity 
Model.  The document detailed potential metrics; however, the measures are IT focused. 
 Lastly, while overlapping risk assessment to an extent, one mission analysis tool 
of potential interest was noted – the mission protection tool.  The mission protection tool 
focused on analyzing and protecting the mission, rather than on protection of personnel or 
things.  The tool recognizes that a mission can be stopped partially or completely by 
events that cause very little damage.  The mission protection analysis considers any 
source of mission interruption, not just those arising from traditional mishap sources.  
Two important resources for this analysis is a detailed mission statement and a diagram 
of key processes linked to the mission (Department of the Air Force, 2000b).  While the 
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mission protection analysis has no particular method, a potential example of the process 
used to select a set of tools for the mission analysis of a mission critical computer facility 
is described in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Example Mission Protection Application (Department of the Air Force, 2000b, 
p. 60) 
Generally, there appears to be a lack of Air Force mission metrics to evaluate 
mission performance.   
 
Mission to Information Technology (IT) Dependencies 
 This topic was not frequently identified; however, the concept was veiled in a 
small number of government publications and more detailed in two NIST special 
publications and two non-governmental documents.  A few government documents 
     Situation:  A major material management center uses a computer to help manage the 
complex distribution and cost accounting needed to successfully carry out the mission.  If 
this computer were to be seriously impaired in any way, the mission could be down for a 
time ranging from several hours to several days.  The decision is made to complete an in-
depth mission protection analysis of computer operation.  The individual responsible for the 
applications uses his hazard ID toolbox to select the following tools for this important 
mission protection analysis.   
 
TOOLS TO BE USED 
 
Operations analysis (to establish the full dimension of the operation) 
What if analysis (to establish contingency-type threats to the mission) 
Interview tool (to get inputs from personnel involved in the operation) 
Several Logic Diagrams (used to explore several of the higher risk issues 
   revealed by the tools above.) 
Interface tool (used to detect any threats from non-related functions) 
Change analysis tool (to assess any intentional or unintentional change in 
    the last 1 or 2 years.) 
 
      The products derived from this analysis is essentially the same as the hazard 
identification assessments except that the focus is on those things, whether they cause 
physical damage or injury or not, that impact the mission of the system. 
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mentioned the need to identify and protect the vital records, databases, and software to 
execute mission essential functions and carry out continuity of operations plans 
(Department of the Air Force, 2005a, 2007, 2008e; DoD, 2006a, 2009a).  However, 
guidance was limited to essentially identifying the concept.   
NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, 2002, drew the linkage between IT systems and mission as well.  In 
the publication, two interview questions are suggested to be asked to an organization 
during an IT system design phase.  The questions are: 
 What is the purpose of the system in relation to the mission? 
 How important is the system to the user organization’s mission? 
Likewise, during the risk assessment process, NIST suggested collecting IT system 
mission (e.g., the processes performed by the IT system) and IT system and data 
criticality (e.g., the system’s value or importance to an organization).  However, value is 
aggregated to the system level, similar to system mission assurance codes, and does not 
address the potentially different values of data, information, and knowledge stored in one 
system. 
 NIST Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1, Performance Measurement Guide 
for Information Security, 2008, provided guidelines on how to link the relationship 
between overall agency performance measures reporting and information security 
performance measures reporting to ensure an agency’s information security program 
contributes to overall accomplishment of the agency mission, goals, and objectives.  The 
security program measures are ultimately linked to IT resources. 
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 COBIT v4.1 (2007) supported IT governance by providing an IT governance 
framework to ensure IT is aligned with the business.  COBIT v4.1 provided a matrix of 
generic business goals and IT goals and shows how the generic examples can be used as a 
guide to determine the specific business requirements, goals, and metrics for an 
enterprise. COBIT v4.1 also illustrated how an enterprise strategy may be translated by 
the business into objectives related to IT-enabled initiatives (business goals for IT).  
These objectives may then lead to a clear definition of the IT goals.  These IT goals in 
turn define the IT resources and capabilities (the enterprise architecture for IT) required 
to successfully execute IT’s part of the enterprise’s strategy. 
  Furthermore, ISO/IEC also suggested vital information required for the execution 
of an organization's mission be identified as part of information security risk management 
activities.  Additionally, ISO discussed the importance of capturing the dependencies 
between business processes and assets (data, information, hardware) and provided 
examples of how dependencies may influence asset valuation (ISO/IEC, 2008). 
 
Continuity Plan 
 In over half of the publications sampled, some type of continuity plan was at least 
identified.  There were a few documents that covered the concept of a continuity plan to a 
greater extent.   
DoDI 3020.42, Defense Continuity Plan Development, 2006, highlighted the 
criticality of determining accurate mission essential functions (MEF) to create the 
foundation of a valid continuity plan.  The instruction further proposed two cyber-related 
mission essential areas of consideration:  crisis communications and crisis data storage, 
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retrieval, and security.  The DoD guidance further detailed components of a continuity 
plan and what the plan’s content should identify.  
 Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 was noted as the 
primary installation plan to provide comprehensive guidance for emergency response to 
physical threats resulting from major accidents, natural disasters, conventional attacks, 
terrorist attacks, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, and high-explosive 
(CBRNE) attacks.  The CEMP is intended to be a separate installation plan and will not 
be combined with other plans until Headquarters Air Force develops and fields a template 
and provides implementation guidance.  The plan addresses major accidents, natural 
disasters, enemy CBRNE attacks, and terrorist use of CBRNE (Department of the Air 
Force, 2007).  However, the Emergency Management Program does not cover non-
physical threats, including cyber threats.  Associated non-physical hazards are the 
responsibility of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations 
(Department of the Air Force Civil Engineer, 2006).  While the intention is not to cover 
cyber threats in the CEMP, the research review suggests publications (e.g., AFI 10-211, 
Civil Engineer Contingency Response Planning, AFI 10-219V2, Civil Engineer Disaster 
and Attack Preparations, AFI 10-219V3, Civil Engineer Disaster and Attack Recovery 
Procedures) are focused on traditional infrastructure activities associated with planning, 
responding, and recovering from non-cyber threats.  However, non-cyber hazards impact 
cyber resources that may ultimately impact mission continuation.   
 One AFI is dedicated to Air Force continuity of operations (COOP).  The AFI 
discusses COOP policy and guidance, and COOP plan development. The instruction also 
provides guidance for developing programs to ensure continuity of essential operations of 
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the Air Force across a wide range of potential emergencies.  Furthermore, every 
organization is required to validate and update their COOP plan every 2 years 
(Department of the Air Force, 2005a).  
ITIL’s Service Delivery (2001) provided an example project plan for the efforts 
required to complete an IT service continuity plan.  The project plan was broken down 
into four stages:  initiation; requirements analysis and strategy definition; 
implementation; operational management. 
  NIST provided a table to collectively define the purpose of the various continuity 
plans as well as a plan’s relationship to other plans or the organization.  The types of 
plans identified in Table 11 are implemented individually or in coordination with one 
another, as appropriate, to respond to a disruptive event.   
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Table 11.  Types of Plans (NIST, 2009, pp. 11-12) 
Plan  Purpose  Scope  Plan Relationship  
Business 
Continuity Plan 
(BCP)  
Provides procedures for 
sustaining business 
operations while recovering 
from a significant 
disruption.  
Addresses business 
processes at a lower or 
expanded level from 
COOP mission-essential 
functions  
Functional continuity plan 
that may be activated with a 
COOP to sustain non-
critical functions.  
Continuity of 
Operations 
(COOP) Plan  
Provides procedures and 
guidance to sustain an 
organization’s mission- 
essential functions at an 
alternate site for up to 30 
days; mandated by federal 
directives.  
Addresses the mission- 
essential functions; 
facility- based plan; 
information systems are 
addressed based only on 
their support to the 
mission-essential 
functions.  
Functional continuity plan 
that may also activate 
several business unit- level 
BCPs.  
Crisis 
Communications 
Plan  
Provides procedures for 
disseminating internal and 
external communications; 
means to provide critical 
status information and 
control rumors.  
Addresses 
communications with 
personnel and the public; 
not information system 
focused.  
Incident-based plan often 
activated with a COOP or 
BCP, but may be used 
alone during a public 
exposure event.  
Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) 
Plan  
Provides policies and 
procedures for protection 
of national critical 
infrastructure components, 
as defined in the National 
Infrastructure Protection 
Plan.  
Addresses critical 
infrastructure components 
that are supported or 
operated by an agency or 
organization.  
Pre-incident-based risk 
management plan that 
supports COOP plans for 
organizations with CI/KR 
assets.  
Cyber Incident 
Response Plan  
Provides procedures for 
mitigating and correcting a 
system cyber attack, such 
as a virus, worm, or Trojan 
horse.  
Addresses mitigation and 
isolation of affected 
systems, cleanup, and 
minimizing loss of 
information.  
System contingency plan 
that may activate an ISCP 
or DRP, depending on the 
extent of the attack.  
Disaster 
Recovery Plan 
(DRP)  
Provides procedures for 
relocating information 
systems operations to an 
alternate location.  
Activated after major 
system disruptions with 
long-term effects.  
System contingency plan 
that activates one or more 
ISCPs for recovery of 
individual systems.  
Information 
System 
Contingency  
Plan (ISCP) 
Provides procedures and 
capabilities for recovering 
an information system.  
Location-independent plan 
that focuses on the 
procedures needed to 
recovery a system at the 
current or an alternate 
location. 
System contingency-based 
plan that may be activated 
with a DRP or on its own if 
relocation is not required. 
Occupant 
Emergency Plan 
(OEP)  
Provides coordinated 
procedures for minimizing 
loss of life or injury and 
protecting property damage 
in response to a physical 
threat.  
Focuses on personnel and 
property particular to the 
specific facility; not 
business process or 
information system-based.  
Incident-based plan that is 
initiated immediately after 
an event, preceding a 
COOP or DRP activation.  
 
Figure 5 shows the interrelationship of each plan as they are implemented to 
respond to the event as applicable to their respective scopes. 
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Figure 5.  Contingency-Related Plan Relationships (NIST, 2009, p. 12) 
 
Lastly, there was a general lack of guidance regarding contingency plans in the 
communication and information series publication.  Communications are sometimes 
considered in plans; but, typically from a long-established standpoint of command and 
control communications (e.g., telephones, radios, faxes, mass notification systems).  The 
plans focused on communication-out procedures, such as using runners, flags, or flares, 
not on how information technology may be imbedded within critical processes and the 
true impact of disrupting communications. 
 
Preparedness 
Preparedness was one of the most discussed topics, and the concept, at the very 
least, was identified in 59 of the 61 publication analyzed.  Preparedness was defined as: 
The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, 
sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.  Preparedness 
is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and 
between government and private-sector and nongovernmental 
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organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify 
required resources.  (Department of the Air Force, 2009a, p. 71) 
 
 To be prepared, organizations should engage in contingency planning.  Now that 
business processes are typically heavily dependent on IT, continuity planning 
incorporates a business element and a technology element (Office of Government 
Commerce, 2001).  
To ensure business continuity and neutralize interruptions from information 
systems failures or disasters, in an effort to protect critical business activities and 
processes, ISO/IEC described five activities and controls organizations should 
implement.  The activities included:  including information security in the business 
continuity management process, performing continuity and risk assessments, developing 
and implementing continuity plans, maintaining a business continuity planning 
framework, and testing, maintaining and reassessing business continuity plans (ISO/IEC, 
2005).  IGTI details the same, and a few additional, activities and controls in COBIT v4.1 
(2007); but, the COBIT-recommended actions are more heavily focused on IT continuity 
planning. 
ITIL’s Service Delivery (2001) provided comprehensive guidance on IT service 
continuity management.  The document discussed the goal, benefits, scope, and concepts 
of IT continuity.  Also, the document provided key messages, hints, tips, examples, and 
strategies on planning, implementing, and operationalizing IT continuity.   
Finally, the Defense Continuity Program noted making the appropriate use of IT 
solutions ”within the continuity operating environment to provide information to leaders 
and other users, facilitate decision making, and issue orders and direction” (DoD, 2006a, 
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p. 2).  Also, as previously mentioned one AFI is dedicated to Air Force continuity of 
operations and provides guidance for developing programs to ensure continuity of 
essential operations of the Air Force (Department of the Air Force, 2005a).  However, 
research suggests there is little provided DoD guidance specific to IT service continuity 
management.   
 
Recovery 
Overall, this topic was identified in about 80 percent of the publications reviewed.  
Recovery was the second most discussed topic in the sampled government publications, 
and sixth in topic coverage within the non-government publications.    
Recovery was defined as: 
The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-
restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of 
government operations and services through individual, private-sector, 
nongovernmental, and public assistance programs that: identify needs 
and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address 
long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement additional 
measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures 
and techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons 
learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the effects of future 
incidents. (Department of the Air Force, 2007, p. 123) 
 
The DoD specifically included cyber resource restoration in their definition of 
cyber security.  Cyber security “also includes restoring electronic information and 
communications systems in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster” (DoD, 
2010). 
A majority of the Air Force publications that discussed recovery to any depth 
were discovered in the 10-series (civil engineering) publications.  These civil engineering 
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publications were principally dedicated to the recovery of facilities, infrastructure (roads, 
runways), and utilities.  Additionally, the Air Force civil engineering community 
dedicated an entire 188-page publication to disaster and attack recovery procedures 
(Department of the Air Force, 2008c).  Communications were mentioned; however, 
predominately from a command and control perspective.   
NIST provided recovery guidance specific to IT systems.  NIST defined recovery 
phase efforts as those activities focusing on recovery strategies executed to restore system 
capabilities, repair damage, and resume operational capabilities. Also, they provided 
information on the sequence of recovery activities, recovery procedures, and escalation 
and notification procedures (NIST, 2009). 
Furthermore, ITIL suggested using a Component Failure Impact Analysis (CFIA) 
to provide estimated recovery times to help provide timely and accurate estimations of IT 
service restoration in an effort to manage the impact of IT failures.  CFIA was devised by 
IBM in the early 1970’s and can provide valuable information, such as single points of 
failure, impacts of component failure, component dependencies, and recovery timings, if 
the analysis is performed thoroughly.  The CFIA is performed by mapping configurations 
items (e.g., computers, applications, power, etc) to IT services having a dependency on 
the configuration item.  Another mapping is also completed, connecting the configuration 
items to vital business functions and the end users impacted by the configuration item.  
Ultimately, the mappings help estimate recovery times, provide alternate recovery 
options, and highlight dependencies (Office of Government Commerce, 2001).  However, 
the scalability of this approach may be questionable. 
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Lessons Learned 
 This topic was moderately covered in the guidance analyzed.  However, most of 
the substantial guidance was provided in government publications.  The principle Air 
Force publication focused on lessons learned is AFI 90-1601, Air Force Lessons Learned 
Program, 2008.  In the AFI, a “lesson learned” is defined as “an insight gained that 
improves military operations or activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, 
and results in long-term, internalized change to an individual, group of individuals, or an 
organization” (2008a, p.3).  The purpose of the program is to enhance readiness and 
improve combat capability.  Lessons may be applicable to training, exercises, 
experiments, and real-world events and the AFI provided an observation/lesson learned 
template for capturing lessons learned as well as prescribed after-action report forms.   
To document and track lessons learned the Air Force uses the Joint Lesson-
Learned Information System (JLLIS). Anyone may make a lesson learned submission 
using the web-based JLLIS (unclassified:  https://www.jllis.mil/USAF; classified:  
http://www.jllis.smil.mil/USAF).  Access to JLLIS capabilities and lessons learned data 
is tiered to ensure sensitive information is protected (Department of the Air Force, 
2009b).  Validated lessons learned may be “pushed” when a lessons-learned specialist 
identifies the target audience to push the information to or “pulled” by ad hoc queries.     
Figure 6 shows the relationships of the different elements of the process. 
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Figure 6.  Air Force Lessons Learned Process (Department of the Air Force, 2009b, p. 
30) 
 The civil engineering community codified some of their historical energy 
disruptions experience gathered as a result of inspector general tests, unplanned outages, 
and personal experiences.  A list of 67 observed or projected disruption effects were 
published (Department of the Air Force, 2008b).  By documenting and cross feeding 
lessons learned, resource protection is greatly enhanced (Department of the Air Force, 
2009b). 
 Regardless of how the lessons-learned observations are collected, to ensure 
validated Air Force and Joint lessons are incorporated into programmatic and risk 
assessment decision cycles, the Headquarters Air Force Office of Lessons Learned is 
charged with coordinating with other Headquarters Air Force directorates on this task.  
Also, to facilitate use of lessons learned, lessons learned staff, at all levels, should 
participate in staff meetings, manning the Crisis Action Team, and/or providing real-time 
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inputs to the commander’s planning and decision process (Department of the Air Force, 
2008a). 
 Additionally, NIST noted one of the most important aspects of incident response 
is also the most often omitted—learning and improving. NIST proposed holding a 
lessons-learned meeting after significant incidents, and periodically after minor incidents, 
to improve security measures and the incident handling process.  Furthermore, collecting 
lessons learned data may be used to justify additional funding for incident responses, 
measure the success/activities of the incident response team, and capture required data for 
any incident response reporting requirements (NIST, 2008a).  Similarly, ISO 
recommended that to learn from information security incidents, mechanisms should be 
implemented to monitor and quantify the types, volumes, and cost of information security 
incidents (ISO/IEC, 2005, 2009). 
 
Scenario-Based Planning 
 Scenario-based planning was also moderately covered in the guidance analyzed.  
The guidance did not cover the topic in depth; however, two tools were discovered to aid 
in creating scenarios—the scenario process tool (also known as the mental movie tool) 
and the “what if” tool.  The scenario process tool is a procedure used to identify hazards 
by visualizing them.  The process adds rigor to the intuitive and experimental process of 
traditional risk management, connects various individual hazards into scenarios, and 
assists in visualizing the worst credible outcomes of related hazards.  Also, the “what if” 
tool is a practical and effective tool for identifying hazards; the tool is particularly 
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effective in capturing hazard data about failure modes (Department of the Air Force,   
2000b).   
 Specific to IT scenario-based planning NIST noted, “Scenarios provide an 
inexpensive and effective way to build incident response skills and identify potential 
issues with incident response processes” (NIST, 2008a, p. B-1).  They proposed 20 
scenario questions in the areas of preparation; detection, analysis, containment, 
eradication, recovery, and post-incident activities, along with 16 scenarios, that 
organizations may adapt for use in their own incident-scenario exercises.  Additionally, 
ISO provided a list of examples of vulnerabilities and threats to help develop relevant 
incident scenarios.  Furthermore, ISO suggested mapping the consideration of the 
likelihood of an incident scenario against the estimated business impact, in an effort to 
evaluate the measured risk against risk acceptance criteria (ISO/IEC, 2008). 
  
Organizational Resilience 
Organizational resilience was one of the least discussed topics in the publications 
reviewed.  However, NIST did summarize organizational resiliency by stating, 
“Resiliency is not a process, but rather an end-state for organizations” (NIST, 2009, p. 5).  
Resilient organizations ensure continuity of operations during any type of disruption and 
they work to adapt to changes and risks that may impact their ability to continue critical 
functions.  An organization’s resiliency program should include such activities as risk 
management, contingency, and continuity planning (NIST, 2009).   
 Organizations also have a style or a culture and this organizational culture may 
affect risk controls (actions designed to reduce risk).  AFPAM 90-902, Operational Risk 
 
 
 
66 
 
Management (ORM) Guidelines and Tools, 2000, discussed the importance of developing 
risk controls consistent with an organization’s culture.  For example, a rigid, centrally 
directed risk control would be incompatible with an organizational culture that 
emphasizes decentralized flexibility. 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 This topic was marginally identified in the documents analyzed.  
Notwithstanding, the DoD has two principle documents focused on critical infrastructure 
protection:  DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 
2010,  DoDI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management, 
2008.  The DoD recognized the need to associate critical infrastructure with cyber 
resources, and the DoD Chief Information Officer is tasked with coordinating with the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on integrating defense industrial base cyber 
security and information assurance activities in the DCIP (DoD, 2010). 
The leading Air Force publication in this area was AFPD 10-24, Air Force 
Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), 2006.  The DoD publications did not explicitly 
define critical infrastructures; however, AFPD 10-24 (2006) defined critical infrastructure 
as “cyber and physical systems and assets so vital to the Air Force that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on the Air 
Force’s ability to execute its missions” (p. 10).  In the Air Force definition, cyber systems 
are clearly included.  For the Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program, criticality is 
broken down into four tiers (Department of the Air Force, 2006a): 
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 Tier I:  Warfighter/Combatant Commands suffers strategic mission 
failure.  
 Tier II:  The Air Force suffers mission failure, but warfighter strategic 
mission is accomplished. 
 Tier III:  Individual element failures, but no debilitating strategic or Air 
Force mission failure. 
 Tier IV:  Everything else. 
  
Risk Management 
 Risk management was a topic included in a majority of the publications reviewed, 
ranking as the fourth most discussed topic among government publications and the third 
most covered topic within non-government publications.  Twelve definitions of risk 
management were noted during the review.  The definitions were consistent with the 
description of risk management in JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 2001.  Risk management is defined in JP 1-02 as the “process of 
identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making 
decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits” (2001, p. 470).   
 As previously discussed, cyber systems are classified as part of the defense 
critical infrastructure (DCI) (Department of the Air Force, 2006a, DoD, 2010).  This 
linkage is important as risk management principles are mandated for the DoD DCI 
Program (DCIP), and thus, for the inclusive cyber infrastructure and dependencies.  The 
DoD policy expressly directed: 
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 Coordination on risk management shall be accomplished with other Federal 
departments and agencies; State, local, regional, territorial, and tribal entities; 
the private sector; and foreign countries, as appropriate 
 DCI risk management actions shall:  
- Be coordinated and accomplished by responsible authorities 
- Support incident management 
- Protect DCI-related sensitive information  
 DCIP shall coequally complement and not be subordinate to other DoD 
programs, functions, and activities that contribute to mission assurance 
through risk management 
 The DCIP shall:  
- Determine the risks to DCI 
- Implement DoD-wide procedures to respond to risks to DCI and work 
with other Federal departments and agencies; State, local, regional, 
territorial, and tribal entities; the private sector; and foreign countries, as 
appropriate 
- Support and advocate for initiatives to respond to risks to national critical 
infrastructure as appropriate and within DoD legal authorities 
- DCIP activities related to the defense industrial base shall be consistent 
with and executed pursuant to the authorities established in the policy 
(DoD, 2010) 
 Of note in the policy are the strong support of risk management, the support of 
incident management, and the idea of associating risk management as a contributing 
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activity to mission assurance.  Essentially, the DCIP is a risk management program to 
ensure DCI availability.  Figure 7 illustrates the DCIP Risk Management Process Model.  
 
Figure 7.  DCIP Risk Management Process Model (DoD, 2008, p. 16)  
Important to note, the DCIP process model requires continuous coordination between 
mission and asset owners (DoD, 2008). 
The Air Force formalized risk management through the concept of Operational 
Risk Management (ORM).  ORM is defined as “the systematic process of identifying 
hazards, assessing risk, analyzing risk control options and measures, making control 
decisions, implementing control decisions, accepting residual risks, and 
supervising/reviewing the activity for effectiveness” (Department of the Air Force, 
2000a).  The ORM definition maps to the Air Force six-step ORM process (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Six-Step Process of Operational Risk Management (Department of the Air 
Force, 2000b, p. 7) 
 The Air Force discussed the importance of integrating the ORM process with 
mission processes, and having commanders dedicate the time and resources to 
incorporate risk management principles specifically into the planning processes.  
Integrating risk management into planning provides decision makers the greatest 
opportunity to control risk (Department of the Air Force, 2000a, 2000b).  Also, during 
recovery operations, the installation commander will use operational risk management 
tools to decide the critical missions to continue (Department of the Air Force, 2009a).   
 While the Air Force ORM process may be applied across mission areas, NIST 
developed a six-step process risk framework specific to information systems (Figure 9).   
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Figure 9.  NIST Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2010a, p.8) 
 NIST also recognized the need for a consistent and effective approach to risk 
management, coupled with the necessary resource allocation (funding and personnel), in 
order for risk management to succeed (NIST, 2010a). 
 The non-government publications focused primarily on information 
systems/security risk management.  However, the guidance also recognized risk 
management as a continuous process.  ISO’s information security risk management 
process consists of six elements:  context establishment, risk assessment, risk treatment, 
risk acceptance, risk communication, and risk monitoring and review (see Figure 10) 
(ISO/IEC, 2008). 
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Figure 10.  Information Security Risk Management Process (ISO/IEC, 2008, p. 5) 
 COBIT v4.1 identified five IT governance focus areas; these are areas executive 
management should address to govern IT across their enterprises.  Risk management was 
one of the five focus areas, and the other four are:  strategic alignment, value delivery, 
resource management, and performance measurement.  The risk management area 
requires such focus as, risk awareness by senior leaders, an understanding of the 
enterprise’s appetite for risk, and embedding risk management responsibilities into the 
organization.  The COBIT v4.1 document also noted the importance of identifying, 
analyzing, and assessing any potential impact of the goals of an organization as the result 
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of any unplanned event.  Furthermore, the following IT risk management related metrics 
were suggested in COBIT v4.1 (2007, p. 65): 
 Percent of IT budget spent on risk management (assessment and mitigation) 
activities 
 Frequency of review of the IT risk management process 
 Percent of approved risk assessments 
 Number of actioned risk monitoring reports within the agreed-upon frequency 
 Percent of identified IT events used in risk assessments 
 Percent of risk management action plans approved for implementation 
 
Again, with a focus on information security risks, OCTAVE Criteria v2 (2001), 
detailed three risk management principles common to effective risk management 
approaches.  The three broad principles are:  Forward-Looking View, Focus on the 
Critical Few, and Integrated Management.  The “Forward-Looking View” requires 
organization’s to think about tomorrow’s risks and focusing on managing the uncertainty.  
The “Focus on the Critical Few” requires organization’s to focus on the most critical 
information security issues.   The “Integrated Management” principle requires integrating 
information security issues with business processes and considering business strategies 
and goals when developing security strategies. 
Lastly, a few Air Force documents referred to Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures 3-2.34, Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk 
Management; but, the publication was rescinded on 19 August 2008 (Air Force e-
Publishing, n.d.). 
 
Risk Assessment 
 Risk assessment was one of the most discussed of the 14 topics, ranking as the 
third most discussed topic among government publications and the number one covered 
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topic within non-government publications.  Sixteen definitions of risk assessment were 
noted during the review, and the definitions focused on detecting hazards and threat, 
criticality, and vulnerability assessments.  Generally, the definitions discovered were 
consistent with the description of risk assessment in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2001.  Risk 
assessment is defined in JP 1-02 (2001, p. 470) as “the identification and assessment of 
hazards (first two steps of risk management process).”  The Joint risk management 
process included three processes—identifying, assessing, and controlling risks (DoD, 
2001).   
DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 
2010, expanded on the Joint publication definition of risk assessment and further 
described risk assessment as “a systematic examination of risk using disciplined 
processes, methods, and tools. A risk assessment provides an environment for decision 
makers to evaluate and prioritize risks continuously and to recommend strategies to 
remediate or mitigate those risks" (p. 20).   However, risk assessment (i.e., criticality 
determination, threats and hazards assessment, and vulnerability assessment), along with 
risk response (i.e., remediation, mitigation, and reconstitution), were clearly noted as the 
major elements of DCIP risk management (reference Figure 7).  Additionally, the 
requirement to coordinate the recommendations, support information, decisions, etc., 
between DCI owners and mission owners was noted again (DoD, 2008). 
Since risk assessment is encapsulated within the risk management process, the 
methods of evaluating and assessing risks are captured within most of the risk 
management frameworks presented in the previous risk management section.  In addition 
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to the other processes presented, NIST (2002) advocated for an IT system risk assessment 
methodology encompassing nine primary steps; the main steps are: 
 Step 1 - System Characterization  
 Step 2 - Threat Identification 
 Step 3 - Vulnerability Identification  
 Step 4 - Control Analysis  
 Step 5 - Likelihood Determination  
 Step 6 - Impact Analysis  
 Step 7 - Risk Determination  
 Step 8-  Control Recommendations  
 Step 9 - Results Documentation  
Specific to information security risk management, risk assessment determines the 
value of the information assets, in addition to identifying applicable threats and 
vulnerabilities, identifying existing controls, determining the potential consequences, 
prioritizing the derived risks and ranks them against the risk evaluation criteria.  
Furthermore, to bound and scope a risk assessment, assets need to be identified 
(hardware, software, etc) (ISO/IEC, 2008).   
 ITIL’s Service Delivery provided a list of risks and threats to be considered by IT 
managers.  Alternatively, ITIL mentioned some risks that are “out of scope” of IT risk 
assessments; for example, changes in business direction, diversification, and restructuring 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2001, p. 170). 
Lastly, while likely never applied to a “cyber mishap” yet, AFI 91-204, Safety 
Investigation and Reports, 2008, recognized “Risk Assessment – During Operations” as a 
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possible judgment and decision-making error categorized in the Department of Defense 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, as a means for studying mishap 
incidents.  A “Risk Assessment – During Operation” is described as a “factor when the 
individual fails to adequately evaluate the risks associated with a particular course of 
action and this faulty evaluation leads to inappropriate decision and subsequent unsafe 
situation.  This failure occurs in real-time when formal risk-assessment procedures are 
not possible” (Department of the Air Force, 2008f, p. 117).  There is also a category code 
for violations based on risk assessment.  A “Violation – Based on Risk Assessment”  is a 
“factor when the consequences/risk of violating published procedures was recognized, 
consciously assessed and honestly determined by the individual, crew or team to be the 
best course of action. Routine "work-arounds" and unofficial procedures that are accepted 
by the community as necessary for operations are also captured under this code” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2008f, p. 118). 
 
Incident Response 
 Incident response was moderately discussed among both categories of 
publications, ranking in the middle tier of the 14 topics assessed.  Over half of the 
publications did not identify the concept.  The civil engineering community provided 
detailed response guidance in AFMAN 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System 
(AFIMS) Standards and Procedures, 2009, and AFMAN 10-2504, Air Force Incident 
Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural Disasters, 2009; however, as 
noted previously, the procedures are focused on facilities, infrastructure (roads, runways), 
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and utilities.  However, the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) discussed 
within the publications was prominent. 
AFIMS was developed to ensure military service compliance and consistency 
with Presidential and DoD directives for all-hazards emergency prevention, preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation operations.  The system is used to organize and direct 
emergency response forces during incident management activities (Department of the Air 
Force, 2009b).  No explicit mention of cyber-related incidents or responses was 
discovered in the publication.  Also, no reference of AFMAN 10-2502 or AFIMS was 
found in the principle network operations incident notification publication, AFI 33-138, 
Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking, 2005.  However, AFIMS is 
stated to support Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents, and the National Response Framework (Department of the Air Force, 2009b).   
Within the National Response Framework (guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards 
response), cyber incidents are one of the seven broad incident categories noted 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008).   
Regarding IT specifically, NIST Special Publication 800-61, Revision 1, 
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, 2008, provided very detail guidance on 
cyber-related incident response.  The publication outlined possible incident response 
team structures, detailed the basic incident handling steps and provides advice for 
performing incident handling more effectively, and provided specific recommendations 
for handling five types of incidents (denial of service, malicious code, unauthorized 
access, inappropriate usage, and multiple component).   
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Furthermore, NIST proposed a four-step incident response life cycle (Figure 11).  
The process is a continuous cycle, and as an outcome of post-incident activities, “lessons 
learned” are analyzed and may be used in the preparation phase. 
 
Figure 11.  Incident Response Life Cycle (NIST, 2008c, p. 3-1) 
 
Incident Notification 
Incident notification ranked ninth within the government publications and fifth in 
the non-government publications. An incident (outage or disruption) may occur with or 
without prior notice and as such, notification procedures should cover both situations. 
 Prompt notifications are important for reducing the effects of a disruption on 
systems.  However, activation criteria for system outages or disruptions are unique for 
each organization and should be stated the organization’s policy. Criteria may be based 
on the extent of any damage to the system (e.g., physical, operational, or cost); criticality 
of the system to the unit’s mission; and expected duration of the outage lasting longer 
than previously stated or expected (NIST, 2009).   
AFI 33-138, Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking, 2005, is 
the primary Air Force guidance for IT related incident notifications.  The AFI provided 
guidance and explained the processes used by Air Force Network Operations to generate, 
disseminate, acknowledge, implement, track, and report network compliance and status 
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information.  AFI 33-138 dictated the use of Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers Notice to Airmen (C4 NOTAM) as the primary means for notifying 
organizations of an information incident that may impact their operations. Within each 
organization, there is an individual who is responsible for reading incoming C4 
NOTAMs and, when appropriate, is responsible for alerting decision makers within the 
organization about the significance of the C4 NOTAM with respect to the organizational 
mission.  In certain cases where the network operations personnel understand the 
percieved criticality of an impacted resource, organizations are required to acknowledge 
receipt of the C4 NOTAM for accountability purposes. 
Lastly, in addition to internal notification of incident, an organization may need to 
communicate with external partners regarding an incident. While minimum coordination 
may be specified for an organization by law or other directives, NIST also recommended 
considering coordinating with the outside parties show in Figure 12.   
 
 
Figure 12.  Incident-Related Communications with Outside Parties (NIST, 2008c, p. 2-5) 
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Summary 
 Overall, the level of coverage of the 14 topics in the government and non-
government publications closely mirrored one another.  No single document provided full 
coverage of every topic; however, ITGI’s Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT) v4.1 (2007) received the greatest number of coding points (48 out 
of maximum of 70), and, minimally, each of the topics was identified in the document.  
AFI 33-101, Commanders Guidance and Responsibilities, 2008, was coded the lowest, 
garnering a score of 16 (minimum possible score was 14). 
Additionally, with an overall interest in the cyber-related aspects of mission 
assurance, generally the data suggest a low level of guidance being authored by the 
communications and information community regarding these 14 topics.  Of the 
publications reviewed in the Air Force Communications and Information 33-series, only 
5 of the 70 coding decisions resulted in a score above “3.” Two of the five higher scores 
were attributed to one publication, AFI 33-138, Enterprise Network Operations 
Notification and Tracking, 2005.   
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V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used  
when we created them.” 
- Albert Einstein  
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents conclusions based on the content analysis conducted during 
the study.  The six research questions identified in Chapter 1 are also summarily re-
examined and conclusions are presented.  Limitations of the research are also explained, 
and recommendations are provided.  Then, the chapter concludes with areas for future 
research. 
 
Research Summary 
Overall, the amount of government guidance addressing the 14 topics in this study 
exceeded the researcher’s expectations, especially within the NIST series of publications.  
The civil engineering community authored a large number of the government 
publications reviewed.  The civil engineering community provided solid guidance on 
several of the traditional preparedness topics; however, some of their guidance may need 
to be expanded to include cyberspace resource preparedness issues or, at least, provide 
linkage to cyberspace preparedness guidance, largely yet to be developed, within the 
communications and information community. 
Although the DoD is a large, highly complex organization that is not easily 
compared to other executive departments or private enterprises (Donley, 1995), the non-
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United States government publications provided insights and significant coverage of 
some of the topics investigated.  However, given the considerable size, complexity, and 
decentralized nature of the DoD and the fact non-government publications focus on 
organizations far smaller than DoD, the scalability of some of non-government solutions 
and recommendations may need to be fully evaluated. 
 
Research Questions Reexamined 
Research Question 1.   
What is mission?  Mission was seldom defined explicitly within the publications 
or issuances.  However, based on the literature reviewed, a mission is essentially a task 
linked to a purpose.  Mission requirements are communicated through mission essential 
task lists (METL).  METLs are hierarchal and originate at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level 
and extend down to the operational level.  However, there is an effort underway to extend 
METLs down to the unit level.   
Extending METLs to the unit level should assist with identifying IT to mission 
dependencies, as the unit-level IT dependencies could be linked to unit- level tasks and 
activities.  Furthermore, if these linkages can be integrated with the proposed Defense 
Readiness Reporting System (Secretary of Defense, 2006), this consolidated view would 
further enhance the situational awareness of commanders and decision makers as it would 
include related cyber dependencies specific to their organization’s mission and tasks.  
 
Research Question 2.   
 
 
 
83 
 
What is mission assurance?  Mission assurance was also an elusive term in the 
publications reviewed; however, mission assurance was recently defined in DoD 
Directive 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 2010.  
DoD defined mission assurance as a process to ensure tasks or duties can be performed in 
accordance with the intended purpose or plan.  Furthermore, mission assurance is a 
summation of the activities and measures taken to ensure required capabilities and all 
supporting infrastructures are available to the DoD to carry out the National Military 
Strategy.  What appeared to be largely absent in the guidance was what control objectives 
or critical success factors (or the like) could be measured, so as to have observable, 
measurable mission success metrics. 
As with mission, the foundational element appeared to be a task.  As such, if a 
task is successful/may be assured, multiple successful tasks may be aggregated to assure 
objectives and missions.  However, a challenge may arise when only some of the tasks 
are successful; then it becomes questionable if an aggregated mission is successful or 
assured.  This challenge further supports the need for some form of mission 
measurements/metrics.   
 
Research Question 3.   
What are risk management and risk assessment, and how are they used to support 
mission assurance?  Risk management was frequently defined in policy.  Risk 
management is an overall process or program, and the process essentially involves 
identifying, assessing, and controlling risks, and furthermore, making decisions balancing 
risk costs with mission benefits.  The Air Force specifically designed a six-step 
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operational risk management process consisting of:  identifying hazards, assessing risk, 
analyzing risk control options and measures, making control decisions, implementing risk 
controls, and supervising/reviewing the activity.  
Risk assessment is a subset of risk management, and fundamentally involves the 
first two steps of risk management—identifying and assessing risk.  Risk assessment 
provides an environment for decision makers to evaluate and prioritize risks and to 
recommend strategies to eliminate or mitigate those risks.     
Also, risk management and assessment activities should be built into operational 
process.  The activities should not be added on top of existing process, but rather, 
integrated within the processes to help ensure the risk management principles are used 
and the benefits garnered. 
Furthermore, risk management and assessment facilitate mission assurance by 
remediating or mitigating risk and hopefully, as such, these activities reduce the 
probability of mission failure.  In the context of infrastructure risk, the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure (DCI) Program supports a risk management process seeking to ensure DCI 
availability.  The DCI Program risk management process is comprised of a risk 
assessment component that identifies critical assets and infrastructure interdependencies 
supporting DoD missions.  Ensuring critical infrastructure availability in turn supports the 
tasks that make up a mission, thus, ultimately aiding in assuring the mission.  However, 
in the cyberspace domain, risk needs to be managed and assessed beyond availability.  
There are other considerations, such as the confidentiality and integrity of information 
resources, that must be evaluated. 
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Research Question 4.   
How are risk management and risk assessment conducted in military and non-
military environments?  As the content analysis illustrated, the processes of risk 
management and risk assessment are largely the same in military and non-military 
environments.  Other than NIST documents, most of the IT specific risk management and 
assessment guidance is authored in the non-military domain.  However, while the risk 
processes may be similar, there can be challenges with executing the activities.  The 
difficultly arises from the size and complexity of the DoD versus business entities.  The 
formidable task of managing risk was summed up in the 2010 QDR—“Effectively 
managing risk across such a vast enterprise is difficult; the range and volume of 
component activities and competencies defy simple identification, categorization, and 
aggregation of risk. Moreover, a dynamic security environment requires the Department 
to be flexible and diminishes the value of formulaic risk assessments” (p. 89).   
 
Research Question 5.   
What elements of continuity of operations are required to enable mission 
assurance?  Based on the results and analysis in Chapter 4, the researcher makes the 
following assertions regarding the relationships of the 14 topics investigated (Figure13).   
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Figure 13.  Relationship of 14 Topics Investigated 
To explain the relationships, first consider mission assurance.  Overall, the desired effect 
of these activities is to assure the mission.  To evaluate mission success, critical success 
factors, mission metrics, and/or other measures must be developed.  Of interest to CIMIA 
is the dependency on IT, particularly the identification and value of IT in respect to a 
mission, in support of mission assurance.  As such, IT dependence is shown as one of the 
linkages between preparedness and assuring the mission.  Mission assurance is supported 
by the overall concept of being prepared.  Preparedness is the ability to continue 
Mission to IT Dependencies
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Organizational Resilience
Mission Assurance
Mission Assessment
Risk Management
Risk Assessment 
Scenario-Based 
Planning
Recovery                  
Incident Notification
Incident Response
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operations in the event of a disaster, attack, crisis, or other disruption.  To codify the 
concept of contingency actions or continuity of operations, plans (e.g., continuity plans, 
contingency plans, disaster plans, etc) are developed.  The protection of critical 
infrastructures is supported through a risk management program and recovery 
procedures.  Risk management includes risk assessment (i.e., the identification and 
assessment of risk), and risk assessments may be augmented with scenarios, such as 
“what if” scenario exercises.  Recovery procedures include incident notification and 
response actions, to include learning from lessons collected and analyzed during recovery 
operations.  These lessons learned may also be introduced into the risk management 
process.  However, it could also be argued that lessons could be captured and learned as 
part of any of any organizational activities.  Lastly, organizational resiliency should 
provide part of the foundation required for a successful preparedness culture.  
Organizational resilience addresses the ability to response to an incident as well as the 
overall style of the organization in support of adaptation to change, flexibility, etc.   
The model is not all inclusive, but, captures the topics analyzed and found to be 
relevant to continuity of operations (i.e., preparedness).  However, other risk management 
program activities and security-related functions (e.g., force protection, antiterrorism, and 
information assurance) may also help to ensure continuity of operations, and ultimately, 
mission assurance.  Also, other terminology could be used within the model.  For 
example, recovery, incident notification, and incident management could be summarized 
under “Incident Management.”  The 14 labels were retained in order to provide 
correlation to the 14 topics analyzed in this study. 
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Research Question 6.   
How are mission impacts represented through risk management and risk 
assessment to facilitate continuity of operations planning?  In some of the risk 
management and assessment guidance, particularly with the DCIP, the guidance stressed 
risk-related recommendations, support information, and decisions should be coordinated 
between defense critical information owners and mission owners.  Likewise, NIST, albeit 
specific to IT, proposed an organization answer two questions during IT system design—
what is the purpose of the system in relation to the mission and how important is the 
system to the user organization’s mission?  These types of coordination efforts support 
the attempt to value resources; but, the guidance is lacking on how to represent the 
mission impacts.  Other than limited metrics, little guidance was discovered. 
  
Limitations of Research  
This research has a few limitations.  Due to the significant quantity of policies 
published across the DoD, only the publications available electronically on the DoD 
Issuances and Air Force e-Publishing web sites were included in the sample.  Also, only 
Air Force departmental (Air Force-wide applicability) publications were included in the 
population.  Drafts of guidance documents, i.e. policies not published yet, were not 
reviewed.  However, while preparedness plans may be designated as “for official use 
only” or may be classified, and thus not included in this study, there was an expectation 
there should be some level of unclassified planning policy provided.    
Also, researcher bias is another limitation.  The researcher has been a member of 
the United States Air Force for over 24 years with a background in communications and 
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information.  Experience, education, and training gained over the researcher’s career 
enabled the researcher to narrow the search parameters to relevant documents within the 
research domain; however, this may inject researcher bias as well.  All efforts were taken 
to maintain objectivity and minimize bias.  For example, when the researcher was 
selecting publications for the content analysis, key word searches were conducted during 
the reviews to ensure objectivity was infused into the process.  However, researcher bias 
cannot be discounted.   
Additionally, mutual exclusiveness may be a limitation to this study, specifically 
in regards to 2 of the 14 topics investigated—lessons learned and risk assessment.  The 
two topics are mutually exclusive, as required for a coding measurement instrument.  
However, a stronger post-content analysis understanding of the topics suggested the 
subtopics for these two topics are potentially not mutually exclusive and could cause 
coding irregularities.  Despite this potential limitation, the researchers remained focused 
by coding the text within the context of the overall category and topic. 
 
Recommendations 
 Based on the content analysis conducted in this study, a few recommendations are 
proposed.  First, the Air Force should produce an overarching continuity of operations 
plan matrix, or a similar umbrella matrix, linking all of the disaster, contingency, 
emergency, crisis, etc. plans together.  NIST published a similar table in Special 
Publication 800-34, Revision 1, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information 
Systems (Draft), 2009.  The civil engineering community did this, in part, within the 
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documents they authored; however, no overarching chart was discovered for all Air Force 
plans. 
 Second, in addition to a matrix, an overall continuity management plan should be 
authored.  ITIL recommended, at the highest level, there is a need for an overall 
coordination plan.  The Air Force does have a plan close to what is needed; the plan is the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2.  The CEMP provides 
comprehensive guidance for emergency response to physical threats resulting from major 
accidents, natural disasters, conventional attacks, terrorist attacks, and CBRN attacks.  
However, the Emergency Management Program does not cover non-physical threats, 
including cyber threats.  As such, the CEMP should be revised to include cyberspace-
related emergency management information, or a new, overarching, comprehensive 
emergency plan should be developed to correlate and synergize all continuity of 
operations efforts. 
 Third, there is DoD guidance directing the construction DCI mission focus 
statements to specify DCI performance standards and conditions necessary for mission 
success.  However, there appears to be lack of guidance on how to implement the 
guidance.  If the standards can be specified though, they should be able to be measured 
and contribute to mission metrics. 
 Fourth, the data suggested there is a general absence of preparedness policy 
authored by the communication and information community.  With the previously stated 
importance of IT resources and assets, cyber preparedness guidance needs published to 
help assure mission success. 
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Lastly, and while this assertion needs to be supported empirically, anecdotally it 
appears from the researcher’s 24 years of experience in the Air Force that the Air Force’s 
ORM program is basically equated to as a safety mishap prevention program.  Although 
ORM may be useful in preventing mishaps, ORM can be applied beyond safety.  Some of 
this safety bias is shown in the principle ORM publication (AFPAM 90-902, Operational 
Risk Management Guidelines and Tools, 2000), as it discussed “mishap prevention,” 
“safeguarding health and welfare,” and “record low mishap rates.”  However, AFPAM 
90-902 did go on to state, “Beyond reducing losses, risk management also provides a 
logical process to identify and exploit opportunities” (Department of the Air Force, 
2000b, p. 5).  Additional education and emphasis should be given as to how ORM should 
be embedded within operational processes and can be used beyond just mishap 
prevention. 
  
Areas for Further Research 
There are many areas associated with the overall CIMIA research project 
requiring additional research.  However, there are a few possible areas for further 
research regarding the research presented. 
Although the research examined DoD, Air Force, NIST, and non-governmental 
publications, the review was not exhaustive. Other armed services (Army, Marine, Navy) 
publications could be reviewed for best practice and policy discoveries to aid in the 
formulation of ideas and action plans to support mission assurance.     
 Also, while a researcher could speculate on why organizations may not perform 
preparedness activities (e.g., competing time/resources, lack of organizational 
 
 
 
92 
 
introspection), a survey of senior leaders and/or commanders could be administered to 
empirically investigate this research area.  For example, a survey could be conducted to 
determine the greatest impediments to a risk management program, the number of 
continuity plans developed, and the frequency of contingency plan testing and exercises. 
 
Conclusion 
This research strove to investigate the concept of mission assurance and to present 
a content analysis of existing continuity of operations elements within military and non-
military guidance to assess the existing policy landscape to highlight best practices and 
identify policy gaps in an effort to further advance mission assurance by improving the 
timeliness and relevance of notification following a cyber incident. 
The recommendations presented are just that, recommendations, and the entire 
CIMIA research effort is a complex challenge.  However, as the dependency on IT for 
mission success continues to grow, cyberspace continues to become an ever increasingly 
contested domain, and the necessity for cyberspace situational awareness intensifies, 
incremental steps should be taken to enhance cyberspace situational awareness 
capabilities.  General Eric Shinseki, former United States Army Chief of Staff, once 
commented, "If you dislike change, you're going to dislike irrelevance even more" 
(Singer, 2009, p. 254).   
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Appendix A:  Overall Research Categories, Topics, and Subtopics 
 
OC 
No. 
Overall 
Category 
(OC) 
Topic Subtopics 
1 Mission Mission Assurance  - Mission Assurance 
 - Mission Success 
  Mission Assessment  - Mission Assessment 
 - Mission Analysis 
 - Mission Evaluation 
 - Mission Metrics 
  Mission to IT 
Dependencies 
 - Mission to IT Dependencies 
   -- Documentation 
   -- Governance 
   -- Strategic Alignment/Linkages 
- Communications 
2 Continuity 
Planning 
Continuity Plan  - Continuity Plan 
 - Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan 
 - Continuity of Government (COG) Plan 
 - Contingency Plan 
 - Business Continuity Plan 
 - Crisis Management/Response Plan 
 - Emergency Management/Response Plan 
 - Back-up Plan 
 - Disaster Plan 
 - Disaster Contingency Recovery Plan 
  Preparedness  - Continuity of Operations, Concept of 
 - Continuity of Government, Concept of 
 - Contingency Operations, Concept of 
 - Disaster Preparedness 
 - Emergency Preparedness 
 - Crisis Preparedness 
 - Readiness 
  Recovery  - Recover/Restore/Remediate 
   -- Disaster  
   -- Disruption  
   -- Catastrophe  
   -- Incident  
  Lessons Learned  - Lessons Learned 
 - Impact Analysis 
 - Business Impact Analysis 
 - Change Impact Analysis 
 - Impact Assessment  
 - Impact Evaluation 
 - Threat Analysis 
 - Threat Assessment 
 - Threat Evaluation 
 
  Scenario-Based Planning  - Impact Scenarios 
 - Worst/Likely/Best-Case Scenarios 
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  Organizational Resilience  - Organizational Resilience 
   -- Organizational Commitment 
   -- Empowerment 
   -- Trust 
   -- Flexibility/Adapt to Change 
   -- Strong Organizational Foundation 
  Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
 - Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 - Infrastructure Assurance Plan 
 - Infrastructure Protection Plan 
3 Risk Risk Management  - Risk Management 
 - Operational Risk Management 
 - Enterprise Risk Management 
  Risk Assessment  - Risk Assessment 
 - Risk Evaluation 
 - Risk Analysis 
 - Risk Profile 
 - Vulnerability Analysis 
4 Incidents Incident Response  - Incident Response 
 - CNO Incident Response 
 - Operational Incident Response 
  Incident Notification  - Incident Notification 
 - CNO Incident Notification 
 - Operational Incident Notification 
    Underlined term = key search term for coding phase 
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Appendix B:  Air Force Publication Series Number, Title and Description  
(Department of the Air Force, 2006d, pp. 104-118) 
 
Series No. and Title  Series Description 
10--Operations  Publications in this series provide policy and procedures on 
operations, and include these subjects:  
Operational readiness and security; operations and 
mobilization planning; basing actions; capability requirements; 
space; support to civil authorities; civilian and foreign use of AF 
airfields; information operations (IO); emergency and/or 
contingency planning actions and programs; electronic 
warfare; mission directives; operational reporting; and Air 
Reserve Component (ARC) forces.  
31--Security  These publications provide policy and procedures on the force 
protection of USAF warfighting resources, and include these 
subjects:  
Force protection.  
Weapon systems (aircraft and missiles), nuclear weapons, 
designated support systems, warning systems, and command and 
control systems.  
Security police, security forces activities. Law enforcement 
mission.  
Protection of resources.  
Traffic administration.  
Confinement, corrections, rehabilitation, and correctional 
custody.  
Use of military working dogs.  
Antiterrorism.  
Security police, security forces equipment management. 
Cooperation with civilian law enforcement.  
Off-installation enforcement.  
Air base defense operations (including organizing, training, and 
equipping organic ground defense forces).  
Organic USAF Point Air Defense (PAD) and Short Range Air 
Defense (SHORAD) operations. Prisoners of war.  
Classifying and declassifying classified information. 
Safeguarding classified information  
Training on classified information.  
Investigations, clearances, and program requirements. Industrial 
security.  
Acquisition security.  
32--Civil 
Engineering 
These publications provide policy and procedures on all aspects 
of Air Force Civil Engineering, including management of real 
property assets.  They treat:  
Contracting, design, construction, repair, and renovation. 
Acquisition and transfer.  
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Management and maintenance.  
Fire protection management. 
Planning and management of contingency and wartime 
activities (including all RED HORSE, Prime BEEF, Air Base 
Operability, and Disaster Preparedness). 
Government-owned or controlled housing used by the Air Force. 
Implementation of National policy goals for environmental 
restoration, compliance, pollution prevention, planning, and 
cultural and natural resource protection. 
33--
Communications 
and Information  
These publications provide policy and procedures on all aspects 
of communications and information management, including 
command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force use to support 
Department of Defense goals, managing information as a 
Department of Defense asset from its creation through its 
disposition. 
90--Special 
Management  
This series provides policy and procedure on subjects that do not 
more appropriately fall under one of the other AFSC-based 
functional series. Includes:  
Organizational strategic planning.  
Policy formulation.  
Performance measurement.  
The Inspector General.  
Liaison with the Congress.  
91--Safety  This series provides policy and procedures on administering the 
Air Force Nuclear Systems Surety and Safety Programs, and 
includes these subjects:  
Monitoring, analyzing, and evaluating all phases of nuclear 
weapon design, operations, maintenance, modifications, and 
logistical movements.  
Preventing nuclear accidents or incidents.  
Overseeing ground-based nuclear reactor systems.  
Reviewing procedures for nuclear power systems and the space or 
missile use of radioactive sources.  
Setting safety rules for all operations with nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapon systems.  
Identifying and eliminating hazardous practices and conditions. 
Investigating and reporting mishaps.  
Creating reporting forms and procedures.  
Analyzing and evaluating mishap reports.  
Recommending measures to prevent mishaps.  
Providing safety education.  
Maintaining records of statistical mishap prevention data.  
Ensuring flight, missile, ground, space, and explosive safety.  
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Appendix C:  USAF Publications of Interest (Operations/10 Series)   
 
Publication Number      Text Extracts/Notes 
AFPD 10-2, READINESS, 
2006 
2. The Air Force will establish C2 architecture to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) and combatant commanders and to provide continuity of C2 in the event of hostile 
action or natural disaster. 
6.2.4. Develop methods to ensure continuity of operations within their commands. 
6.2.4.1. Prioritize the essential functions necessary to support mission execution and apply 
risk management principals to ensure continuity. 
Continuity of Operations—The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of 
functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out 
the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as 
the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the 
authority and direction of the commander. 
AFPD 10-7, 
INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS, 2006 
Network Operations (NetOps)—The integrated planning and employment of military 
capabilities to provide the friendly net environment needed to plan, control and execute 
military operations and conduct Service functions. NetOps provides operational planning and 
control. It involves time-critical, operational-level decisions that direct configuration changes 
and information routing. NetOps risk management and command and control decisions 
are based on a fused assessment of intelligence, ongoing operations, commander‘s intent, 
blue and gray situation, net health, and net security. NetOps provides the three capabilities 
of information assurance, network/system management, and information dissemination 
management. (AFDD 2-5) 
AFPD 10-8, HOMELAND 
DEFENSE AND CIVIL 
SUPPORT, 2006 
1.5. To fulfill the National Strategy for Homeland Security’s key objectives, the DOD must 
have core capabilities in place to assure mission success. Mission assurance-- the certainty that 
DOD components can perform assigned tasks or duties in accordance with the intended 
purpose or plan-- is therefore itself a key objective. DOD’s framework for mission assurance 
includes a range of programs and efforts aimed at securing DOD warfighting capabilities even 
when under attack or after disruption. These include force protection measures, installation 
preparedness, COOP, emergency management (EM), consequence management, continuity of 
government (COG) and critical defense infrastructure protection. 
6.2.4. Maintain a comprehensive and effective COOP and CIP to ensure continuity of 
mission essential functions under all circumstances. 
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AFPD 10-24, AIR FORCE 
CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROGRAM (CIP), 2006 
1. Air Force operations in support of the National Military Strategy are dependent on globally 
linked physical and cyber infrastructures (US and foreign, public and private sector). These 
interconnected infrastructures, while improving capabilities and mission effectiveness, also 
increase the Air Force’s vulnerability, 
in regards to failures due to human error, natural disasters, and/or intentional attack. 
Consequently, it is important to identify and protect those infrastructures that are truly critical 
to the Air Force so it can accomplish its worldwide missions. 
3.  The Air Force CIP will complement and integrate the mission assurance aspects of 
existing Air Force Antiterrorism, Force Protection, Information Assurance, Continuity of 
Operations, and Readiness programs. 
4. It is the Commanders’ responsibility to judiciously manage risk in order to accomplish 
the mission. 
5.2. The Secretary of the Air Force, Communications (SAF/XC dual-hatted as A6): 
5.2.3. Plans and develops procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information 
systems that support the operations and assets of the Air Force. 
6.7. Monitor and report decisions undertaken to remediate identified critical asset 
vulnerabilities. In case of loss or disruption of critical infrastructure, develop strategies for 
mitigating the effects of such loss or disruption and include them in the Continuity of 
Operations Plans (COOP). 
Critical Infrastructure Asset—An infrastructure asset deemed essential to Air Force 
operations or the functioning of a Critical Asset. 
Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)—The identification, assessment, and security 
enhancement of cyber and physical assets and associated infrastructures essential to the 
execution of the National Military Strategy. It is a complementary program linking the mission 
assurance aspects of the Anti-Terrorism, Force Protection, Information Assurance, Continuity 
of Operations, and Readiness programs. 
Critical—The level of importance of an asset to the success of the Combatant Commands or 
Air Force mission. For the AF CIP, criticality is broken down into four Tiers: 
– Tier I - Warfighter/Combatant Commands suffers strategic mission failure. Specific 
timeframes 
and scenarios assist in infrastructure prioritization. 
– Tier II - The Air Force suffers mission failure, but warfighter strategic mission is 
accomplished. 
– Tier III - Individual element failures, but no debilitating strategic or Air Force mission 
failure. 
– Tier IV - Everything else. 
AFPD 10-25, 
EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT, 2007 
3. Air Force organizations will use the AFIMS for peacetime and wartime incident 
response and recovery. The Air Force will support federal emergency preparedness and 
incident management programs consistent with military operations. EM Program policies, 
guidance and procedures will focus on operational requirements and will incorporate 
requirements in the National Response Plan, federal statutes, DOD guidance and host-nation 
agreements. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection—Mission Assurance/Risk Management program 
involving actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the risks resulting from 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending on risk, these actions could include 
changes in tactics, techniques or procedures; adding redundancy; selection of another asset; 
isolation or hardening; guarding; or similar measures. (DODD 3020.40) 
 
 
 
99 
 
AFI 10-201, STATUS OF 
RESOURCES AND 
TRAINING SYSTEM, 2006 
Wartime Mission—A task or group of tasks assigned to a unit in an approved operations plan 
and expected to be executed during some level of armed conflict whether incident, limited 
war, or general  war. 
1.1.3.3. A fundamental premise of SORTS reporting is integrity. Commanders must “tell it 
like it is” (in accordance with (IAW) paragraphs 1.10.7. and 1.10.8.) and not allow masking of 
deficiencies to affect their ability to provide capability or other readiness related information. 
Risk must be balanced with responsibility. Effective management of unit resources requires 
accurate information at all levels. 
AFI 10-204, 
PARTICIPATION IN 
JOINT AND NATIONAL 
EXERCISES, 2010 
Exercises play an essential role in preparing United States Air Force (USAF) forces to conduct 
air, space, and cyberspace operations and perform their mission essential tasks. 
1.5.4.1.2. Ensure exercise activities help command and subordinate units achieve and 
maintain their designed operational capability, and are able to fulfill OPLAN taskings and 
appropriately respond to contingencies, such as natural disasters or terrorist incidents. 
AFI 10-206, 
OPERATIONAL 
REPORTING, 2008 
3.1. Subject and Purpose. CPs uses the OPREP-3s to immediately notify commanders of any 
significant event or incident that rises to the level of DoD, AF, or MAJCOM interests. 
Subject of OPREP-3 (reference event/incident category from AFI 10-206, Attachment 2, 
OPREP-3 and Reports Matrix). 
Aircraft/equipment status (available, fully mission capable, partially mission capable, not 
mission capable) 
AFI 10-207, COMMAND 
POSTS, 2008 
6.1. Mission Movement. Execution of the mission is accomplished by controllers performing 
pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight coordination, direction, and reporting necessary to 
ensure successful mission accomplishment for all tasked missions. 
6.1.1. Mission management is the function of organizing, planning, directing, and controlling 
Combat Air Forces (CAF), MAF, and training missions operating worldwide. Mission 
management includes mission execution authority: the authority to direct where and when a 
mission goes and what it does once it arrives. This function is typically performed at the AOC 
level. An example of mission management is the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). 
Mission Management—The function of organizing, planning, directing, and controlling 
AMC airlift and/or tanker mission operating worldwide. Mission management includes 
mission execution authority, the authority to direct where and when a mission goes and what it 
does once it arrives there. The TACC and AME controllers are mission managers. 
AFI 10-208, CONTINUITY 
OF OPERATIONS (COOP) 
PROGRAM, 2005 
Chapter 1— DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE COOP POLICY AND GUIDANCE  
1.1. General; 1.2. Air Force Guidance; 1.3. Air Force Policy; 1.4. Air Force Organizational 
Responsibilities; 1.5. Air Force Organizational Responsibilities for a COOP Program; 1.6. Air 
Force Organizational Responsibilities for COOP Planning; 1.7. Air Force Organizational 
Responsibilities for COOP Training; 1.8. Air Force Organizational Responsibilities for COOP 
Exercises; 1.9. Air Force Organizational Responsibilities for COOP Communication and 
Logistics; 1.10. Air Force Organizational Responsibilities for COOP Funding and Acquisition; 
1.11. Air Force Organizational Responsibilities for COOP Issue Resolution 
Chapter 2— COOP PLAN DEVELOPMENT GUIDANCE 
2.1. COOP Planning Factors; 2.2. Implementing COOP Plans; 2.3. Writing the COOP Plan; 
2.4. Classifying COOP Plans; 2.5. COOP Plan Review. All organizations are required to 
validate and update their COOP plan every 2 years 
Chapter 3— HAF COOP PROGRAM.   
3.1. Introduction; 3.2. Applicability; 3.3. HAF Responsibilities; 3.4. Additional Tasked 
Organizations; 3.5. Emergency Planning Coordinator Responsibilities; 3.6. Air Force 
Emergency Operations Center (AFEOC) and Site M Administration; 3.7. Exercises and 
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Training; 3.8. Issue Resolution 
AFI 10-209, RED HORSE 
PROGRAM, 2008 
1.5.1. Establish a command RED HORSE program to ensure personnel are organized, 
trained, and equipped to respond to wartime, disaster, and other contingency-related 
missions. 
Contingency—An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, 
subversives, or military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies 
require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of 
personnel, installations, and equipment. 
AFI 10-211, CIVIL 
ENGINEER 
CONTINGENCY 
RESPONSE PLANNING, 
2008 
Chapter 2— CONTINGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS 
2.1. Peacetime Planning;  2.2. Disaster and Attack Preparations; 2.3. Disaster Recovery Tasks 
Chapter 3— CE CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS 
3.1. Command and Control (C2); 3.2. CE Contingency Response Structure; 3.3. Military 
Personnel; 3.4. Civilian Personnel 
Contingency—An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, 
subversives or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, 
contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and 
readiness of personnel, installations and equipment. (JP 1-02) 
AFI 10-213, 
COMPTROLLER 
OPERATIONS UNDER 
EMERGENCY 
CONDITIONS, 1994 
2.4.1. Ensure their command or agency comptroller wartime and contingency planning is 
accomplished per applicable guidelines, including those in the comptroller annexes to the 
WMP, the USAF Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution (SRR 355) Plan, AFPD 10-4 and 
AFMAN 10-401 and AFIs 10-402, Mobilization Planning, and 10-403, Deployment Planning, 
and this instruction. 
7.4. Contingency Plans. 
7.4.1. There are numerous scenarios that could occur at a base-level comptroller office which 
would affect the mission. Every base has some risks uniquely associated to location, 
weather, or mission.  Each base level comptroller office is tasked with developing and 
maintaining local plans to be implemented in the event of a local emergency or natural 
disaster. Specific guidance is contained in AF 170, 172, and 177 series publications and AFI 
32-4001. Comptroller personnel should work closely with disaster preparedness personnel to 
develop the plans. These plans should cover, as a minimum, the following: 
7.4.1.1. The roles of the accounting and finance office (DAO and FSO), and the financial 
analysis office. 
7.4.1.2. Points of contact at all levels in the event of implementation of the plan. 
7.4.1.3. Priority mission requirements. 
7.4.1.4. Guidance for implementation. 
AFI 10-218, PERSONNEL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
OR NATIONAL 
EMERGENCIES, 2006 
1.1. Background. During natural disasters or national emergencies, the ability to quickly 
assess the status of Air Force Airmen, Department of the Air Force (DAF) and 
Nonappropriated Funds (NAF) civilians and families is critical. Both our ability to recover 
from these incidents and to return to normal  operations are top priorities.  
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AFPAM 10-219V1, 
CONTINGENCY AND 
DISASTER PLANNING, 
2008 
2.4.2. Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2. At any USAF base, the 
CEMP 10-2 is the "master" plan for base level emergency response to physical threats 
resulting from major accidents; natural disasters; enemy attack or terrorist use of chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosives (CBRNE). This plan outlines actions 
and assigns responsibilities to agencies required to cope with catastrophes caused by the 
incidents mentioned above—especially those that involve nuclear or other hazardous material. 
This can be a very useful and versatile document. A planner can add appendices to the annexes 
to cover almost any disaster. A few other plans are often incorporated in this way. Civil 
engineers are responsible for preparing this plan, but it requires the input of many other 
organizations on base. This plan helps provide the basis on which to build the CE Contingency 
Response Plan. The directing document for the CEMP 10-2 is AFI 10-2501, Air Force 
Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations. This publication lays out 
the basic requirements; however, the MAJCOM may provide additional details. 
6.5.1. Set Objectives. When planning CE inputs, first determine or set objectives for the 
exercise. The particular crisis or threat will dictate the basic thrust of the exercise. Also 
consider MAJCOM special interest items, Inspector General (IG) findings from other units, 
and deficiencies noted from previous exercises when setting exercise objectives. Do not 
overlook the common-core criteria detailed in AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities. 
General information is also contained in AFI 10-204, Readiness Exercises and After-Action 
Reporting Program. Obviously, the scenarios should test response capabilities and evaluate 
response planning. Scenarios should also identify limiting factors (LIMFAC) and evaluation 
of the following: 
6.5.1.1. Recall procedures. 
6.5.1.2. Command and control. 
6.5.1.3. Crisis management; the ability to respond to the situation (recovery actions). 
6.5.1.4. Predisaster actions. 
6.5.1.5. Security (OPSEC and COMSEC). 
6.5.1.6. Deployment processing. 
6.5.1.7. Postdisaster recovery. 
A3.2.4.2. Vulnerability Analysis. Identify the parts of the base or off-base community that 
may be affected by each hazard or threat; the population within each zone that is subject to 
harm; critical facilities or functions at risk (for example, hospital and command post); and 
property and environmental systems that may be damaged. 
A3.2.4.3. Risk Analysis. A risk analysis provides a means to judge the relative likelihood of a 
hazard/threat occurring and the magnitude of harm to personnel and mission should that 
hazard/threat occur. 
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AFPAM 10-219V2, CIVIL 
ENGINEER DISASTER 
AND ATTACK 
PREPARATIONS, 2008 
3.5.3.4. Dispersal During Survival, Recovery, and Reconstitution (SRR) Plan 
Implementation. The SRR plan is intended to improve survival and enhance recovery and 
reconstitution operations for CONUS air force installations under threat of nuclear attack. 
Not all CONUS civil engineer units have responsibilities under an SRR plan. For those 
installations that do, the BCE and staff should carefully review the local SRR plan to 
determine specific actions required during implementation. The general SRR concept of 
operations during various attack phases follows. 
4.2.1. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC is the C2 support element that 
directs, monitors, and supports the installation’s actions before, during, and after an 
incident, attack, or disaster. 
4.4.1.2. Incident Status Displays. In addition to maps, readily visible status displays (usually 
electronic or status boards) help the EOC staff keep track of the condition of the installation, 
unit status, and the recovery efforts. Suggested incident status displays include those listed in 
Table 4.3. 
4.4.4. Continuity of Operations. Provide for continuity of command and control. Organize 
the second shift for the control center. Set up an alternate control center during wartime 
operations. There are many ways to do this.  
7.2.3. Risk Analysis. Risk analysis is an assessment of the likelihood of an accidental release 
of a hazardous material and the consequences that might result based on the estimated 
vulnerable zones. Risk analysis is based on the history of previous incidents at the installation, 
mathematical modeling, and the best available information. 
8.1. Introduction. Support between units is a routine activity at most air bases and is necessary 
to ensure daily mission accomplishment. Likewise, the support that CE provides to and 
receives from others during or after an emergency also helps to ensure mission 
continuity. 
AFPAM 10-219V3, CIVIL 
ENGINEER DISASTER 
AND ATTACK 
RECOVERY 
PROCEDURES, 2008 
1.1. General Information. The unpredictable nature of war and disasters requires a great 
degree of flexibility by the civil engineer (CE) force during disaster and attack recovery 
operations. CE units must maintain contingency response capabilities to restore operations, 
save lives, mitigate human suffering, and minimize damage during and after a crisis on or near 
the installation. The CE contingency response plan (CRP) should be followed to ensure a 
coordinated response; however, no plan covers all possible scenarios. Therefore, all elements 
of the civil engineer team must have the ability to quickly adjust to changing circumstances. 
Engineering knowledge, experience, and common sense are crucial factors to installation 
recovery. Immediately after a disaster or attack, civil engineers operate in the reactionary 
mode to immediately eliminate life-threatening hazards. In later phases of the recovery, the 
engineer force begins a more deliberate effort. The environment may still be chaotic and there 
are still many immediate actions that must be taken, but the overwhelming dangers that 
prevailed during the emergency are past. The effort to identify and quantify the damage, 
assign repair priorities, and determine recovery strategy now begins. Volumes 1 and 2 of this 
pamphlet series discuss preparedness planning and steps to take prior to experiencing a 
natural/manmade disaster or installation attack. This volume, coupled with Volume 4, Airfield 
Damage Repair Operations, provide CE procedures that form the basis for an effective 
installation recovery capability. 
2.3.4.1. Recovery Activities. The EOC determines the scope of the damage and its impact on 
the installation mission. The EOC accounts for personnel and casualties and monitors material 
resources. It develops a recovery strategy, directs recovery actions, and tracks recovery 
progress. 
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AFPAM 10-219V4, 
AIRFIELD DAMAGE 
REPAIR OPERATIONS, 
2008 
1.4.7.8. Airbase Recovery. Forces must be prepared to recover the airbase after a 
conventional attack with the resumption of flying operations as first priority. Other recovery 
activities may be conducted concurrently; however, these activities must not impede the 
resumption of flying operations. Base recovery actions should be identical whether at a MOB 
or bare base. 
2.1. General. Mission success in all theaters of operation depends upon the level of individual 
and unit training. 
AFPAM 10-219V7, 
EXPEDIENT METHODS, 
2008 
2.1. Introduction. Expedient construction and repair of roads and drainage systems during 
disasters or after an attack could be crucial to recovery operations and mission 
sustainment. 
AFPAM 10-219V8, PRIME 
BASE ENGINEER 
EMERGENCY FORCE 
(BEEF) MANAGEMENT, 
2007 
1.3. Military Operations Planning. Good operations planning enables the Air Force—jointly 
with its sister services—to respond rapidly and effectively to anticipated threats or unforeseen 
crises. Because many of the concepts and terms used in this volume are tied to joint operations 
planning, this short over view of military operations planning is included to help clarify the 
process unfamiliar to many personnel. For more details, see AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations 
Planning and Execution. 
1.3.1. Deliberate Versus Crisis Action Planning. Operation planning is usually done 
deliberately during peacetime to prepare for likely threats; however, operation planning is 
done in the crisis action mode when an unanticipated crisis arises with little or no 
warning. The big difference between deliberate and crisis action planning is the amount of 
time available. In the crisis action mode, the situation will dictate whether commanders and 
planners can modify a deliberate plan or must create a “no plan” response. 
1.3.2. Operation Plans. In either case, operation planning is a process to determine how to 
respond to a likely threat or actual crisis and what forces are needed. The result is 
documented in an operations plan (OPLAN) or, if time is very short, in the operations order 
(OPORD). An OPLAN or OPORD identifies which combat and support units will be used to 
respond to the threat or crisis. It shows where, when, and how those forces will be deployed, 
employed, and supported. An OPLAN also outlines the command structure and provides 
functional area direction. An OPLAN covers the five phases of a military operation: 
mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.  Major OPLANs are 
updated every 24 months. 
1.4.  The next few paragraphs highlight key parts of the systems and subsystems that 
affect civil engineers.  For more information on these systems, refer to AFI 10-401. 
2.8.5.8. Create the force beddown or base recovery plan of action. Clearly define the tasks 
for subordinates and make sure they understand their tasks, resources, and required completion 
times. Ensure the latest available data, plans and checklists are being utilized for 
beddown/recovery plans. Verify through appropriate personnel/offices/directorates. 
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AFH 10-222V3, CIVIL 
ENGINEER GUIDE TO 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
PROTECTION, 2008 
1.3. Elements of Force Protection. Force protection includes efforts designed to prevent 
attacks on DOD assets and interests and minimize the effect of any attacks. It is unrealistic to 
assume every DOD asset can be protected. For this reason, plans and preparations to 
recover from an attack must be focused on enabling the mission to continue and 
restoring confidence throughout the unit and local population. 
1.3.4. Recovery. Commanders design plans to recover from the effects of a terrorist 
incident while continuing the mission. Air Force emergency man-agement procedures are 
outlined in AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and 
Operations. 
2.7. Risk Management. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and 
controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions to balance risk costs 
with mission benefits. This process is called a risk assessment. Risk assessments provide 
commanders with a method to assist them in making resource allocation decisions designed to 
protect their personnel and assets from possible terrorist threats in a resource-constrained 
environment. The risk assessment is based upon three critical components: threat, criticality, 
and vulnerability assessments. It is conducted after completing all other assessments. Any plan 
that does not start with these assessments will probably be too reactive and result in wasted 
efforts and resources. Once vulnerabilities are identified, commanders manage risk by 
developing strategies to deter terrorist incidents, employing countermeasures, and mitigating 
the effects and developing plans to recover from terrorist incidents. Civil engineers 
participating in the development of FP and AT plans should also participate in the risk 
assessment. The information collected during the risk assessment is critical to developing 
effective FP and AT plans. For more information on risk management, refer to AFTTP(I) 3-
2.34, Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management. 
5.2.1. Assessment. As stated in Chapter 2, an assessment of the threat, including 
vulnerability, criticality, and risk assessments, must be conducted to determine how best 
to employ defensive measures. 
AFH 10-222V4, 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
GUIDE FOR 
CONTINGENCY 
OPERATIONS, 2007 
2.1.1. Risk Management. Risk Management is an effective method for ensuring all 
environmental concerns are addressed. Environmental risk management matrices can be used 
to identify when, where, and how planned training activities or fast-paced military operations 
might cause damage to the environment and to what extent. Plans can then be adjusted to 
minimize adverse effects on the environment and personnel without jeopardizing the mission. 
This increases the overall chance of mission success. 
2.2.5. Risk Assessment (RA). A Risk Assessment (RA) is normally included in the EIAP and 
can be conducted prior to operations to determine potential environmental impacts. The RA 
can be used to assess alternative methods or actions which might minimize environmental 
impacts. The RA is also used to determine the level of acceptable risk in the contingency 
environment when operations take priority. 
AFH 10-222V8, GUIDE TO 
MOBILE AIRCRAFT 
ARRESTING SYSTEM 
INSTALLATION, 2006 
1.2.2.1. Based on the above information, the Wing or Installation Operations Center should 
pass information through the Survival Recovery Center (SRC) or the CE disaster control 
center (DCC) in order to make appropriate MAAS installation, operation, and maintenance 
decisions. 
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AFH 10-222V14, CIVIL 
ENGINEER GUIDE TO 
FIGHTING POSITIONS, 
SHELTERS, OBSTACLES, 
AND REVETMENTS, 2008 
1.3.1. Planning Factors. Some key factors engineers consider while planning for physical 
security include desired levels of protection, potential threats, criticality and vulnerability 
assessments, and acceptable levels of risk. 
1.3.2. Levels of Protection. Physical security measures are employed to obtain certain levels of 
protection. These protection levels are usually based upon known threats and the results of 
intelligence and assessment reports. It is unrealistic to believe all assets can be protected and 
the threat completely eliminated. This perception causes valuable resources to be wasted or 
misallocated. Risk management is based on the assumption that some risks must be taken to 
ensure limited resources are applied against the highest priority assets first, rather than all 
assets equally. Criticality assessments usually result in the assignment of certain values to 
particular assets. They reveal the degree of debilitating impact that destruction of certain 
assets would have upon the mission; obviously, personnel come first. Unacceptable losses 
require higher levels of protection. Assets most critical to the mission must be afforded 
higher levels of protection, especially if vulnerability assessments indicate these assets are not 
already sufficiently protected. Different levels of protection are described in UFC 4-020-01, 
DOD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual. The following paragraphs cover the 
assessments usually conducted to assist commanders in determining levels of protection. 
1.3.3. Threat Assessment. This assessment is used to identify threats based on key factors 
such as the existence, capability, and intentions of potential hostile forces and terrorist groups. 
Group activities and the operational environment are also considered. Potential threats are 
categorized in various ways (e.g., terrorists, saboteurs, spies, extremists, criminals). Any 
weapons, tools, and explosives likely to be used in an attack upon DOD personnel or critical 
assets are also identified during the assessment. 
1.3.5. Vulnerability Assessment. The vulnerability assessment is an evaluation conducted to 
determine if key assets are provided appropriate levels of protection. Protection levels are 
based on minimum standards where no specific threat has been identified or on higher levels 
of protection where a specific threat has been identified. This assessment analyzes the threat, 
likely tactics, and key targets that may be vulnerable to attack. 
1.3.6. Risk Assessment. Risk assessments help commanders make decisions on the most 
effective ways to allocate limited resources needed to protect personnel and critical assets. The 
assessment is based upon the results of the threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments. 
Based on these assessments, the commander commits resources to achieve certain levels of 
protection for personnel and mission-critical assets. With limited resources, all assets cannot 
be afforded equal levels of protection. Risk Management provides the commander with the 
best information available to make resource allocation decisions. If plans do not 
incorporate these assessments, they will likely be too reactive and cause limited resources to 
be misdirected or wasted. For additional information on the assessments used in determining 
levels of protection, refer to AFH 10-222, Volume 3, Civil Engineer Guide to Expeditionary 
Force Protection. 
Risk Management—The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from 
operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. 
AFH 10-222V16, GUIDE 
FOR USE OF THE 
MINIMUM AIRFIELD 
OPERATING SURFACE 
MARKING SYSTEM, 2005 
The expedient procedures in this handbook are emergency recovery actions performed when 
urgent mission requirements and insufficient time prevents restoring the markings to their 
original peacetime criteria. 
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AFH 10-222V22, 
REFUGEE CAMP 
PLANNING AND 
CONSTRUCTION 
HANDBOOK, 2000 
Flexibility. Another likelihood during a refugee crisis is that “firm” requirements will often 
change. Like any contingency operation, critical planning factors that are unknown 
during the planning stage can have significant impacts on the project as the operation 
progresses. 
AFI 10-245, 
ANTITERRORISM (AT), 
2009 
1.1.2.  AT programs should be coordinated with overarching efforts to achieve protection, 
such as Force Protection (FP), critical infrastructure protection and continuity of 
operations, as described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 
1.2.14.3. Implement terrorism incident planning for response, consequence management 
and recovery within AT Programs. 
2.20.1. Incident response measures shall be developed consistent with the principles outlined 
in DOD 5200.08-R and AFI 10-2501 and included in the overall AT plan. These measures 
shall include procedures for determining the nature and scope of incident response (including 
incidents with a CBRNE component); procedures for coordinating security, fire, medical, 
hazardous material and other emergency responder capabilities; and steps to recover from 
the incident while continuing essential operations. 
AT Risk Management—The process of systematically identifying, assessing and controlling 
risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance possible adverse 
outcomes with mission benefits. The end products of the AT program risk management 
process shall be the identification of DOD elements and personnel that are vulnerable to the 
identified threat attack means. From the assessment of risk based upon the three critical 
components of AT risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment and 
vulnerability assessment), the commander must determine which DOD elements and personnel 
are at greatest risk and how best to employ given resources and FP measures to deter, mitigate 
or prepare for a terrorist incident. 
Table 2.1. AT Threat Planning Scenarios. 
Figure 2.1. AT Risk Management Process. 
A4.1. Overview . The commander has an inherent command responsibility to reduce risks that 
threaten the mission with available resources. Risk management described in AFPD 31-1, 
aids the commander in assessing risk. 
AFI 10-246, FOOD AND 
WATER PROTECTION 
PROGRAM, 2004 
2.28.8. Develops contingency support plans and base recovery actions related to water 
systems IAW applicable AF policy and coordinates plans/actions with appropriate base 
agencies. 
Attachment 3 - Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
AFI 10-401, AIR FORCE 
OPERATIONS PLANNING 
AND EXECUTION, 2006 
Risk—1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. See degree of risk. See also 
hazard; risk management. 
Risk Assessment—(DOD) The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of 
risk management process). 
Risk Management—(DOD) The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling, risks 
arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission 
benefits. Also called RM. See also risk. 
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AFMAN 10-401V2, 
PLANNING FORMATS 
AND GUIDANCE, 1998 
3. ( ) EXECUTION [C4 INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROTECTION(U)] 
a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Summarize the description of the environment, intended use, 
and broad security guidance. Include personnel clearance and access levels, the sensitivity 
assessment, security mode of operation, and both hardware and software security mechanisms 
and identify all intended connections and interfaces. Employ information protection tools, 
backups/recovery, and other procedures or tactics to thwart adversary lethal and 
nonlethal attacks on friendly C4 information systems. Include low system threats, 
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures are to be obtained and degrees (low, medium, high) 
of assurance for availability, integrity, confidentiality, and accountability. 
b. ( ) Tasks. Identify a command element that is responsible for coordinating C4 information 
systems protection actions. In separate sub-paragraphs, assign tasks and responsibilities to 
each subordinate command in order to implement and accomplish C4 information systems 
protection actions (to include identifying C4 information systems protection vulnerabilities). 
Develop emergency recovery procedures in the event all protection measures fail. 
AFI 10-403, 
DEPLOYMENT 
PLANNING AND 
EXECUTION, 2008 
2.23. Factors in Determining Worst-Case Scenario. 
2.23.1. There are a number of factors units must consider in estimating their worst-case 
scenario. The IDO works with functional planners, unit representatives, operational planners, 
and MAJCOMs to determine the worst-case scenario. They review contingency plans the 
installation is tasked to support, the UTC Availability, UTC availability P-coding, DOC 
statements, home station mission requirements, possible installation through-put, etc. Table 
2.1. depicts many of the factors that must  be considered. 
AFI 10-420, COMBAT AIR 
FORCES AVIATION 
SCHEDULING, 2006 
4.2.2.  All MAJCOM objections must be stated in terms of the four GFM risk categories: 
operational risk, force management risk, future challenges risk, and institutional risk. For CAF 
SIPT purposes, force management risk is the most likely category. 
Risk Definitions 
Operational Risk: The ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or 
contingency.  
Future Challenges Risk: The ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational 
concepts needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. 
Force Management Risk: The ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip sufficient numbers of 
quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many 
operational tasks. 
Institutional Risk: The ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources 
efficiently and promote the effective operation of the Defense establishment. 
Risk Levels 
Low Risk: Success can be achieved with planned resources; unanticipated requirements can be 
easily managed with minimal impact on the force. 
Moderate Risk: Success will require additional resources from other plans or operations; 
timelines will have to be extended to achieve commander’s end states; unanticipated 
requirements may necessitate adjustment to the plan. 
High Risk: Success will require resources from other plans and operations and some 
significant capability shortfalls may exist; significant adjustments to timelines will be 
required; unanticipated requirements will necessitate major adjustments to plans. 
Extreme Risk: Success will require extraordinary adjustments to plans and programs; will 
require reallocating significant resources from other operations; some resources may be 
deficient or absent altogether; even with significant adjustments to timelines, all commander’s 
objectives may not be achieved; the force will be unable to manage unanticipated 
requirements. 
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AFI 10-604, 
CAPABILITIES-BASED 
PLANNING, 2006 
Capabilities-Based Planning—Planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable 
for a wide range of challenges and circumstances, all designed to achieve certain battlespace 
effects. 
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA)—A process identifying Air Force-wide 
capability shortfalls, gaps, and tradespace study areas. Capabilities review, risk assessment, 
and senior leader review and decisions are incorporated into the CRRA process. 
Course of Action—1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A 
possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the 
accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A 
line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System concept development phase. 
AFI 10-701, OPERATIONS 
SECURITY (OPSEC), 2007 
2.1.1. OPSEC is accomplished using a five-step process: 1) Identify critical information; 2) 
Analyze threats; 3) Analyze vulnerabilities; 4) Assess risk; and 5) Apply OPSEC measures. 
Although these steps are normally applied in a sequential manner during deliberate or crisis 
action planning, dynamic situations may require any step to be revisited at any time. 
Acceptable Level of Risk—An authority's determination of the level of potential harm to an 
operation, program, or activity due to the loss of information that the authority is willing to 
accept. 
AFI 10-802, MILITARY 
SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES, 2002 
1.2. Homeland Security (HLS). The preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption 
of, defense against and response to threats and aggressions directed towards US territory, 
sovereignty, domestic population, infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence 
management, and other domestic civil support. 
HLS includes domestic preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, and civil support in 
case of attacks on civilians, continuity of government, continuity of military operations, 
border and coastal defense, and national missile defense. MSCA operations are a part of the 
nation’s Homeland Security campaign. 
AFI 10-901, LEAD 
OPERATING COMMAND-
-COMMUNICATIONS 
AND INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
MANAGEMENT, 2001 
3.7.12. Ensures operational risk management (ORM) is incorporated into the Lead 
Command process in accordance with Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 91-215, Operational 
Risk Management (ORM) Guidelines and Tools, to help control risks. 
AFI 10-1211, SPACE 
LAUNCH OPERATIONS, 
2006 
1.2.  Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is the AFSPC organization responsible for 
acquisition and sustainment of the Expendable Launch Vehicle flight systems and ground 
systems. SMC performs acquisition management and mission assurance for these systems. 
Mission Assurance—Accomplished through the contractor’s demonstration of their 
production, operation, maintenance, and problem resolution processes with government 
personnel performing surveillance to ensure these processes result in an acceptable level of 
mission risk to the government. 
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AFI 10-1212, SPACE 
LAUNCH VEHICLE 
RETURN TO FLIGHT, 
2001 
2. Scope. This instruction applies to all (government and commercial) unmanned space launch 
vehicle systems (current and future) that have a launch mishap at an AFSPC space launch 
range, or have commonality to another system that has a mishap. There are two RTF 
certification processes: safety assurance and mission assurance. 
3.2. Mission Assurance RTF Certification Process. Mission assurance certification 
demonstrates that appropriate corrective actions have been taken to ensure mission success. 
Responsible agencies will actively participate in the mission assurance RTF process by 
providing the SMC/CC and SW/CC with an analysis, an action plan and written certification 
that mission assurance RTF criteria have been met.  For USAF-supported missions, the 
SMC/CC will approve mission assurance RTF certification as soon as it is complete, but no 
later than the FRR for the first flight following a launch mishap for the affected launch system. 
If mission assurance RTF certification is not complete by the scheduled FRR, the FRR and 
possibly the launch will be rescheduled to a later date. 
4. Criteria. Safety and mission assurance RTF certification will determine the readiness to 
resume flight operations for a space launch vehicle system based on the following criteria. 
4.2. Mission Assurance Criteria. The SMC/CC is responsible for certifying that mission 
assurance criteria are met for USAF-supported missions. As a minimum, certification must 
address the following criteria: 
4.2.1. Ensure all failure-related issues involving pre-launch processing are resolved. 
4.2.2. Ensure all failure-related issues involving launch vehicle and/or payload performance 
go/no-go criteria are resolved. 
4.2.3. Ensure all failure-related issues involving launch vehicle and/or payload hardware 
production, integration and test, vehicle inspection/checkout, or contractor 
processes/procedures are resolved. 
4.2.4. Ensure all failure-related issues involving launch vehicle and/or payload design flaws 
are resolved. 
AFI 10-2001, DEFENSIVE 
COUNTERINFORMATION 
PLANNING, 
OPERATIONS AND 
ASSESSMENT, 2001 
1.2.   Defensive Counterinformation (DCI) involvement should incorporate an operational risk 
management (ORM) process by which commanders assess and address risks posed to their 
information and associated infrastructures. In order to achieve these goals, commanders and 
planners must identify mission critical information and information systems, conduct 
vulnerability assessments on those systems, develop and implement plans to mitigate 
risk, include these activities in exercise planning and implementation, and include DCI 
considerations into the acquisition and procurement planning cycles. 
2.1.1.2. Ensure operational and exercise planning includes identification and risk assessment 
of friendly information centers of gravity (COGs). 
2.1.1.3. Integrate Operational Risk Management (ORM) to develop courses of action to 
mitigate vulnerabilities of these critical friendly information COGs.  See AFI 90-901, 
Operational Risk Management (ORM). 
2.1.1.4. Periodically test an organization’s ability to protect information COGs via the unit’s 
exercise program. 
AFI 10-2303, 
BATTLELABS, 2003 
2.4. Knowledge Management. Maintaining an accessible repository for accumulated 
knowledge is crucial for exchanging information among innovation organizations, activities, 
and stakeholders. HQ USAF/XIIV maintains the Information Sharing Website (ISW) to 
facilitate the exchange of information. The ISW is comprised of resources, Public Affairs 
information, lessons learned, summaries of initiatives, and AIRs. The ISW (a restricted 
website) can be found at (https://www.battlelabs.hq.af.mil/). 
2.4.1. Lessons Learned. Significant impacts to the planning and/or execution of each 
Initiative will be documented in a lessons learned database maintained by HQ USAF/XIIV in 
the ISW to insure best practices are followed to the maximum extent possible. Significant 
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impacts include any major cost, schedule, or safety factors that were avoided, or could have 
been avoided by taking additional planning or execution steps. 
Course of Action (COA)—A step-by-step plan to accomplish a goal with the following 
elements: 1) strategy to achieve; 2) methods of measurement; 3) schedule and risk; 4) funding 
required; 5) expertise required; and, (6) organizational support required.  
AFI 10-2305, 
WARGAMING, 2003 
3.1.4.1. Plan and conduct the Air Force Future Capabilities Wargame (FG) series of 
wargames. All facets of wargame planning, execution, and post-game activities will be under 
the direction and guidance of HQ USAF/XPX. 
AFI 10-2501, AIR FORCE 
EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT (EM) 
PROGRAM PLANNING 
AND OPERATIONS, 2007 
3.3.4.10. Assesses operational impact of attacks on air bases; identifies key enablers for 
mission recovery and sustainment; and develops and tests risk-based mitigation strategies 
for commanders. 
4.5. Standard Phases of Incident Management. The NIMS and the NRP state that the five 
phases of incident management are prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and 
mitigation. These phases of incident management have been incorporated into AFIMS and 
provide the framework with which the installation DRF responds to all EM events. 
Comprehensive definitions of these phases are included in Attachment 1. 
6.6.11. The Air Force Incident Management Course (formerly the On-Scene Commander’s 
Course) is an Air Force-unique course for EOC Directors, their alternates and EOC Managers. 
6.6.5.2. AERO – Command and Control (C2) Course. This course incorporates the AERO 
Introduction Course and describes Air Force Emergency Response Operations with an 
emphasis on command and control during incident response and recovery. 
8.4. After-Action Reports. Procedures for after-actions reports are provided in AFI 10-204. 
Commanders must send an installation-wide lessons-learned report to their MAJCOM, FOA, 
or DRU for all emergency responses. After-action reports should include actions implemented 
and  any lessons learned during actual incident response and exercises. 
Contingency—An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, 
subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, 
contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and 
readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. 
Contingency Operations Costs—These are the incremental costs that would not be incurred 
if the contingency operation were not being carried out. 
Continuity of Operations (COOP)—The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of 
functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out 
the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander as well as 
the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the 
authority and direction of the commander. 
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AFH 10-2502, USAF 
WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION (WMD) 
THREAT PLANNING AND 
RESPONSE HANDBOOK, 
2001 
The eight operational tasks of the WMD Threat Planning and Response Tree encompass the 
three response phases—pre-incident, incident, and post-incident—providing for enhanced 
planning and response for a terrorist WMD incident/attack. 
The Notification Operational Task. Notification begins when a report of the WMD 
incident/attack arrives at a link in the notification chain, whether it be the control tower, fire 
department, emergency room, security forces, or command post. All installation personnel 
should notify the proper authorities of a suspected terrorist incident. Typically, installations 
will use the primary and/or secondary crash nets to notify fire, medical, security forces, and 
the remainder of the DCG. This topic is discussed in greater detail in the section titled “The 
Notification and Resource Activation Process”.  NOTE: See the Notification and Resource 
Activation flow charts for a visual representation of the Notification Process in figures 17 and 
18. 
3. Risk Assessment & Management: Definition: Identify base shortfalls/vulnerabilities; 
identify the level of risk base commander is willing to accept.   
Implement a Mission Recovery Plan (Figure 19). This phase normally begins with an 
assessment of the area after the scene has been declared safe. The OSC has primary 
responsibility to approve all recovery operations. Restoration of the area is a long-range 
project, but general restoration steps should appear in the plan. 
DRF--Disaster Response Force; the organization used for disaster, accident, or incident 
response, command and control, and recovery. 
AFMAN 10-2502, AIR 
FORCE INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
(AFIMS) STANDARDS 
AND PROCEDURES, 2009 
1.3.7.4. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3020.36, Assignment of National Security 
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DOD Components. Each DOD 
component shall share the general responsibilities for emergency preparedness, 
mobilization planning, and crisis management in ensuring the continuity of government in 
any national security or domestic emergency. 
2.1.2. Phases of Incident Management. AFIMS phases of incident management include 
prevention, preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation. 
3.3.  For AFIMS, the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 
provides the comprehensive guidance, to include referencing other plans that are appropriate 
for the situation, for responding to an emergency incident that may affect an installation or its 
mission. 
3.4. Crisis Action Planning. In a crisis, the time available for lengthy and detailed planning 
does not exist. Planners and operators are likely to be in a ―no plan‖ situation for 
contingencies not anticipated by deliberate planning. They must develop courses of action, a 
CONOPS, and an IAP from scratch in a compressed timeframe. However, even though 
the crisis may not resemble existing operation plans in detail, there are probably aspects of 
one or more plans in the database that could be adapted to the situation. Quality deliberate 
planning and mitigation efforts enhance the potential for success during crises. If the response 
to an incident has to be completely developed without adapting plans or parts of plans, the 
routine process of developing the CEMP10-2 in deliberate planning keeps the CAT, EOC, and 
response forces familiar with the procedures, policies, and installation response capabilities 
that assist with rapid development of IAPs. 
A2.4. Incident Command Post (ICP). According to NIMS and ICS, the ICP is the physical 
location at the tactical-level for on-scene incident command and management organization. 
Typically, it is comprised of the IC, Command Staff (Safety Officer, Liaison Officer, and 
Public Information Officer) and General Staff (Operations, Planning, Logistics, and 
Finance/Administration). Most Air Force incidents will not require the entire Command and 
General Staff. In most cases the tasks associated with the General Staff functions of Planning, 
Logistics, and Finance/Admin will be carried out by those in the EOC. It may also include 
other designated incident management officials and responders from Federal, State, local, and 
 
 
 
112 
 
tribal agencies, as well as private sector, nongovernmental, and volunteer organizations. 
A2.8.3.1.1. Communications Unit. 
A5.1. Incident Types. Are used by the civilian authorities to categorize the incident. Incidents 
are categorized by five types based on complexity. Type 5 incidents are the least complex and 
Type 1 the most complex. 
A5.2. Table A5. 1. shows that incidents may be typed to make decisions about resource 
requirements. 
AFMAN 10-2504, AIR 
FORCE INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT 
GUIDANCE FOR MAJOR 
ACCIDENTS AND 
NATURAL DISASTERS, 
2009 
1.2. Mission. The missions of the Air Force (AF) EM Program are to save lives, minimize 
the loss or degradation of resources, continuity of operations (COOP), and sustain and 
restore operational capability in an ―all hazards‖ physical threat environment at AF 
installations worldwide. Major accident and natural disaster physical threats are defined in 
Chapter 2. 
4.2. Mission Continuation. The installation commander may direct or prioritize mission-
essential activities to continue during major accident or natural disaster response and 
recovery operations regardless of the threat posed. The importance of these missions should 
justify the increased risk to personnel and resources. The installation commander will use 
operational risk management tools to provide the decision-making basis upon which to allow 
critical missions to continue. Hazard areas must be identified. As a planned consequence, 
personnel will avoid those areas. In addition, this reduces the protective factor for others 
working in an uncontaminated area; personnel can initiate recovery actions to stabilize and 
continue the mission. 
4.6. Restoration. The restoration, in concert with mission continuation tasks, officially begins 
when the IC advises the EOC Director that the incident has been sufficiently controlled or 
terminated and the security of the situation is sufficient to begin restoration activity. 
Consequently, the EOC directs and coordinates recovery inspections and reports damage by 
using ―quick looks‖ and detailed assessments. 
Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS)—A methodology designed to 
incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS, the NRP, and OSD guidance while 
preserving the unique military requirements of the expeditionary Air Force. AFIMS provides 
the Air Force with an incident management system that is consistent with the single, 
comprehensive approach to incident management. 
Continuity of Operations (COOP)—The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct 
of functions, tasks or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying 
out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as 
well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the 
authority and direction of the commander. 
AFMAN 10-2507, 
READINESS AND 
EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT (R&EM) 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS, 
2009 
A2.3.2.9. Estimate Operational Risk: Based on reconnaissance and initial entry teams’ 
assessments and CBRN detection grid results an operational risk assessment is given to the 
commander. The assessment will be based on mission criticality and the risk to personnel. 
EM personnel will consult with BEE on the health risks to personnel based on existing 
information prior to providing the commander an operational risk assessment on reducing 
individual protective equipment requirements or allowing personnel to re-enter the area or 
facility. 
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AFMAN 10-2602, 
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, 
CHEMICAL, AND 
CONVENTIONAL (NBCC) 
DEFENSE OPERATIONS 
AND STANDARDS, 2003 
4.5. Continuity of Operations. Develop plans, checklists, and procedures to maintain unit 
integrity and  the continuity of operations for the WOC, SRC, and unit control centers. 
Establish an alternate control  center, or equivalent command and control function, with 
sufficient manning and redundant communications systems to maintain unit cohesion and 
mission continuity. Alternate command and control elements  and systems provide the 
ability to continue operations in the event of failure or damage to the primary element or 
system. Update status boards and event logs to duplicate information available in the primary 
function. Locate the alternate function a reasonable distance from the primary to avoid damage 
or destruction  of both functions from a single event. Consider using the alternate function as 
the off-shift beddown location for primary UCC personnel. 
4.1.2. Survival Recovery Center (SRC): 
4.1.2.1. The SRC gathers information, directs, and monitors execution of the installation 
NBCC defense survivability, recovery, and sustainment operations. The SRC collects, 
analyzes, prioritizes, displays, and reports information on the status of the base. It recommends 
courses of action and executes pre-planned and WOC-directed actions. The SRC objective is 
to concentrate resources and expertise at the right place and at the right time to implement the 
commander's direction. 
AFI 10-2603, 
EMERGENCY HEALTH 
POWERS ON AIR FORCE 
INSTALLATIONS, 2005 
1.5.2. National Incident Management System (NIMS). Established by HSPD-5, the NIMS 
provides a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology for incident command and multi-
agency coordination of efforts responding to a domestic incident at all echelons of government 
(i.e., local, state, and federal). 
1.5.3. National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP provides the national framework for 
domestic incident management across all categories of incident type. It establishes 
incident/potential incident monitoring  and reporting protocols. It typically is enacted only for 
incidents of national significance, which include credible threats/indications/acts of terrorism 
within CONUS, major disasters or emergencies  (as defined by the Stafford Act, Title 42, 
United States Code, Section 5121 et seq), catastrophic incidents, or unique situations that may 
require the Department of Homeland Security to aid in coordination of incident management. 
AFMAN 10-2605, 
EDUCATION, TRAINING 
AND EXERCISE 
COMPETENCIES FOR 
COUNTER-CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL, 
RADIOLOGICAL AND 
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, 
2008 
3.8.19. Understand mission assurance/continuation planning considerations and 
relationship to command, control, communications, computers and intelligence on Air Force 
installations 
3.6.6. Use all available C-CBRN SMEs to assess operational risk decision tools against 
mission criticality [C-CBRN ETE COMPETENCIES, ASSOCIATED EDUCATION 
LEVELS OF LEARNING] 
Consequence Management— Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 
manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, 
manmade or terrorist incidents. Also called CM. (JP 1-02) [CM activities serve to reduce the 
effects of a CBRN attack or event and assist in the restoration of essential operations and 
services at home and abroad in a permissive environment.] (AFDD 2-1.8) {Words in brackets 
apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 
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AFI 10-2801, AIR FORCE 
CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT, 2005 
Capabilities-Based Planning—An approach where the focus is to identify a prioritized, 
integrated, and optimized set of air and space capabilities, including required support, that 
provide for specific effects.  This set of effects-based capabilities is in turn tied to distinct, 
prioritized planning and programming actions that balance risk across the spectrum of military 
operations. 
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment—The Air Force process for identifying and 
assessing the levels of capability needed to execute service-level concepts of operations, 
determining the status of these capabilities to achieve desired effects, and recommending 
courses of action to rectify overages, shortfalls, and gaps in the capability portfolio. 
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Appendix D:  USAF Publications of Interest (Security/31 Series)   
 
Publication Number       Text Extracts/Notes 
AFI 31-201, SECURITY 
FORCES STANDARDS 
AND PROCEDURES, 
2009 
12.3.6. Information/Industrial Security Incidents. Summaries of major espionage cases, 
independent research on insider threats, and substantiated cases of industrial 
espionage/sabotage. 
12.4.1. Provide the final report within 30 days of the conclusion of an exercise or operation or 
within 15 days after an incident via Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). 
AFMAN 31-201V4,  
HIGH-RISK RESPONSE, 
2002 
2.5. Phases of Response. Generally, the actions taken to properly contend with accident, 
disaster and incident scenes consist of notification, response, response force actions, 
withdrawal, recovery, circulation and/or crowd control and release of information or permission 
for photography. 
AFMAN 31-201V6, 
CIVIL DISTURBANCE, 
2002 
5.3.3. Vulnerability. Focuses on security weaknesses and high-risk targets (e.g., military 
installations, utility plants, dams or dike works). To assess the vulnerability of the installation, 
consider: 
5.3.3.3. Communications availability/vulnerability. 
AFI 31-203, SECURITY 
FORCES 
MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (SFMIS), 2009 
1.1.1. The Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) was developed 
primarily to meet the Congressionally-mandated Defense Incident-Based Reporting System 
(DIBRS) requirements and improve day-to-day operations of the Air Force Security Forces. It 
also provides statistical data for various users, and has grown to meet many other needs. 
AFI 31-401, 
INFORMATION 
SECURITY PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT, 2005 
5.1.1. Everyone should be aware that advancing technology provides constantly changing means 
to quickly collect and transport information. The introduction of electronic storage or 
transmission devices into areas that store, process, and/or generate classified information 
increases the risk to that information. 
9.3. Information System (IS) Deviations. Coordinate all security deviations involving 
information systems with the local ISPM and the supporting information assurance office to 
begin an evaluation on the impact of the incident to national security and the organization’s 
operations. If COMSEC material is involved, refer to AFI 33-212, Reporting COMSEC 
Deviations (will be incorporated in AFI 33-201, Volume 3, COMSEC User Requirements). 
AFI 31-406, APPLYING 
NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY 
ORGANIZATION 
(NATO) PROTECTION 
STANDARDS, 2004 
6.6.1. Military operations. Military commanders may authorize alternate procedures to meet 
mission requirements in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, para 1-400; however, mission impact 
must be demonstrable. In doing so, consideration must be given to risk management factors 
such as criticality, sensitivity, and value of the information; analysis of the threats both 
known and anticipated; and vulnerability to exploitation. 
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Appendix E:  USAF Publications of Interest (Civil Engineering/32 Series)   
 
Publication Number      Text Extracts/Notes 
AFMAN 32-1089, AIR 
FORCE MILITARY 
CONSTRUCTION AND 
FAMILY HOUSING 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
GUIDE, 1996 
Risk--The probability of an uncertain event occurring. 
7. Risk Assessment: Identify the key variables which could possibly change to the extent that 
the recommendation would change. 
AFI 32-2001, FIRE 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES PROGRAM, 
2008 
6.1. Risk Assessment and Management. Fire Chiefs are responsible for managing available 
resources to minimize risk to people, property, and the environment. Risk decisions based on 
fact-based analysis provide a high degree of confidence that FES events will be managed 
appropriately with available resources. Risk assessments based on actual emergency response 
data, tempered with sound professional judgment, provides the best opportunity for 
effectively managing FES events. 
6.1.1. Failure to provide adequate fire prevention services poses the greatest potential for long-
term negative impact on fire safety. MAJCOM Directors, Installation Commanders and Fire 
Chiefs must ensure prevention programs including engineering controls, education, and 
enforcement receives the highest priority to effectively mitigate hazards. 
6.1.2. The FES operations function is critical to the safety of people and property during 
emergencies. When emergencies occur, early intervention is the critical factor in reducing the 
potential for damage, injury and death. For this reason, response time standards are crucial to 
initial success. 
6.1.3. The level of service provided must be balanced based on risk, probability of incidents 
and available resources. Although the RLS may provide resources needed to accomplish 
successful operations, it must be measured against historic response data to ensure 
resources are sufficient for the risk. When the CLS is reached, leaders must recognize the 
severe limitations of FES capability. There are, however, periods where the Installation 
Commander and Fire Chief must consider a reduction of service. 
6.3. Mitigating Risk. Fire chiefs have wide latitude to manage risk by allocating resources 
according to local risk factors, to provide capability within the limits of available resources. 
6.4. Risk Management. 
6.4.1. The Fire Chief will establish management plans addressing reduced operational capability 
during periods of time when the department will operate below OLS as determined using the 
guide described in Attachment 4. The plan must include control measures implemented by the 
Fire Chief that describe both the probability and consequence of the potential risk. These 
components include predicting the consequence of the identified risk and the probability of the 
event occurring. Control measures can include varying the available resources by time of day 
and day of the week based on the predicted probability while considering the consequence 
during both periods of risk. 
Attachment 4 - DETERMINING RISK PERIODS 
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AFPMAN 32-2004, 
AIRCRAFT FIRE 
PROTECTION FOR 
EXERCISES AND 
CONTINGENCY 
RESPONSE 
OPERATIONS, 2010 
3. Risk Management. Fire fighting capability is dependent on two primary resources – fire 
fighting agent and personnel - discussed separately in paragraphs 4 and 5 below. An assumption 
that only one major fire incident will occur at the same time always exists. This document 
approaches risk management from a perspective of requiring the local risk managers to 
determine the acceptable levels of risk based on local risk factors. Generally, local risk factors 
include historic fire experience (if available), type and duration of the operation. 
3.7. The three elements of risk assessment are probability, severity, and exposure. 
Probability involves using historical data to determine the likelihood an event will occur. 
Severity involves a subjective assessment of how severe the fire will be if it does occur. 
Exposure is a subjective assessment of the potential impact of the exposure (value of the 
material exposed and the time exposed) realizing that risk increases over time. Generally the 
probability of an ARFF fire is very low and the probability of a large fire is extremely low. 
Aside from crashes or explosions the severity of a fire is minimized by early intervention to 
prevent fire growth. Response time standards ensure early intervention by fire crews. Although 
fire safety standards make it unlikely a major fire will occur, local risk factors that can impact 
any of the three risk elements must also be factored in. For example, mission impact of even a 
small fire on a B-2 may have significantly more impact than a small fire on a C-130. Risk 
Manager—The technique or profession of assessing, minimizing, and preventing accidental loss 
to a business, as through the use of insurance, safety measures, etc. 
AFHAN 32-2005, 
FIREFIGHTING GUIDE 
FOR CONTINGENCY 
OPERATIONS, 2009 
4.2.4. Communicate risk and capability issues to the installation commander. For more 
information regarding reporting level of service capability see AFI 32-2001, chapter 6.5. 
3.4. Operational Risk Management (ORM). 
3.4.1. Risk requires a subjective assessment of the probability that an FES emergency event will 
occur, and the expected severity of such an event. The probability factor relies heavily on 
historic emergency response data to predict future events. But for contingency operations, 
historical data is not available and assumptions must be made on which to estimate risk. 
AFMAN 32-4004, 
EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 
OPERATIONS, 1995 
1.2. Disaster Control Group (DCG). The Air Force uses the installation DCG for initially 
responding to peacetime major accidents and natural disasters. It provides for on-scene 
command and control of military resources and functional expertise. 
1.2.1. The DCG coordinates and directs operations and support requirements with the command 
post, unit control centers, specialized teams, and coordinates with civil and governmental 
authorities. 
1.2.2. Primary and alternate functional representatives are required. Primary representatives 
should be organization commanders or chiefs; alternates should be functional experts delegated 
the same  authority as the primary representative. 
1.2.3. Composition and responsibilities vary with the resources, capabilities, and mission of each 
installation. Responding functional representatives perform duties inherent to their specific 
mission. If support requests exceed the capability of the installation, requests should be sent to 
higher headquarters. 
The following are recommended composition and response requirements for the DCG: 
1.2.15. Communications-Computers. Advises the OSC on the capability and availability of 
resources such as cellular phones, secure radios, and secure telefacsimile. 
3.1. General. Actions taken for natural disaster response can be divided into four phases: 
notification, initial emergency, sustained emergency, and recovery. In an actual response, these 
phases will most likely overlap. AFI 32-4001, Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations 
contains policy on Air Force response to natural disasters. The following is a break-down of 
each phase and generic actions that could occur. Use Attachment 4 to develop checklists to 
support natural disaster response actions. 
Disaster Support Group.— A major command and field operating agency headquarters 
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command and control element. It coordinates and supports the headquarters’ response to a 
disaster. 
Natural Disaster.— All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack 
or civil disturbance (Joint Publication 1-02). These may include hurricanes, tornadoes, storms, 
floods, high water, wind-driven water, tidal surge, tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, 
landslides, mud slides, severe snow storms, drought, or other catastrophe not caused by people. 
AFI 32-7040, AIR 
QUALITY 
COMPLIANCE AND 
RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT, 2007 
2.11. Emergency Planning. Follow AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) 
Program Planning and Operations for emergency planning and response to major accidents; 
natural disasters; terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction; and nuclear, biological, 
chemical and conventional warfare. 
Risk Management—The process of evaluating alternative regulatory and nonregulatory 
responses to risk and selecting among them. The selection process requires consideration of 
impact to human health and the environment, legal, economic, military and social factors. 
Risk Management Plan—A plan that documents the actions a facility that stores, transports or 
uses regulated hazardous substances at levels exceeding established thresholds will take to 
prevent and mitigate their accidental release, and reduce the severity of releases that do occur. 
RMP requirements are found at 40  C.F.R. Part 68. 
AFI 32-7064, 
INTEGRATED 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT, 2004 
12.5.6. Risk Assessment/Decision Analysis Processes. Sound operational risk management 
will be the foundation of the Wildland Fire Management Plan. Identify the indices and/or fire 
danger rating system that will be used to assess wildfire risk and potential fire behavior. The 
indices and/or fire danger rating system must adequately describe fire hazard, severity, intensity, 
and other significant factors affecting the protection of life and property. Identify the 
environmental factors that will be measured prior to ignition of a prescribed fire treatment. 
Identify normal and unique weather patterns that affect fire behavior on the installation. 
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Appendix F:  USAF Publications of Interest (Communications and Information/33 
Series)   
 
Publication Number      Text Extracts/Notes 
AFPD 33-3, 
INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, 2006 
Data Reliability—Refers to the accuracy and completeness of data, given the intended purposes 
for use.  Data are reliable when they are (1) complete (they contain all the data elements (a unit 
of information with definable parameters (e.g., a Social Security number) and/or records 
required) and (2) accurate (they reflect the data entered at the source; or, if available, in the 
source documents). Air Force automated information processes enable data reliability by 
establishing/maintaining controls, that address process risks, to include, but not limited to, 
security, access, configuration controls and change management processes, system software, 
segregation of duties, continuity of service, authorization, completeness, accuracy, and 
confidentiality of data. 
AFI 33-101, 
COMMANDERS 
GUIDANCE AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, 
2008 
A2.2.5. Plan the evolution of systems supporting the installation users' missions; ensure war, 
support, and contingency planning are accomplished for communications and information 
requirements. 
AFI 33-104, BASE 
LEVEL PLANNING 
AND 
IMPLEMENTATION, 
2001 
4.1.2. Risk Analysis--Identify, assess, and prioritize risks. 
A8.2.3. Another variable in project management is risk management. A project risk is a potential 
source of deviation from the project plan. These risks can have either a negative or positive 
outcome on the project. Negative risks are considered threats, while positive risks can be 
opportunities. 
Risks—Types of risk may include schedule risk, risk of technical obsolescence, cost risk, risk 
implicit in a particular contract type, technical feasibility, dependencies between a new project 
and other projects or systems, the number of simultaneous high risk projects to be monitored, 
funding availability, and program management risk. (OMB Circular No. A-130) 
Risk Management—1. Appropriate techniques should be applied to manage and mitigate risk 
during the acquisition of information technology. Techniques include, but are not limited to: 
prudent project management; use of modular contracting; thorough acquisition planning tied to 
budget planning by the program, finance and contracting offices; continuous collection and 
evaluation of risk-based assessment data; prototyping prior to implementation; post 
implementation reviews to determine actual project cost, benefits and returns; and focusing on 
risks and returns using quantifiable measures. (FAR 39) 2. Risk management is the process used 
by decision-makers to reduce or offset risk. The risk management process provides leaders and 
individuals a systematic mechanism to identify and choose the optimum course of action for any 
given situation. Risk management must become a fully integrated element of planning and 
executing an operation (See AFPD 90-9, Operational Risk Management; AFI 90-901, 
Operational Risk Management; and AFPAM 91-215, Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
Guidelines and Tools). 
 
 
 
120 
 
AFI 33-107V1, 
STRATEGIC 
AUTOMATED 
COMMAND CONTROL 
SYSTEM-DATA 
TRANSMISSION 
SUBSYTEM, 1997 
CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS: What to do if unable to support the Electronic Program 
Update at the scheduled time. 
AFI 33-107V2, SACCS-
DTS NETWORK 
SECURITY PROGRAM, 
1997 
2.4.3. Perform a risk analysis of the SACCS-DTS Network at 3 year intervals. Identify and 
document all assumptions and constraints associated with the network. Review and update the 
risk analysis on an annual basis or when major configuration changes are made. 
2.4.5. Direct a preliminary inquiry into each reported security incident involving the 
network.  Ascertain the extent of the incident, refer it to the appropriate agency for action, and 
assist in the investigation. Coordinate with the investigating agency to identify and implement 
necessary changes to prevent reoccurrence. 
2.6.1.10. Establish security incident and reporting policy and procedures. 
2.11.1. Network users must comply with the Network Security Plan and local security 
procedures. All users must immediately report security violations, incidents, or problems to their 
security officer. The applicable security officer will immediately relay the report up the chain of 
command to the NSM, and begin preliminary inquiry into the situation. 
AFSSM 5018, Risk Analysis Guide 
AFSSI 5021, Vulnerability and Incident Reporting 
AFI 33-113, MANAGING 
AIR FORCE 
MESSAGING CENTERS, 
2007 
1.6.3. Establish an alternate site to ensure continuity of operations for their SIPRNET 
messaging equipment and services during times when the MMSC is offline. 
AFI 33-115V1, 
NETWORK 
OPERATIONS 
(NETOPS), 2006 
(SAF/XCI)  3.4.6. Be the lead for establishing an Air Force policy on continuity of operations 
plans for the AFNOSC, the NOSCs and NCCs. 
3.8.2. Report to AFNOSCs and MAJCOM NOSCs all backdoors and unauthorized connections 
to Air Force networks discovered during the course of operations. Reports will be made 
immediately upon discovery if associated with an on-going incident and within 48 hours from 
discovery if not associated with an incident response action. 
4.2.4.3. Draft SITREPs according to AFI 10-206, Operational Reporting. Draft Operational 
Event/Incident Reports (OPREP3) according to AFI 10-206 to document and report 
significant network events affecting Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) connections 
not previously reported in SITREPs. 
4.2.6.2. Provide real-time analysis, response and reporting according to AFI 33-138 for 
network attacks and security incidents. Analyze customer impact of all network incidents, 
problems and alerts, and develop corrective actions or management changes. 
4.5.4.11.45.20. Analyze customer impact, within the base, of all network incidents, problems 
and alerts, and develop corrective actions or management changes. 
7.2.1.2. Operational Event/Incident Reports (OPREP3). OPREP3s are reported using operational 
channels, e.g., Command Posts, to notify commanders immediately of any event or incident that 
may attract international, national, US Air Force, or significant news media interest. They 
provide immediate up-channel notification of local network intrusions and probes, INFOCON 
level changes, and network degradations. They are generally tied to events. 
7.2.1.5.1. TCNOs may be generated internally to direct the implementation of an operational or 
a security vulnerability risk mitigation procedure or fix action (e.g., software patch), or 
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issued in response to DISA-generated Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA). 
TCNOs are used to address Air Force or theater wide incidents/problems and not for isolated 
internal incidents unless impact is determined to be system-wide. 
AFI 33-129, WEB 
MANAGEMENT AND 
INTERNET USE, 2005 
3.12.6. Ensuring certification and accreditation of their Web server before connecting to the 
network, as well as developing, coordinating, publishing,  maintaining, and testing support plans 
for contingency and service restoration. 
AFI 33-138, 
ENTERPRISE 
NETWORK 
OPERATIONS 
NOTIFICATION AND 
TRACKING, 2005 
Enclave—Collection of computing environments connected by one or more internal networks 
under the control of a single authority and security policy, including personnel and physical 
security. Enclaves always assume the highest mission assurance category and security 
classification of the automated information system applications or outsourced information 
technology-based processes they support, and derive their security needs from those systems. 
They provide standard IA capabilities, such as boundary defense, incident detection and 
response, and key management, and also deliver common applications, 
such as office automation and electronic mail. Enclaves may be specific to an organization or a 
mission, and the computing environments may be organized by physical proximity or by 
function independent of location. Examples of enclaves include LANs and the applications they 
host, backbone networks, and data processing centers. (AFI 33-202) 
2.3.2. When delegated as the MAJCOM Designated Approving Authority (DAA), approve or 
disapprove applicable TCNO extension requests based on an assessment of the overall risk to the 
AFEN and to supported operations (see Section 3E). 
2.10.2. Thoroughly understand the risk to the AFEN and supported operational missions 
before endorsing or approving TCNO extension requests. 
3.16. Implementing Time Compliance Network Orders (TCNO). The goal of the TCNO process 
is the mitigation of risk to the AFEN through the implementation of network vulnerability 
countermeasures. 
3.20.2. An extension does not grant the requesting agency the authority to accept the 
vulnerabilities or risks identified in the TCNO indefinitely; rather, it is approval to accept the 
risk for a specified period based on an operational risk management decision. 
3.31.1.2. Conduct an operational risk management assessment of potential impact to local 
and Air Force missions if vulnerable workstations are exploited. 
A4.1.9. Risk Mitigation Actions. Describe in detail what actions have been taken or processes 
put in place to mitigate the risk associated with the vulnerability. If some amount of the risk can 
be mitigated through other actions, this will help extension evaluation and approval officials 
assess the residual risk imposed on the AFEN and Air Force information systems if the 
extension is approved. 
A10.1. Vulnerability Reports (VR). Use the format below to submit initial, update, and final VR 
for newly discovered vulnerabilities for which no risk mitigation procedure has been 
established. If the newly discovered vulnerability was exploited or an incident actually 
occurred, go directly to Incident Reporting section (Section 5B). Prepare and submit a separate 
VR for each vulnerability being reported. 
Chapter 5— INCIDENT AND VULNERABILITY REPORTING 
Chapter 6— SECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING 
Chapter 7 — SERVICE INTERRUPTION REPORTING 
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AFI 33-200, 
INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE (IA) 
MANAGEMENT, 2008 
Mission Assurance Category—Applicable to DoD ISs, the MAC reflects the importance of 
information relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives, particularly the 
warfighters’ combat mission. MACs are primarily used to determine the requirements for 
availability and integrity. DoD has three defined MACs (DoDD 8500.01): 
Mission Assurance Category I—Systems handling information that is determined to be vital to 
the operational readiness or mission effectiveness of deployed and contingency forces in terms 
of both content and timeliness. The consequences of loss of integrity or availability of a category 
I system is unacceptable and could include the immediate and sustained loss of mission 
effectiveness. Category I systems require the most stringent protection measures. [DoDD 
8500.01] 
Mission Assurance Category II—Systems handling information that is important to the support 
of deployed and contingency forces. The consequences of loss of integrity are unacceptable. 
Loss of availability is difficult to deal with and can only be tolerated for a short time. The 
consequences could include delay or degradation in providing important support services or 
commodities that may seriously impact mission effectiveness or operational readiness. Category 
II systems require additional safeguards beyond best practices to ensure adequate assurance. 
[DoDD 8500.01] 
Mission Assurance Category III—Systems handling information that is necessary for the 
conduct of day-to-day business, but does not materially affect support to deployed or 
contingency forces in the short-term. The consequences of loss of integrity or availability can be 
tolerated or overcome without significant impacts on mission effectiveness or operational 
readiness. The consequences could include the delay or degradation of services or commodities 
enabling routine activities. Category III systems require protective measures, techniques or 
procedures generally commensurate with commercial best practices. [DoDD 8500.01] 
Specified Robustness—The strength and level of confidence required of each IA solution is a 
function of the value of what is being protected (e.g., the mission assurance category or 
confidentiality level of the information being supported by the DoD IS) and the threat. 
2.25.12.1. Report security violations and incidents to the DAA and Air Force network operations 
activities according to AFI 33-138, Enterprise Network Operations Notification and Tracking. 
3.28. Incident Response and Reporting. AFI 33-138 defines reportable incidents, outlines SOPs 
for incident response, outlines user requirements, and establishes requirements for incident 
response in the AFNetOps hierarchy. Refer to AFNetOps instructions and procedures for 
classified message incidents. 
AFI 33-210, AIR FORCE 
CERTIFICATION AND 
ACCREDITATION 
(C&A) PROGRAM 
(AFCAP), 2008 
3.1.2.1. Mission Assurance Category (MAC I) systems (see DoDI 8500.2 for guidance). Air 
Force Network Operations (AFNETOPS)/CC or AFNETOPS/CV has connection approval 
authority. 
3.1.2.2. MAC II systems. AFNETOPS/CC delegates connection approval authority to AFCA/CC 
or CV. 
3.1.2.3. MAC III systems. AFNETOPS/CC delegates connection approval authority to 
AFCA/EV or EV Deputy. 
2.6. Information System Owner. Must be a DoD official (O-6 or civilian equivalent), be a United 
States citizen, and have a level of authority commensurate with operating the IS on behalf of the 
Air Force so as to manage the mission risk. 
AFI 33-360, 
PUBLICATIONS AND 
FORMS 
MANAGEMENT, 2006 
1.2.2.2.2.2.4. Develops and maintains a contingency plan to ensure accessibility of publications 
and forms posted on the e-Publishing website when the site is down. 
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AFMAN 33-363, 
MANAGEMENT OF 
RECORDS, 2008 
2.4.2. All information created in or received while carrying out the Air Force missions is 
categorized as a record. How long the record is needed to facilitate the work and the degree to 
which it must be controlled is an attribute of its value to the mission or the agency, legal 
requirements, and its uniqueness. 
6.1.1.4.2.4. Program managers must identify vital records needed to continue day-to-day 
operations without interruption or mission degradation after a disaster such as terrorist 
attack, hurricane, etc. 
A5.2.3. Review of documentation created for the contingency planning and risk assessment 
phase of emergency preparedness. The offices performing those functions would be an 
obvious focus of an inventory. 
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Appendix G:  USAF Publications of Interest (Special Management/90 Series)   
 
Publication Number      Text Extracts/Notes 
AFPD 90-8, 
ENVIRONMENT, 
SAFETY, AND 
OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH, 2004 
1. This directive establishes the Air Force Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health 
(ESOH) program.  This program identifies the ability of existing resources to meet operational 
requirements and assess risks caused by resource degradation or denial. 
1.7. Make operational risk management a fundamental element at all levels of planning, 
decision-making, budgeting, acquisition, and all phases of operations in order to reduce the 
ESOH component of installation and weapon system total ownership costs. 
AFPD 90-9, 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT, 2000 
Risk—The probability and severity of loss or adverse impact from exposure to various hazards. 
Risk Assessment—The process of detecting hazards and their causes, and systematically 
assessing the associated risks. 
“Integrate ORM into Operations and Planning at all Levels” - To effectively apply risk 
management, commanders must dedicate time and resources to integrate risk management 
principles into the planning processes. Risks are more easily assessed and managed in the 
planning stages of an operation. 
AFPD 90-13, MILITARY 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
QUALITY ASSURANCE, 
2008 
1.1. MFOQA is the analysis and trending of aircraft flight performance and system data to 
proactively 
enhance combat readiness through improvements in operations, maintenance, training, and 
safety 
functions. MFOQA provides tools for commanders to: establish a baseline for normal 
operations; identify, mitigate, and monitor operational risks while detecting precursors to 
aviation mishaps; and identify operational inefficiencies. MFOQA gives capabilities to multiple 
levels and functional areas to improve and enhance mission-effectiveness through awareness of 
abnormal trends, continuous knowledge of aircraft systems performance, and insight into the 
effectiveness of procedures, policy, and aircrew training on actual mission accomplishment. 
AFPD 90-16, AIR FORCE 
STUDIES, ANALYSES, 
ASSESSMENTS, AND 
LESSONS LEARNED, 
2008 
Risk—The quantifiable level of exposure to an undesirable outcome based on consequence and 
likelihood. (AFI 10-604) 
4.6. Operational Analyses. Analyses will sharpen the warfighters’ edge by providing combat, 
operational, and support assessments, contingency and exercise support, risk assessments, and 
analysis of campaign and operational planning. 
AFPD 90-17, ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT, 2009 
Energy Security—Energy security includes physical security of infrastructure and supply, and 
continuity of operations. 
3.9.4.  Energy security shall be evaluated to determine potential short and long term energy 
disruptions and appropriate action shall be taken to mitigate energy security risks. 
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AFI 90-201,INSPECTOR 
GENERAL ACTIVITIES, 
2009 
A2.3.3.5.11. Evaluate the mediation plans for resolving Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)-
related problems affecting their mission assurance. 
4.1.1. Scenarios. IG teams will attempt to create a realistic environment for evaluation while 
ensuring safety is not compromised. ORI scenarios evaluate garrison operations, contingency 
response (from both garrison and continuity of operations (COOP) location), and sustained 
performance. When possible, combine ORI scenarios with existing exercises, contingency 
events, or other MAJCOM scenarios. 
4.5.5.1. Evaluate unit’s ability to integrate deployed location procedures and requirements into 
unit’s plans. Evaluate if the unit has a COOP plan which it exercises for contingency operations 
for incidents at the garrison location IAW AFI 10-208, Continuity of Operations (COOP) 
Program. Evaluate if all unit individuals know what actions to take during potential incidents. 
4.7. Ability To Survive and Operate (ATSO). Evaluate the unit’s ability to conduct the full 
range of contingency operations, either in a stand alone, joint, or coalition forces operating 
environment, while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-
state use of CBRN weapons, major accidents, natural disasters, or HAZMAT incidents using the 
Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS). 
4.7.4.5. Evaluate ability to identify and mark CBRN hazard and hazard areas, conduct post-
attack risk assessment, and implement management actions to reduce mission degradation. 
AFI 90-801, 
ENVIRONMENT, 
SAFETY, AND 
OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH COUNCILS, 
2005 
1. Background. The Air Force will provide safe and healthful workplaces and conduct 
operations in a manner that minimizes risk to mission accomplishment while preserving 
resources, protecting the environment, and safeguarding Air Force personnel and the public both 
on and off the installation. 
2.2. The ESOHC should ensure the appropriate level of ESOH assets are sustained, restored, and 
modernized to achieve the desired mission capability using a risk-based decision making 
process. 
5.2.7. Champion inclusion of Air Force-unique ESOH needs in the Capabilities Review and Risk 
Assessment (CRRA) process and in the development of the Initial Capabilities Documents 
(ICDs), Capability Development Documents (CDDs), and Capability Production Documents 
(CPDs). 
5.3.7. Use risk assessment methodology to identify and prioritize requirements that maximize 
mission performance and minimize ESOH risk and cost. 
Risk— A combination of the probability and severity of a loss or an adverse impact resulting 
from exposure to hazards. The greater the risk, the more likely it will cause a drain on resource 
capability and negatively affect the mission. 
ESOH - Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health 
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AFI 90-901, 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT, 2000 
ORM—The systematic process of identifying hazards, assessing risk, analyzing risk control 
options and measures, making control decisions, implementing control decisions, accepting 
residual risks, and supervising/reviewing the activity for effectiveness. 
Risk—The probability and severity of loss or adverse impact from exposure to various hazards. 
Risk Assessment—The process of detecting hazards and their causes, and systematically 
assessing the associated risks. 
3. ORM Principles. Four principles govern all actions associated with the management of risk. 
These principles, continuously employed, are applicable before, during, and after all tasks and 
operations. 
3.1. Accept no unnecessary risk. Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in 
terms of real benefits or available opportunities. All Air Force missions and daily routines 
involve risk. The most logical choices for accomplishing a mission are those that meet all 
mission requirements while exposing personnel and resources to the lowest acceptable risk. 
3.2. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. Making risk decisions at the appropriate 
level establishes clear accountability. Those accountable for the success or failure of the 
mission must be included in the risk decision process. 
3.3. Accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs . All potential benefits should be compared to 
all potential costs. The process of weighing risks against opportunities and benefits helps to 
maximize unit capability. Even high risk endeavors may be undertaken when there is a well 
founded basis to believe that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. 
3.4. Integrate ORM into operations and planning at all levels. To effectively apply risk 
management, commanders must dedicate time and resources to integrate ORM principles 
into planning and operational processes. Risk assessments of operations are most mission 
supportive when they are done as a normal way of conducting a mission, not an add-on process 
performed by people not otherwise involved. 
4.5. Is a continuous, systematic decision-making tool consisting of six steps that define the 
process. The following is a description of the six-step process. 
4.5.1. Identify the Hazards . Step one of the process involves application of appropriate hazard 
identification techniques in order to identify hazards associated with the operation or activity. 
Hazard can be defined as any real or potential condition that can cause mission 
degradation. 
4.5.2. Assess the Risk . The assessment step involves the application of quantitative or 
qualitative measures to determine the probability and severity of ill effects potentially resulting 
from exposure to a hazard. 
4.5.3. Analyze Risk Control Measures . Step three involves the evaluation of specific strategies 
and controls that reduce or eliminate risk. Effective mitigation measures reduce one of the three 
components (probability, severity or exposure) of risk. 
4.5.4. Make Control Decisions . Decisions are made at the appropriate level and are based upon 
analysis of overall costs and benefits. Decision-makers choose the most mission supportive risk 
controls consistent with ORM principles. 
4.5.5. Implement Risk Controls . Once control measures have been selected, an implementation 
strategy must be developed and carried out. 
4.5.6. Supervise and Review. Risk management is a process that continues throughout the life 
cycle of the system, mission, or activity. Leaders at every level must fulfill their respective 
roles in ensuring controls are sustained over time. Once controls are in place, the process must 
be periodically reevaluated to ensure their effectiveness and mission supportiveness. 
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AFPAM90-902, 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT (ORM) 
GUIDELINES AND 
TOOLS, 2000 
1. Introduction. All US Air Force missions and our daily routines involve risk. All 
operations, both on and off-duty, require decisions that include risk assessment as well as risk 
management. Each commander and supervisor, along with every individual, is responsible for 
identifying potential risks and adjusting or compensating appropriately. Risk decisions must be 
made at a level of responsibility that corresponds to the degree of risk, taking into consideration 
the significance of the mission and the timeliness of the required decision. Risk should be 
identified using the same disciplined, organized, and logical thought processes that govern all 
other aspects of military endeavors. The USAF aim is to increase mission success while 
reducing the risk to personnel and resources to the lowest practical level in both on- and 
off-duty environments. 
Hazard—Any real or potential condition that can cause mission degradation, injury, illness, 
death to personnel or damage to or loss of equipment or property. 
Risk—An expression of consequences in terms of the probability of an event occurring, the 
severity of the event and the exposure of personnel or resources to potential loss or harm. A 
general expression of risk as a function of probability, severity, and exposure can be written as: 
Risk = ƒ(P, S, E). 
Risk Assessment—The process of detecting hazards and their causes, and systematically 
assessing the associated risks. 
Defines Risk Management in paras 1.1., 1.2, and 1.3. 
Six-Step Process of Operational Risk Management 
11.1. The 5-M Model. The 5-M model, Figure 3., provides a basic framework for analyzing 
systems and determining the relationships between composite elements that work together to 
perform the mission. The 5-M’s are Man, Machine, Media, Management, and Mission. Man, 
Machine, and Media interact to produce a successful Mission or, sometimes, an unsuccessful 
one. 
11.3.3. Machine. Used as intended, limitations, interface with man. 
11.3.3.1. Design: Engineering reliability and performance, ergonomics. 
11.3.3.2. Maintenance: Availability of time, tools, and parts, ease of access. 
11.3.3.3. Logistics: Supply, upkeep, repair. 
11.3.3.4. Tech data: Clear, accurate, useable, available. 
A2.21. THE MISHAP/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.  Purpose, Method, Application, etc 
defined in this section. 
AFI 90-1301, 
IMPLEMENTING 
MILITARY FLIGHT 
OPERATIONS QUALITY 
ASSURANCE , 2008 
1.2. By reducing aircrew risk, improving risk management, and enhancing situational 
awareness, MFOQA effectively protects people, conserves aircraft, maximizes efficiency, and 
improves readiness. 
2.2.6. Assess risk, identify mitigation measures, and monitor effectiveness. 
2.2.6.1. The appropriate reviewing body or commander evaluates risk exposure as measured by 
Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) analysis results, initiates mitigation 
efforts when unacceptable levels of risk are identified, and monitors the effectiveness of the 
mitigation measures. 
2.2.6.2. Mitigation measures include any means necessary, ranging from modification of 
procedures, aircraft limitations, or training syllabi, to simple aircrew, maintainer, or commander 
awareness efforts. 
2.2.6.3. Groups or individuals implementing mitigation measures utilize further MFOQA 
analysis to monitor effectiveness and determine modifications or additional measures necessary, 
as required. 
3.2.4. Conduct risk assessments on hardware or software using the Standard Practice for System 
Safety, MIL-STD-882D. The required formal risk acceptance must be in accordance with DoDI 
5000.2, E.7. 
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AFI 90-1601, AIR FORCE 
LESSONS LEARNED 
PROGRAM, 2009 
7.4.1. AF/A9L will coordinate with other HQ USAF directorates to ensure consideration of 
current actions addressing Air Force and Joint lessons implemented are incorporated into 
programmatic and risk assessment decision cycles. 
4.2.2.1. Participative. The lessons learned staff performs two roles during the event. First, the 
lessons learned staff participates in the unit’s operational battle rhythm, attending staff 
meetings, manning the Crisis Action Team, and/or providing real-time inputs to the 
commander’s planning and decision process. 
AFI 90-1701, ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT, 2009 
11.2. Goals. 
11.2.1. Identify Air Force assets and infrastructure dependencies critical to the execution of our 
missions, capabilities, and core functions. 
11.2.2. Assess critical assets to determine vulnerabilities and risk of loss. 
11.2.3. Prioritize critical assets to support management of risk and to apply scarce resources. 
Remediate risks through a risk management process. 
11.2.4. Coordinate with existing programs for protection of critical assets in order to leverage 
existing processes where possible. 
11.3.3. Field the Critical Asset Prioritization Methodology (CAPM) tool. This CAPM tool will 
allow prioritization of Air Force critical assets. This allows leadership to utilize its limited 
funding to remediate the most important critical assets at highest risk of being degraded or lost. 
11.3.7. Build remediation recommendations that provide Commanders with options to 
remediate their risk of loss of their critical assets (for the critical supporting energy 
infrastructure, including new tactics, techniques, procedures, protection measures, 
implementation of redundancy capabilities, etc). 
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Appendix H:  USAF Publications of Interest (Safety/91 Series)   
 
Publication Number      Text Extracts/Notes 
AFMAN 91-201, 
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY 
STANDARDS, 2008 
Section 4A–Risk Assessments 
4.1. Requirements for Risk Assessments. Risk assessments are required for all new or 
modified explosives, explosives operations, equipment and facilities. These risk assessments 
will be used to identify design and operations criteria (e.g., shielding, protective clothing). See 
Chapter 2 for reaction effect information to support risk assessments. 
Section 13C–Risk Management 
13.6. Risk Management. Consistent with operational requirements, it is Air Force policy to 
manage risks associated with AE (see paragraph 1.1). Exceptions to this chapter’s criteria are 
allowed only where equivalent protection is provided, or where risk assessment and risk 
management control is performed. 
Risk—The product of the probability or frequency that an accident will occur within a certain 
time and the accident’s consequences to people, property or the environment. 
Risk Assessment—A method of determining and documenting hazards which may be present 
and controls for mitigating or eliminating those hazards. 
AFI 91-202, THE US AIR 
FORCE MISHAP 
PREVENTION 
PROGRAM, 1998 
9.6. Risk Assessment and Management. Accomplish an appropriate assessment/analysis of the 
safety and operational risks associated with all modification proposals and acquisition and 
development efforts. Program safety offices must ensure all necessary engineering and design 
data is produced and maintained to adequately document the risk decisions made, the design 
changes incorporated to reduce or eliminate hazards and any residual risks and hazards left in 
the system. Residual hazards and risk accepted and signed off by the appropriate authorities 
should be thoroughly documented and periodically reviewed by using and developing 
commands. This ensures that risk assessments are still appropriate and for available possible 
correction as part of a later modification or redesign. 
Risk Assessment— An evaluation of possible loss in terms of hazard or deficiency severity and 
mishap probability of occurrence.  
Risk Assessment Code (RAC)— An expression of the degree of risk in terms of hazard or 
deficiency severity and probability of occurrence. See AFI 91-301 for a discussion of RACs.  
Risk Management— The application of a systematic process or thinking to detect, assess, and 
control risk to enhance total organizational performance. 
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AFI 91-204, SAFETY 
INVESTIGATIONS AND 
REPORTS, 2008 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM (DOD HFACS) 
Judgment and Decision-Making Errors are factors in a mishap when behavior or actions of 
the individual proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired 
end-state and results in an unsafe situation. 
    AE201 Risk Assessment – During Operation 
    Risk Assessment – During Operation is a factor when the individual fails to adequately 
evaluate the risks associated with a particular course of action and this faulty evaluation leads 
to inappropriate decision and subsequent unsafe situation. This failure occurs in real-time when 
formal risk-assessment procedures are not possible. 
Violations are factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent willful disregard 
for rules and instructions and lead to an unsafe situation. Violations are deliberate. 
    AV001 Violation - Based on Risk Assessment 
    Violation- Based on Risk Assessment is a factor when the consequences/risk of violating 
published procedures was recognized, consciously assessed and honestly determined by the 
individual, crew or team to be the best course of action. Routine "work-arounds" and unofficial 
procedures that are accepted by the community as necessary for operations are also captured 
under this code. 
Personnel Factors are factors in a mishap if self imposed stressors or crew resource 
management affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation. 
   PP109 Mission Planning 
   Mission planning is a factor when an individual, crew or team failed to complete all 
preparatory tasks associated with planning the mission, resulting in an unsafe situation. Planning 
tasks include information collection and analysis, coordinating activities within the crew or team 
and with appropriate external agencies, contingency planning, and risk assessment. 
   PP111 Task/Mission-In-Progress Re-Planning 
   Task/mission-in-progress re-planning is a factor when crew or team members fail to 
adequately reassess changes in their dynamic environment during mission execution and change 
their mission plan accordingly to ensure adequate management of risk. 
Planned Inappropriate Operations is a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to adequately 
assess the hazards associated with an operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is also a 
factor when supervision allows non-proficient or inexperienced personnel to attempt missions 
beyond their capability or when crew or flight makeup is inappropriate for the task or mission. 
   SP006 Risk Assessment – Formal 
   Risk Assessment – Formal is a factor when supervision does not adequately evaluate the risks 
associated with a mission or when pre-mission risk assessment tools or risk assessment 
programs are inadequate. 
AFPAM 91-211, USAF 
GUIDE TO AVIATION 
SAFETY 
INVESTIGATION, 2001 
A8.2.2. Human Factors Definitions and Codes 
IB606 RISK ASSESSMENT is a factor when the individual fails to adequately evaluate 
potential risks associated with a selected course of action and this failure leads to an unsafe 
situation. 
IB905 INVULNERABLE is a factor when the individual demonstrates a "bullet proof" attitude 
that leads the individual to ignore realistic threats or risks. 
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AFPAM 91-216, USAF 
SAFETY DEPLOYMENT 
AND CONTINGENCY 
PAMPHLET, 2001 
Risk—1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. See degree of risk. See also 
hazard; risk management. (JP 1-02) 
Risk Assessment—The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk 
management process). 
Risk Management—A process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk. Also called RM. 
See also risk. (JP 1-02) 
AFI 91-217, SPACE 
SAFETY AND MISHAP 
PREVENTION 
PROGRAM, 2010 
1.2.2. Mission Assurance and Space Safety. Space safety provides for mission assurance by 
appropriately managing risks and increasing system availability. Note: Space safety is only 
one aspect of mission assurance for space systems. There are other aspects of mission assurance 
that are beyond the scope of space safety and this document. 
4.6.3. Launch Operations Risk. Independent risk budgets for a mission will be developed when 
the phases of flight meet the guidelines specified in the Range Commander’s Council (RCC) 
Standard 321. Risk management responsibility directly corresponds with mission command and 
control responsibility/authority. Launch and orbital risk management will apply quantitative 
risk analysis consistent with DoD, RCC, AF and industry standards and practices. 
Acceptable risk—A predetermined criterion or standard for a maximum risk ceiling which 
permits the evaluation of cost, national priority interests, and number of tests to be conducted. 
MISSION ASSURANCE—An integrated engineering-level assessment of analysis, production, 
verification, validation, operation, maintenance, and problem resolution processes performed 
over the life cycle of a program by which an operator/user determines that there is an acceptable 
level of risk to employment of a system or end item to deliver an intended capability in an 
intended environment. The objective of the assurance process is to identify and mitigate design, 
production, test and operational deficiencies that could impact mission success. 
MISSION FAILURE—The inability of a space or ballistic system to complete its assigned 
mission. 
MISSION RISK—The risk that the mission will fail or be significantly degraded in capability. 
Risk—See Collective risk. A measure that takes into consideration both the probability of 
occurrence and the consequence of a hazard to a population or installation. Risk is measured in 
the same units as the consequence such as number of injuries, fatalities, or dollar loss. For Range 
Safety, risk is expressed as casualty expectation or shown in a risk profile. 
AFMAN 91-223, 
AVIATION SAFETY 
INVESTIGATIONS AND 
REPORTS, 2004 
7.2.1. Evaluating MOFE Recommendations. OPRs are expected to use risk management 
principles during the evaluation. For formal report recommendations, formal risk assessments 
are required. Risk assessments must consider the identified hazard and associated risk (as 
identified by the safety investigation and corrected as necessary by the OPRs and OCRs), the 
associated costs, benefits, schedule to implement, and residual risk assuming recommendation 
implementation. These assessments are then used for decision-making and at the MAJCOM 
level for the purpose of prioritizing open recommendations. Refer to AFI 90-901, Operational 
Risk Management, and AFPAM 90-902, Operational Risk Management (ORM) Guidelines and 
Tools, for information on appropriate risk management concepts, principles, and processes. 
 
 
 
132 
 
AFI 91-301, AIR FORCE 
OCCUPATIONAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SAFETY, FIRE 
PROTECTION, AND 
HEALTH (AFOSH) 
PROGRAM, 1996 
Section C—Hazard Abatement 
16. Risk Assessment Code (RAC). Evaluate each occupational hazard or deficiency and assign 
a RAC (Table 1.). Qualified safety, fire protection, and health personnel evaluate and assign 
RACs. Determine the mishap probability and severity for occupational safety and fire hazards 
and safety deficiencies according to the procedures in paragraphs 16.1. and 16.2. Determine the 
RAC by plotting the probability (A, B, C, or D) that a mishap will occur and the potential 
mishap severity (I, II, III, or IV) if it does happen. Attachment 7 provides procedures for 
determining RACs for health hazards or deficiencies. Attachment 8 provides procedures for 
determining RACs for fire deficiencies. Implementing interim control measures to reduce the 
level of risk associated with a particular hazard or deficiency will not affect the assigned RAC 
for corrective action purposes. 
Risk Assessment—A method of evaluating the occupational mishap potential, based upon 
severity and mishap probability associated with an identified occupational hazard or deficiency. 
Risk Assessment Code (RAC)—An expression of the degree of risk associated with an 
occupational hazard or deficiency that combines hazard severity and mishap probability into a 
single numeric identifier. 
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Appendix I:  Coding Results – US Government Documents   
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Appendix J:  Coding Results – Non-US Government Documents   
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